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Common Submarine Radio Room is the latest step by the submarine force towards 
implementing a modular approach using an open systems architecture and increasing the 
automation of communications network management. Introduced on the Virginia class 
submarines as a commercially furnished design, it has since transferred to government 
management as an acquisition category two program, replicated on the other four 
submarine classes and planned for the Ohio replacement submarine. The current design 
and development approach is done in a serial fashion, with a version completed for each 
class before beginning the development of the next. The increasing pace of technology 
due to obsolescence, new capabilities, demands to support individual program 
development and fielding schedules create conflicting priorities between fielding 
capability and maintaining effective configuration management of a version. Common 
Submarine Radio Room version uses a system of systems engineering and integration 
approach to balance the demands of each stakeholder and deliver capability. This 
approach will be examined as a case study to identify the benefits and consequences of 
design, testing, production, deployment, and sustainment. 
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The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for acquiring capabilities for the 
submarine force to support a myriad of missions. Historically systems were acquired and 
deployed to support a specific capability. Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities within the submarine force have evolved 
over the last century as new technologies increase access to the RF spectrum and 
available bandwidth. As systems evolve and interoperability becomes more critical, these 
are being integrated into systems of systems (SOS) to provide capabilities that were 
previously not available. This thesis used a case study approach to examine the Common 
Submarine Radio Room (CSRR) as a SOS. The following recommendations, or learning 
principles, where identified as applicable to the development and management of a 
system of systems. These are: 
 Clearly define the requirements for the entire SOS life cycle. 
 Avoid building a SOS before defining the architecture.  
 The design of an acknowledged SOS must be shared to the maximum 
extent practicable. 
 System of systems must control interfaces. 
 Allow the SOS to go fast when possible, otherwise go slow. 
 Account for all of the “ilities” when developing the system of systems 
design. 
 Consider how the SOS will be tested. 
 Acknowledge SOSs can change unexpectedly.  
 Understand perfect is the enemy of good enough. 
 Building a SOS requires building effective relationships. 
 Regardless of what the SOS is built for it must be able to support the 
customers. Keep them in mind. 
 Effective SOSs require effective teams that are engaged, motivated, and 
productive. 
The research determined CSRR exhibited the characteristics of an acknowledged 
SOS. Common Submarine Radio Room is made up of a number of independent systems 
capable of operating independently and has their own requirements, funding, and 
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management. These systems have their own engineering and sustainment approaches. 
Each system is fully operational within its established requirements but additional 
capabilities are not fully realized until they are integrated into a SOS (Vaneman 2012). 
As a SOS, CSRR provides redundancy in several ways. If a communications path is not 
available another can be selected. If there is a network failure, alternate means to reroute 
or restore network management exist. Centralized control and management provides 
more efficient use of resources and improved situational awareness.  
System of systems design and implementation require a more holistic view. 
Developing and managing a mission or platform SOS extends beyond the activities 
involved for a single system. Managing a SOS is a complex endeavor as competing 
demands of the individual systems must be addressed and balanced against the 
requirements and objectives of whole SOS. Working with an acknowledged SOS, such as 
CSRR, means changes to the constituent systems must be evaluated and integrated to 
avoid a disruption or degradation of the whole SOS capability. New capabilities that 
result from integrating several systems into a SOS can create confusion as to who owns 
these new capabilities. Program managers have responsibility for their specific system 
whereas most SOS have no assigned manager. Most programs are acquired using clearly 
defined capability requirements. Systems of systems requirements and characteristics can 
be more complex and amorphous. A SOS program with an assigned manager must work 
continuously with all of the individual programs to minimize the impact of one program 
attempting to optimize at the expense of the others. Depending on the systems involved 
and the type of SOS, programmatic and systems engineering decisions may occur at 
lower levels that are not in the best interests of the overall SOS. Understanding the 
characteristics of a SOS and the engineering principles involved are key factors to 
successfully delivering operational capabilities from a group of individual systems. Only 
recently has DOD acknowledged acquisition of SOS capability requires a much more 
holistic approach (Director, Systems and Software Engineering 2008). 
This thesis researched the following questions to regarding CSRR. 
1. What is CSRR and what characteristics classify it is as a SOS? 
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2. What are the benefits and challenges of developing, designing, producing, 
deploying, and sustaining CSRR as a SOS? 
3. What best practices have been identified and implemented in the CSRR 
program and what benefits have been realized in terms of cost, 
performance, and schedule? 
4. What lessons learned can be applied to future versions of CSRR and 
common radio room (CRR) for surface combatants? 
The research questions were bounded to examine the history leading up to CSRR 
to understand how evolving requirements and capabilities led to its development. The 
organizational structure of the CSRR program and stakeholder relationships, management 
of an SOS architecture and the benefits and drawbacks, initiatives to improve cost, 
schedule, and performance were also examined. Last, the ability to meet future mission 
requirements was evaluated. 
The methodology used a Friedman and Sage (2003) framework for providing the 
necessary background and context to understand the activities involved in managing a 
SOS and their impacts. Capturing the lessons provide opportunities to share them with 
others. The methodology used the following steps. Other case studies were reviewed to 
determine if previous work had been accomplished and if there was merit to using this 
approach. The review confirmed similar case studies had been written by the Air Force 
and National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) (Chislaghi, Dyer and Free 
2010; Grenville, Kleiner and Newcomb 2004; Griffin 2004; Griffin and Kinnu 2007; 
Jacques and Strouble 2010; Kinzig 2010) and several addressed SOS issues (Collens and 
Krause 2005; Mattice 2003; O’Brien and Griffin 2007). The Air Force recognized the 
need to extract lessons learned from a number of their programs after acknowledging 
much of their systems engineering expertise had atrophied. Additionally, NASA faced a 
similar situation when it recognized that its workforce, which consists of highly 
specialized and experienced engineers, scientists and technicians, had a significant 
percentage approaching retirement. Capturing their knowledge and experience in order to 
share it with others resulted in a series of case studies analyzing Air Force and NASA 
programs.  
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Searches for Navy and specifically command, control, computers, 
communications, and intelligence (C4I) case studies revealed few existed for C4I 
systems. Further searches of the Program Executive Office (PEO) C4I archives had none 
for PEO C4I managed systems. Most DOD documentation regarding SOS principles, 
characteristics, requirements and acquisition has been developed only recently. The 
CSRR program documentation provided insight to the history, requirements and policies 
for managing the CSRR program. Review of various team documents and interviews 
with subject matter experts from the engineering and production teams were conducted to 
capture insight about developing and managing a SOS program and the challenges of 
coordinating with the constituent systems. The compiled information was then 
synthesized to identify lessons learned, or learning principles, develop conclusions, and 
make recommendations for further investigation.  
Developing case studies meets several objectives. Capturing the information 
about a particular event, person, or object can reveal the significant issues or lessons 
learned. These lessons learned can be used as real life examples to train engineers and 
program managers. Application of these lessons can aid in avoiding repeating mistakes, 
or identify similar opportunities to improve cost, schedule and performance. The use of 
case studies by the Navy is not clearly evident but the Air Force and NASA have 
recognized their value for identifying important lessons. Capturing the knowledge 
transfers it from a tacit form to a more easily accessible explicit format. The lack of case 
studies about C4I systems, particularly those managed by PEO C4I, identified the value 
of examining a program within their portfolio. 
CSRR revealed managing a SOS program has a number of challenges. Most DOD 
SOSs are classified as an acknowledged type of SOS since they are composed of 
individual programs with their own program and funding responsibilities. Acknowledged 
SOSs, such as CSRR, also have their own requirements and funding, but these must be 
synchronized with the other systems within the CSRR architecture. Each individual 
system can cause emergence to other systems as components are added or removed. 
Effective governance is required to balance the requirements of the constituent systems 
composing CSRR within the SOS architecture (Vaneman and Jaskot 2013). Changes to 
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any of the constituent systems are managed by their respective programs but must be 
evaluated by the overarching SOS to avoid or minimize degradation or disruption of 
capability. Attempting to optimize one system over the others can be detrimental to the 
overall system of systems. An advantage of a SOS is the redundancy not available from a 
single system (Jamshidi 2009). Disruption of a communications or network path can be 
mitigated by using an alternate means.  
Systems engineering and SOS engineering share many characteristics but differ in 
their approach (Director, Systems and Software Engineering 2008). A system engineer 
will strive to develop a single system based on clearly defined requirements. System of 
systems requirements are more generalized and the SOS engineer is responsible for 
integrating the capabilities of two or more systems. Systems have a fairly defined life 
cycle. System of systems tend to be more perpetual. The various life cycles typically are 
not aligned so a system of systems will possess an evolutionary life cycle which changes 
but does not end. A system normally has a single program manager while a system of 
systems, depending on the type, may not have one at all.  
Examination of CSRR as a program, process and product provided insight to the 
integration approach and the domains related to requirements, architecture, design, 
integration and management. As a program, understanding the SOS and balancing them 
with the constituent systems is key to delivering the right capabilities to the user. From a 
product consideration, effective management of interfaces is necessary to enabling the 
right capabilities as systems are integrated. As a process, implementing SOS engineering 
processes acknowledges emergence may occur. All of these have a bearing on 
performing successful SOS engineering.  
Common Submarine Radio Room is the culmination of these efforts while 
introducing open systems architecture designed to combine and leverage its constituent 
systems to deliver capabilities not possible in an individual manner. The approach for 
developing CSRR has evolved as well, moving from developing a specific increment 
version for each class to the point where a single version delivers a complete core 
capability capable of accounting for any unique platform characteristics. 
 xxvi 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Today’s submarine communications requirements continue to increase as 
bandwidth and network capacity expands. Interoperability challenges between the various 
communications systems throughout the U.S. military place additional burdens and 
vulnerabilities on the warfighter. While there are specific requirements which must be 
addressed, the overall capability of the communications systems must (a) rapidly adapt to 
changing demands while providing the right information to the right place at the right 
time, (b) protect it from interception and exploitation, and (c) deliver it in a format which 
can be actionable (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] 2011). Achieving these basic objectives 
enable U.S. forces to accomplish their assigned missions.  
The challenge of meeting the demands of the warfighter has forced individual 
command, control and communications systems to integrate more closely into large and 
complex system of systems. Many systems are developed without consideration of how 
they impact other systems or the operations and support infrastructure. Common 
Submarine Radio Room (CSRR) provides a programmatic path to oversee integration 
activities, an architecture supporting coordinated delivery of capabilities and physical 
products to achieve interoperability of individual systems across multiple submarine 
platforms.  
The CSRR program is the latest effort by the submarine force to implement a 
holistic approach to design, build, certify, and deploy a command, control, 
communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) architecture as a system of systems 
composed of individually managed programs of record (POR). The CSRR program was 
established within the undersea integration program management warfare office 
(PMW770) to assume the lead systems integrator role for Program Executive Office for 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (PEO C4I) programs 
planned for deployment to a submarine. Using a robust design, build, test and certify 
strategy the CSRR has successfully demonstrated it is operationally effective and 
suitable. Since the initial operating capability (IOC) in 2006, CSRR is fielded on all 
Virginia (VA), Ohio ballistic missile (SSBN), Ohio guided missile (SSGN), and Seawolf 
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(SW) platforms. The Los Angeles (LA) class began in 2012 and is planned to reach full 
operational capability (FOC) in fiscal year (FY) 2018. Common Submarine Radio Room 
as a product architecture and program strategy has demonstrated the effectiveness of 
integrating multiple products within the PEO C4I portfolio. Since the original increment 
one version zero CSRR has continued to evolve. Today increment one version three (V3) 
is being fielded to LA and VA platforms with SSBN, SSGN, and SW beginning in 2014.  
The success of the CSRR program has spurred other warfare domains to examine 
how the CSRR architecture can be expanded to influence other platform architecture and 
engineering strategies and create a product line for the other communities within the U.S. 
Navy. In order to capture the lessons learned from the CSRR program this case study will 
analyze the history, concept of operations, systems engineering, the results and 
assessment of the benefits and costs. The lessons learned from the CSRR program as a 
system of systems engineering and integration activity can be identified and passed onto 
other programs. Acknowledgment by PEO C4I the CSRR model works serves as a key 
testament to the viability of using a system of systems design approach. Today PEO C4I 
is evaluating the idea of a “Common Radio Room” for surface combatants. 
A. WHY A CASE STUDY? 
Case studies provide the opportunity to capture and distribute valuable lessons 
learned. Case study approaches can vary in their format and goals. Case studies are used 
to perform the following (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA] 
Goddard Space Flight Center [GSFC] 2011; Haskins 2012):  
 Record mission or project successes or failures 
 Lessons learned of a technical or programmatic nature 
 Design decisions of what worked or did not work and the outcomes 
 Incidents, near incidents and safety reminders 
 Personal insights 
Friedman and Sage (2003, 84–96) discuss how case studies can contribute to 
capturing the history of a program or event for systems engineering, systems 
management and acquisition. Case studies support teaching students about problems 
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experienced in the real world. Effective case studies capture lessons learned during the 
different phases of the program life cycle so they can be shared with others. Sharing in 
turn provide insight for future systems engineers and program managers tasked with 
developing and managing a system of systems program to understand the challenges and 
opportunities and how to avoid, minimize, or leverage them. The use of a case study 
framework provides an effective means to decompose the issues into a specific topic and 
responsibility.  
B. PURPOSE OF THIS CASE STUDY 
Research both online and available libraries identified there are few case studies 
concerning the application of system of systems (SOS). Many systems case studies exist 
but the concept of a SOS has only been widely acknowledged recently. This thesis will 
examine the CSRR program and attempt to provide lessons that can be applied to other 
SOS in terms of the following:  
1. The history of submarine communications leading up to the CSRR 
program. 
2. The organizational structure of the CSRR program. 
3. The relationship with other programs of record and stakeholders.  
4. SOS architecture management.  
5. The advantages and disadvantages of the CSRR SOS approach within the 
various disciplines (e.g., development, modernization, integrated logistics 
support (ILS), training, sustainment, and information assurance (IA)).  
6. Process improvement initiatives and their impact in regard to cost, 
schedule and performance. 
7. CSRR’s ability to meet future mission requirements while supporting 
current missions. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research into the development of CSRR and management of a SOS identified 
several questions. This thesis will examine the following questions to provide a clearer 
understanding of how PEO C4I develops their individual programs and integrates them 
into a larger system of systems program such as CSRR.  
1. What is CSRR and what characteristics classify it as a system of systems? 
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2. What are the benefits and challenges of developing, designing, producing, 
deploying, and sustaining CSRR as a SOS? 
3. What best practices have been identified and implemented in the CSRR 
program and what benefits have been realized in terms of cost, 
performance, and schedule? 
4. What lessons learned can be applied to future versions of CSRR and CRR 
for surface combatants? 
D. SCOPE 
This assessment will look at the CSRR program from the following perspective: 
1. The development of submarine communications from its initial beginnings 
up through the deployment of CSRR increment one version three. 
2. The organizational structure of the CSRR program to include the design 
and development group, production and installation group, ILS and 
training groups, IA groups, and sustainment group.  
3. The version development process, its strengths and weaknesses. 
4. SOS architecture management with other programs of record and portfolio 
capability management, the relationships with the other programs of 
record and the warfighter. 
5. The advantages and disadvantages of the CSRR system of systems 
approach regarding ILS, training, production, installation (synchronization 
of installations into block upgrades), IA and sustainment.  
6. Assessment of requirements in a changing environment with regard to the 
Undersea Connectivity Roadmap, Design for Undersea Warfare, PEO C4I 
Master Plan, and the way ahead for considering disruptive technologies. 
7. An evaluation of the process improvement initiatives and their influence 
and impact in regard to cost, schedule and performance. 
8. The future of CSRR in today’s environment and tomorrow up through 
2030. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this case study consisted of the following activities. 
1. Investigation into other case studies to determine if other researchers had 
performed similar work and confirm if a case study would be an 
appropriate approach. Review of other case studies did indicate similar 
work had been done but no specific case studies had been found 
specifically addressing specific programs as a SOS. 
2. Investigation into Navy and specifically PEO C4I archives to determine if 
any case studies had been written.  
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3. Review of the DOD acquisition and program documentation regarding 
SOS, defense acquisition requirements, systems and system of systems 
principles. 
4. Perform an in depth analysis of the CSRR program documentation, This 
includes the formal program documentation and minutes from the various 
integrated product teams (IPT) supporting the program. 
5. Conducted selected interviews with subject matter experts (SME) with 
regard to developing and managing a SOS program and the individual 
systems supporting the SOS. 
6. Synthesize the information to capture lessons learned (or learning 
principles), develop conclusions and make recommendations for further 
consideration. A derivative of the Friedman and Sage framework will be 
used since contractor involvement is limited.  
F. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS CASE STUDY 
Warfighter capabilities increasingly involve using complex, disparate, and 
geographically separate systems. PEO C4I manages over 100 programs and many more 
projects and investigations. The importance of programs is determined by the acquisition 
category (ACAT) assigned which is primarily related to the expected program cost and 
not its complexity (Carter 2013, Encl 3). Every program manager wants to be successful 
in managing the activities and funding aligned to their program. Management of 
individual programs versus management by capability creates unexpected issues and 
friction as systems are deployed in different environments. Many programs fail to 
develop synergy with others to improve or expand their capabilities. Systems 
requirements and system of systems requirements often conflict forcing unexpected 
changes. For example an individual system may need to meet a higher availability 
requirement in order to help the SOS meet its availability threshold requirement. 
The benefit of examining how the CSRR program is managed, the processes it 
developed, relationships with stakeholders, and its successes and failures can provide a 
guide for managing a complex SOS from development through evolution/modernization 
and sustainment. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a great deal of literature available about systems, systems engineering, 
systems of systems engineering and the development and use of case studies. Available 
case studies of other government programs identify learning principles of the positive and 
negative aspects. A majority of CSRR program information is normally limited to what is 
developed within the program office to support its acquisition responsibilities. This 
includes the requirements documentation, engineering plans, test and evaluation plans, 
acquisition strategies, concept of operations, etc. Understanding the activities and events 
which led up to the development of CSRR look at how communications evolved from 
simple single function components to complex, multi-functional voice and information 
network nodes. These documents are important as each supports the systems engineering 
activities necessary for developing and managing an acquisition program. 
This chapter will look at: 
1. The background of submarine communications leading up to CSRR 
2. Available CSRR program documentation to include acquisition, 
engineering, test and evaluation, logistics and information assurance (IA) 
3. Available systems, systems engineering and system of systems 
engineering documentation 
4. Systems engineering case studies 
A search of the Dudley Knox Library for the term “Navy system engineering case 
studies” identified 96 possible candidates. Performing a more detailed search for a 
“‘system of systems’” Navy engineering case study” identified only five hits. Using 
Google to perform a similar search generated over 25,000,000 possible results. Extending 
this further for the term “system of systems” narrowed the results to over 350,000. In 
each search, several of the example case studies were listed. The search for case studies 
identified those written by the Air Force and NASA. The Hubble space telescope 
(Mattice 2003), F-111 (Richey 2005), Global Hawk (Kinzig 2010), Theater Battle 
Management Core System (TBMCS) (Collens and Krause 2005), C-5 Galaxy (Griffin 
2004) and several others were used in support of the research. 
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A. SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS BACKGROUND 
The modern submarine force has been in existence since 1900. Since the 
beginning development of effective and reliable technology capable of supporting 
submarine command and control (C2) has always proved to be challenging. The 
invention of wireless telegraphy provided the ability to communicate between a 
submarine and another location. The U.S. Navy began experimenting with submarine 
communications in 1912 successfully testing the capability at a range of four nautical 
miles off Newport, Rhode Island (Howeth 1963, 513–546). Following World War One a 
100 watt submarine transmitter, a model TM, provided the initial capability of a spark 
gap radio. At the same time, the Navy teamed with the Edison Society, Bureau of 
Standards, Hammond Laboratory and Marconi Telegraph to determine how to 
communicate with submarines. Demonstrations of different antennas and radios resulted 
in a combination capable of receiving very low frequency (VLF) signals from distances 
up to 3,000 miles (Howeth 1963, 319–335) while submerged at periscope depth. The 
1920s saw the invention and expansion of high frequency (HF) communications with the 
Navy successfully demonstrating the technology to reliably communicate from ship to 
ship and ship to shore via voice. Navy leadership recognized their growing submarine 
force needed a reliable means to receive long range communications in all planned areas 
of operation. Another unintended aspect during the 1920s was the increase of commercial 
radio, which caused a clash between military and civil interests. The competition for 
access to the frequency spectrum drove investigation into using higher frequencies 
expanding into the very high frequency (VHF) and ultra- high frequency (UHF) spectrum 
(Howeth 1963, 397–402). 
Communications continued to play a key role during World War Two. Vice 
Admiral Thomas Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, used low frequency (LF) radio to 
initiate unrestricted submarine warfare following the attack on Pearl Harbor. At the time 
high frequency was acknowledged as the primary long haul communications path. 
Unfortunately, HF suffered from interference caused by weather, sun spots, diurnal 
effects, and could not be utilized while submerged. U.S. submarines copied the German 
model of wolf packs, where submarines coordinated their operations, which in turn 
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identified a need for short range communications. Additional threats from attacks by 
friendly aircraft emphasized the need as well. The deployment of VHF radios addressed 
this need near the end of the war and the post war period (Clay 2008). Figure 1 illustrates 
the typical radio room of a WWII fleet submarine.  
The Cold War and nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union created requirements 
for greater C2 and weapons systems capabilities, driving further advances in submarine 
communications. However, all systems up to this point were still a single function, 
stovepipe capability. The expansion of the VLF usage and establishment of transmitters 
capable of a global reach provided one reliable path for supporting communications with 
submarines. Additional communications circuits were added as the submarine missions 
expanded and additional radio frequency (RF) spectrum became available. The USS 
Nautilus radio room shown in Figure 2 is more modular but still maintains unique 
functions within a specific box.  
 




Figure 2.  Replica of USS Nautilus Radio Room (from Amateur Radio Relay 
League 2009) 
Deployment of the SSBN USS George Washington in late 1960 (Yarnell n.d.), 
shown in Figure 3 was supported with the capabilities of the Fixed Submarine Broadcast 
System (FSBS) in the VLF spectrum and establishment of transmitters capable of a 
global reach to provide reliable one way continuous communications with the National 
Command Authority (NCA). The VLF Digital Information Network (VERDIN) served as 
the shipboard system of the FSBS to receive and process messages to the message 
processor. The VERDIN systems were phased out in the late 1990s to be replaced with 
the Submarine LF/VLF Versa Modular Eurobus (VME) Receiver (SLVR).  
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Figure 3.  USS George Washington SSBN-598 (from Yarnell n.d.) 
The 1960s ushered in the era of global satellite communications as the 
commercial industry realized the potential of using satellites. NASA launched the first 
Telstar satellite in 1962 and Syncom three, shown in Figure 4, became the first 
geosynchronous satellite providing television coverage of the Olympics in Tokyo (King 
and Ricchio 2010). 
Successful launches in the 1960s and 1970s of communications satellites added 
UHF capability with the Submarine Satellite Information Exchange System (SSIXS) 
(Chief of Naval Operations [CNO] N61 and N87 1998, B-15). Unlike VLF 
communications which had a slow data rate SSIXS provided a near real time means for 
tactical and strategic communications. Additional communications circuits were 
developed by leveraging derivatives of established data management architectures, such 
as the Battle Group Information Exchange Subsystem (BGIXS) and Officer in Tactical 
Command Information Exchange System (OTCIXS) to provide direct, bi-directional 
communications between battle group units and a submarine (CNO N61 and N87 1998, 
A-34, B-15; Naval Networks Warfare Command [NETWARCOM] 2008). 
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Figure 4.  SYNCOM Satellite (from NASA 2009) 
These systems were operational well into the first decade of the twenty-first 
century before being retired. Extremely high frequency (EHF) capable radios were 
introduced in the 1970s with the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and 
expanded to include a larger segment of the RF spectrum. The Military Strategic and 
Tactical Relay System (MILSTAR) EHF system demonstrated the capability to provide 
protected communications in a contested environment (King and Ricchio 2010).  
Several classes of submarines entered service along with the SSBN. The USS 
Permit class entered service in the early 1960s followed rapidly by the USS Sturgeon 
class. The USS Los Angeles (LA) class submarines entered service in 1976 as the 
replacement for the USS Sturgeon class. Originally conceived to be a member of a carrier 
strike group or battle group there was a greater emphasis on using satellite and LOS 
communications circuits. The communications capabilities for all of these classes were 
similar in terms of systems being installed and operated in a stovepipe fashion. 
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 The USS Ohio SSBN Trident submarines were the first platforms to deliver an 
integrated communications capability. The integrated radio room (IRR) was a 
commercially provided solution based on 1970s technology delivered by the shipbuilder, 
Electric Boat. Heavily oriented toward reliable communications links the IRR was a 
contractor delivered system specifically built to support the submarine strategic mission. 
Designed with a high degree of automation, the IRR was centrally operated by several 
watch standers responsible to ensure continuous communications in order to act on orders 
from the NCA received via emergency action messages (EAM). The engineering 
approach proved the IRR design was robust but its proprietary design proved to be too 
expensive to maintain and modernize (NUWC 2008, 21). Some minor standalone 
changes were accomplished in the 1990s to meet the changing technology of Internet 
Protocol (IP). The last IRR was removed from service in 2011 with the installation of 
CSRR increment one version one (V1).  
The tactical communications system was conceived in the 1980s as an attempt to 
leverage the Trident centralized control capability to improve nuclear attack submarine 
(SSN) radio room operability. SSN communications circuits at that time required many 
steps to lineup, providing opportunities for operator error (NUWC 2008, 15). The USS 
Seawolf (SW) class, designed as follow on to the LA, was planned to use a commercially 
furnished equipment design similar to the approach of the Trident but also planned to 
introduce centralized RF and baseband switching. Designed primarily as a Cold War 
response to the Soviet Navy the significant procurement cost and the end of the Cold War 
limited the SW procurements to three platforms. Since then they have been modernized 
with CSRR. The demise of the SW program drove the development of another 
replacement for the LA class. The new SSN program began development in the early 
1990s which ultimately became known as the USS Virginia. 
 In the early 1990s the Navy acknowledged an integrated communication solution 
was needed. Mission needs statement (MNS) M063-06-95 established the need for an 
Integrated Maritime Communications System (IMCS) in support of maritime and joint 
C4I (CNO N81 1995). The MNS outlined the IMCS requirements to encourage improved 
reliability, survivability, standardization, flexibility, data formats and throughput, use of 
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commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) and non-
developmental item (NDI) components, provide multi-level security, and reduce life 
cycle costs. Table 1 lists the objectives for the IMCS and Table 2 outlines the general 
capabilities from the MNS. 
Table 1.   IMCS MNS Objectives (after CNO N81 1995) 
Integrated Maritime Communications System Objectives 
 
(1) Improved shipboard information transfer capability by: 
 (a) Providing reliable and survivable communications connectivity, increased 
variable information transfer capacity, and timely dissemination in a stressed 
environment 
 (b) Providing forces with flexibility to rapidly re-align communications service 
in response to changing operational needs 
 (c) Providing forces with the new information transfer technologies 
encompassed in personal communications services 
 
(2) Implement improved information transfer capabilities through evolutionary and 
incremental phasing by: 
 (a) Standardization of hardware, algorithms, data formats an operational 
procedures 
 (b) Use of dynamic reprogrammable architecture, 
 (c) Use of open system architecture to ensure delivery of all source SCI 
information and data 
 (d) Introducing new Non-Developmental Item (NDI) antenna system, (e.g., 
Pico-cells) to improve survivability and provide user location 
 
(3) Introduce state-of-the-art technology into the information transfer process by: 
 (a) Shared use of equipment with parallel/redundant capacity and RF links, 
 (b) Maximizing efficiency of resources access control and sub-network 
processing algorithms 
 (c) Multimedia networking 
 (d) Automation of system control, monitoring, setup, and information 
dissemination 
 (e) Full use of non-developmental items (NDI), commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS), and government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) applications 
(4) Reduce or eliminate the dependence on tethered communications devices without 
hindering the continued need to disseminate tactical data in near real time within the 
fleet and from shore to the fleet 
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Table 2.   Integrated Maritime Communications System General Capabilities 
(from CNO N81 1995) 
IMCS General Capabilities 
1 Decant and direct operational data onto information pathways where operational 
priorities can be set and managed by doctrine established to manage the system with 
minimal operator intervention 
2 Rapidly reconstitute essential capabilities during degraded modes of operation 
while maintaining continuity of information. This reconstitution may be 
accomplished by the use of redundant or reconfigurable equipment 
3 Employ data compression, object-oriented transmission packets, “delta” 
transmission (e.g., sending only the part of data files that actually change between 
transmission) 
4 Accommodate dramatic change in information format characterized generally by 
voice, video teleconferencing, imaging and digital data, not principally character-
oriented textual information 
5 Employ more efficient formats, predominantly using binary data files, displayed as 
high resolution graphics 
6 Provide full media capability 
7 Perform dynamic bandwidth management using full parallel/redundant networks 
8 Provide multi-level security 
9 Provide reduced life cycle costs 
 
The submarine communications support system (SCSS) was developed in the 
1990s in response to the IMCS MNS (CNO N81 1995) and the release of the original 
Submarine Communications Master Plan (SCMP) (CNO N87 1995). The SCSS began an 
incremental approach to modernizing the submarine radio room. The FY00 revision to 
the SCMP (CNO N61 and N87 1998, ii–iii) augmented the MNS requirements as well as 
defining the phases for the SCSS with the following:  
The SCSS must be a cost-effective system architecture, with emphasis on 
maximizing commonality between the SCSS suites on all classes of 
submarines. This comprehensive development and installation plan 
integrates all current communications improvement programs in a time 
phased implementation, taking into account the rapid development of 
communications technology. The defined phases (Automated Message 
Handling phase (FY94–96), Automated Signal Routing phase (FY97–98), 
Automated Radio Room phase (FY99–05)) will transition the current 
radio rooms to a hybrid SCSS, based largely on modern, open systems 
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architecture (OSA) radios and switching equipment, with some legacy 
equipment retained. 
The SCSS used the submarine message buffer to provide the automated message 
handling while the submarine baseband circuit switch (SBCS or BBS) and miniature 
demand assigned multiple access (MINI-DAMA), shown in the land based submarine 
radio room (LBSRR) in Figure 5, provided the automated baseband, RF switching and 
improved UHF signal routing using COTS and NDI solutions. Each of these components 
was still an individual system within the block upgrade approach which packaged 
capabilities and implemented them within the wideband modernization plan. Packaging 
these systems enabled them to be integrated, tested and installed as a complete set of 
capabilities (NUWC 2008).  
 
Figure 5.  Submarine Communications Support System Pre-baseband Switch in 




The SCSS was not a formal program, but a concept proving individual component 
programs could be integrated in order to deliver greater C4I capability. Thus SCSS 
became the first generation to demonstrate the integration of communications, 
networking, and automation could meet the MNS objective and capabilities but was 
limited to the LA class submarines. An online article written by the engineers working 
for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Newport and posted by the submarine 
warfare directorate described SCSS in the following quote  
A key element in this new architecture is the Submarine Communications 
Support System (SCSS), which adapts Navy-wide communications 
components and capabilities, while minimizing dependence on submarine-
unique equipment. The SCSS will use industry-standard protocols and 
commercial technology in hardware ruggedized for the rigors of the 
shipboard environment. Its architecture will phase out today’s “stovepipe” 
systems to implement a client-server environment for exchanging 
information by means of seamless and comprehensive connectivity on 
shared, common-user communication links. (Longacre, Exley and 
Macmillan 1998) 
These early radio suites provided a broad spectrum of communications capability 
and some automation but their stove piped programmatic and technical approaches 
limited the potential of a more effective and robust C4I system. SCSS and IRR consisted 
mostly of components unique to the submarine but there was little commonality between 
their architectures. Sailors transferring from a SSN to a SSBN required extensive 
retraining prior to reporting. Even within the classes platform configurations would vary 
greatly. Lack of configuration management and control led to sailors developing their 
own operating and technical documentation to operate and maintain their radio rooms. 
IRR maintained tight configuration control but at the expense of not maintaining pace 
with technology changes in the overall military communications architectures.  
The Submarine Exterior Communications System (SUBECS) Capstone 
Requirements Document (CRD) 01-87-98 (CNO N8 1998) provided the specific 
requirements for the SUBECS. The CRD serves as the operational requirements 
document (ORD) since the joint capabilities integration development system (JCIDS) 
process was not yet in existence. The CRD also highlighted the limitations of the current 
submarine C4I systems. Stovepipe systems, limited throughput, manual operations, and 
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limited data storage were several of the significant areas of interest. The CRD described 
the operational capability of the SUBECS to provide attack and fleet ballistic missile 
submarines with secure, reliable, covert communications, and effectively manage, 
control, process, and disseminate Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 
Intelligence (C4I) information (CNO N8 1998).  
The SUBECS also had to be interoperable with the global command and control 
system maritime/ defense information infrastructure-common operating environment 
(GCCS-M/DII-COE), joint maritime command information system (JMCIS), and joint 
maritime communications system (JMCOMS). Furthermore, the CRD stipulated the new 
system must use an open systems architecture approach while still meeting the 
interoperability requirements. The systems supporting the SUBECS (e.g., SLVR, MINI-
DAMA, and BBS) have their own requirements documentation defining key performance 
parameters for frequency coverage, information routing efficiency, aggregate system 
throughput, and operational availability (Ao).  
Revision one to the CRD (CNO N8 2003) mandated the SUBECS will not 
develop unique C4I solutions while adding requirements for interoperability with the 
joint technical architecture standards, joint tactical radio system (JTRS), Navy Marine 
Corps Intranet and naval integrated information network. SUBECS planned to use a 
spiral development approach as technology evolved and became available. As a system 
of systems, the SUBECS leverages other capstone requirements documents to achieve 
compliance. 
The CRD provided the requirements for the Virginia (VA) SUBECS. The 
FY2000 Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) report described the 
SUBECS as “an umbrella program, which integrates fifteen smaller acquisition programs 
and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components into a system that supports network 
centric warfare” (DOT&E 2000, section IV-167). PMS450, the VA program office, 
originally envisioned implementing an unmanned radio suite capable of automatically 
managing communications. The manned capability was reinstated at the request of 
Commander Submarine Forces (COMSUBFOR) due to the observed technology 
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limitations. The modified version of the SCSS design for the LA class served as the 
initial plan for the VA.  
In the late 1990s, asymmetric communications using submarine Internet Protocol 
(IP) began fielding as a replacement to the legacy circuits such as SSIXS and OTICXS. 
The deployment of submarine IP proved to be a complex and lengthy endeavor since 
engineers had to devise solutions to integrate contemporary and legacy systems. Initially 
planned as a two year effort in 1998 the full deployment of IP capability to all platforms 
did not reach FOC until 2007. Even then there were unique solutions for each submarine 
class. However, the solutions did reflect the initial development of a larger overall open 
systems architecture. 
Commanding officers guidance in revision one of the Design for Undersea 
Warfare (DUSW) (Richardson, Caldwell and Breckenridge 2012) emphasizes the 
capability to rapidly shift postures from complete communications silence to being fully 
engaged with other Navy, DOD, or other government agencies to provide support as 
needed. The DUSW emphasizes a high level, broad requirement for providing systems 
capable of operating with unmanned aerial or undersea vehicles in a myriad of 
environments. The commander’s guidance lists communications as a key area of 
proficiency. The DUSW provides additional support to the currently defined 
requirements for developing an effective SOS capable of meeting the requirements for 
the submarine warfighter.  
The advances of network technology and increasing use of COTS greatly 
increased the complexity of delivering submarine C4I capabilities. These complexities 
have proven to be a challenge for acquisition, engineering, and logistics. In many cases 
the legacy systems had reached their maximum capabilities and were approaching end of 
life. The next step to address these challenges required considering a new approach. 
Common Submarine Radio Room was the outcome.  
B. COMMON SUBMARINE RADIO ROOM DOCUMENTATION 
PMW770 maintains the documentation to support the CSRR program. Using the 
DOD 5000 series acquisition instructions and memorandums, the required documentation 
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is created and updated as necessary. Some documents such requirements documents, 
acquisition plans and strategies remain fairly static once signed. Others such as the test 
and evaluation master plan and system engineering plan are updated as necessary to 
support key program events. The SCMP to support the FY2000 program objective 
memorandum (CNO N61 and N87 1998) is an update to the original SCMP drafted in 
1995. It provides a complement to the SUBECS CRD rev one (CNO N8 2003) as well as 
serving as a compendium of related acquisition requirements. Process documents have 
been developed to aid in capturing the processes for design, development and testing, and 
acquisition planning. Information assurance (IA), or Cybersecurity, drives a whole series 
of documents which captures the relationship of the components of the CSRR. 
1. What is Common Submarine Radio Room 
CSRR is a network-centric communications system designed to support 
submarine force C4I requirements. CSRR was designed to provide seamless, transparent, 
secure connectivity for information exchange between submarines and other joint, naval, 
DOD, federal, allied and coalition force (PMW770 2008, 9). Figure 6 is the operational 
view (OV) one (OV-1) from the CSRR capability production document (CPD) (PMW770 
2006).  
Originally an ACAT III program in 2001 (PMW 173 2002, 5), CSRR became the 
next step towards a common, modular open systems architecture while expanding 
automating communications network management. The initial CSRR was based on a VA 
class submarine contractor furnished design. CSRR was reclassified as an ACAT II 
program in 2005 (ASN (RDA) 2005) based on the revision to the DOD acquisition 
guidance which updated the funding levels for development and procurement.  
After seeing significant cost increases in the delivery of the first VA CSRR, 
Program Executive Officer Submarines (PEO SUB) directed an analysis of alternatives 
(AOA) be performed to determine the optimal acquisition strategy to use. The AOA 
resulted in the program responsibilities for the lead systems integrator being managed by 
the government while the original software vendor provided the control and management 
(C&M) software (PMW173 2002, 18-19).  
 21 
 
Figure 6.  CSRR Operational View (OV-1) (from PMW770 2006, A.1.1) 
PMW173 was assigned the responsibilities as the lead systems integrator for the CSRR 
program. Following the initial delivery for the VA, the approach has been replicated on 
the SSGN, SSBN and SW classes. Currently, CSRR is deployed in several versions 
across all classes (e.g., SSBNs have increment one version one (V1), SSGN and SW 
classes have increment one version two (V2), and VA has increment one versions one, 
two and three (V3). In 2012 the LA class installed the first CSRR on the USS Hampton. 
The approach has been extended to the Ohio SSBN replacement program (ORP).  
CSRR leveraged the benefits of bundling the capabilities of other established 
acquisition programs of record (POR) and integrating them using an open systems 
architecture system of systems core design approach. Section 1.3.3 of the CPD (PMW770 
2006, 3) provides a general description of the functional end-to-end communications 
integration. CSRR integrates the program of record component systems, makes any 
necessary modifications to accommodate any related support equipment and perform 
coordinated development, testing, and installation of the new capabilities. The design and 
development is accomplished in a serial fashion, with a version completed for each class 
before beginning development of the next. The installation of CSRR on the LA platforms 
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identified the need to evolve this approach in order to preserve operational availability 
and add flexibility with other PORs. 
The baseline system met the submarine exterior communications requirements 
defined in the CSRR CPD and SUBECS CRD. The CSRR Systems Engineering Plan 
(PMW770 2007) points out CSRR program key performance parameters are dependent 
on the capabilities of the system that actually makeup a version. Capability upgrades 
were planned to occur as changes occurred in other programs of record (POR) including 
automated digital networking system increment three (ADNS Inc3), Navy multi-band 
terminal (NMT), joint tactical radio system (JTRS), and mobile user objective system 
(MUOS). Each program maintains its own acquisition responsibilities. CSRR integrates 
these systems into the overarching architecture, provide updated C&M software, and 
creates system level documentation and training. These capabilities would fit within the 
CSRR open system architecture. A sample of the CSRR architecture is shown in Figure 
7.  
2. CSRR Program Description 
The CSRR program is managed by the Undersea Integration Program Office 
(PMW770) within PEO C4I. PMW770 is the designated lead integrator for systems 
destined to be installed onboard a submarine or submarine broadcast control authority 
(BCA). Since a submarine C4I SOS initial capabilities document does not exist for 
submarine communications the CSRR program must work closely with the other 
programs in order to achieve the operational requirements identified in the CPD 
(PMW770 2006, 6).  
As an ACAT II program CSRR has the responsibilities as the lead systems 
integrator. In order to perform this responsibility CSRR is closely engaged with several 
ACAT I major defense acquisition programs such as the NMT, GBS, MUOS, VA and the 
Ohio replacement program. The challenge is working with the large and small programs 




Figure 7.  Common Submarine Radio Room (from Anderson 2014) 
In this role, CSRR not only integrates systems but coordinates the activities of 
other organizations and teams. Figure 8 is the organization structure of the Undersea 
Integration Program Office. The highlighted area is the personnel assigned specifically to 
the CSRR program. Personnel assigned to the other divisions work closely with the 
CSRR program and other programs of record (POR) to manage requirements, integration, 
testing, fielding, and sustainment responsibilities. 
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Figure 8.  PMW770 Program Office Structure (after Anderson 2014) 
The CSRR program team includes a number of external stakeholders responsible 
for the various functional areas shown in Table 3. These include the OPNAV resource 
sponsors within the CNO’s office, the ships’ program managers within Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NAVSEA), the user community represented by COMSUBFOR, 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), SPAWAR Fleet Readiness 
Directorate (FRD), Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantic (SSC LANT), 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific (SSC PAC), Naval Undersea Warfare 
Center (NUWC) Newport, and Submarine Learning Center. The specific relationships are 
shown in Table 3. Figure 9 shows the relationships between the internal and external 
stakeholders supporting the CSRR program. The organizations inside the circle are 
closely teamed with the CSRR program. This relationship extends into the design and 
production groups as well the sustainment and training activities in order to develop 
synergy. Installations are accomplished in a coordinated approach managed by the FRD 
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through their installation management offices located within SSC LANT and SSC PAC. 
The SPAWAR/PEO modernization CONOPS (PEO C4I 2005) details how the individual 
programs and the platform program offices will coordinate their efforts to accomplish 
design, development and modernization.  
Table 3.   CSRR Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Relationship 
CNO OPNAV N2/N6 Resource sponsor—Provides funding and 
requirements 
NAVSEASYSCOM Ships Acquisition Platform Manager 
COMSPAWARSYSCOM Functional and matrix support for logistics, 
systems engineering, and acquisition 
SPAWAR Fleet Readiness Directorate Installation management and sustainment of 
systems past full rate production 
SPAWAR Systems Center Atlantic Production management; sustainment of      
in-service systems; training development 
SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific Control and management software  
development and management 
Naval Undersea Warfare Center 
Division Newport 
Design and testing; documentation 
development 
Submarine Learning Center Training delivery, formal classroom and 
modernization training 




Figure 9.  CSRR Program Model (from Anderson 2014) 
Revision one of the Acquisition Plan / Acquisition Strategy (AP/AS) (PMW770 
2008, 13) describes CSRR as a system of systems which integrates Navy PORs. CSRR 
integrates the systems from other programs of record such as EHF, GBS, ADNS, 
submarine masts and antennas outboard electronics (OE) OE-538/OE-592, OE-562, 
periscopes, floating wire antennas, towed buoy antennas, submarine single messaging 
system (SUBSMS), digital modular radio (DMR) and others. Each system provides an 
aggregate component, which when integrated creates a system of systems. Each 
individual system has its own program schedules and required capabilities but when 
integrated together achieve capabilities not possible as an individual component.  
The CSRR test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) (PMW770 2012) discusses all 
of the testing accomplished previous to V3 and identifies the overarching plan for testing 
of capabilities delivered with V3. Section 1.3.3 related to key capabilities and interfaces, 
discusses the necessity of CSRR as a system of systems requirement to interface the 
component systems, host platform systems, other DOD components, and allied and 
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coalition partners. The specific performance requirements and characteristics of each 
component system are defined within their respective program documents.  
The CSRR program requirements are defined in the CSRR Capabilities 
Production Document (CPD) (PMW770 2006) and SUBECS CRD (CNO N8 2003). The 
CPD was developed in support of the production decision for increment one Version zero 
(V0). The CPD in concert with the CRD, AP/AS, system engineering plan and TEMP 
outline the main requirements for developing and deploying each successive version of 
CSRR. 
Changing technology presents challenges to system of systems programs since 
most acquisition documentation is created at the beginning of the program and placed on 
the shelf after achieving the production and deployment phase. The CSRR circuit matrix 
(PMW770 2014) is an agreement maintained between PMW770 and the submarine force 
to capture changes delivered by new programs of record and changes to operational 
doctrine. The circuit matrix is a living document that is periodically reviewed and 
updated to reflect the evolving communications capabilities for each CSRR version. 
CSRR also identified the need to maintain a common “core capability” (PMW770 
2006, 34), which acknowledges there are differences in the submarine platforms but the 
overall mission requirements remain the same. Maintaining the architecture, workstation 
and interfaces common across all classes provide the basis for the core capabilities. This 
same core capability is used in support of the incremental development approach. Once 
the core capabilities have been identified they form the baseline. This baseline allows for 
scalability and modularity. This core capability approach was briefed to the milestone 
decision authority during a gate six review which resulted in maintaining CSRR at 
increment one with each version providing new capabilities from other programs.  
The CSRR Requirements Design Integration Test Process (Ross 2013) provides 
an introduction for new personnel to get acquainted with the CSRR program and for 
experienced personnel to have a ready reference. The document was generated as a 
Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) initiative to capture the processes used 
within the CSRR program management, engineering and test teams. 
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C. CSRR CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A concept of operations (CONOPS) is a vision, verbally or using graphics, of how 
a system is expected to be employed by the warfighter. The JCIDS (JCS 2012) and Joint 
Pub (JP) 5-0 (JCS 2011) outlined the purpose of a CONOPS is to illustrate how a joint 
force commander will organize his forces and deploy them for a particular scenario or in 
support of the introduction of new capabilities. From the CONOPS the acquisition 
community can decompose a mission concept into its constituent components and begin 
defining how to test and deploy once it is ready. The CSRR CONOPS describes the 
different systems and capabilities available for each version. These capabilities are shown 
in the various scenarios the submarine would be reasonably expected to execute. There 
are eight scenarios developed for the CONOPS. Each of these scenarios describes how 
CSRR will be employed from initial deployment through the post event reporting 
activities. Figure 10 is a simplified graphic of the systems composing CSRR and its 
relationship to the external systems.  
 
Figure 10.  CSRR High Level Concept Graphic (from PMW770 2011b, 2) 
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Since CSRR is an SOS the CONOPs show the aggregate C4I capabilities needed 
to support the following mission scenarios:  
1. Land attack/strike mission (STK) 
2. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance mission (ISR) 
3. Carrier strike group/expeditionary strike group operations mission 
(CSG/ESG) 
4. Special operations forces mission (SOF) 
5. Mine warfare operations mission (MIW) 
6. Undersea warfare mission (USW) 
7. Surface warfare mission (SUW) 
8. Strategic deterrence mission (SD) 
Each mission scenario proceeds through the pre-deployment to post mission 
reporting. Most scenarios share common pre and post mission activity characteristics but 
interfaces with different activities and may use different primary and secondary 
communications paths.  
1. Land Attack/Strike Mission  
The STK scenario describes the activities that occur in support of launching 
Tomahawk missiles. The STK CONOPS shown in Figure 11 describes the CSRR 
activities that occur during each phase by providing the voice, video and data pathways 
necessary for coordinated land attack/strike operations. Each line identifies the type of 
communications available in each phase. Data flows are a key element for STK reflected 
in a majority of the phases. 
2. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Mission  
Submarines’ stealth makes them ideally suited for ISR missions. CSRR enables 
communications with in-theater, national command, or intelligence community activities 
to coordinate the entire spectrum of ISR operations during peacetime or hostilities 
including coordination of STK or SOF missions in hostile areas. More emphasis is on 
covertness and exchange of intelligence information, including imagery.  
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Figure 11.  Land Attack/Strike Mission Scenario (from PMW770 2011b, 52) 
3. Carrier Strike Group/Expeditionary Strike Group Operations 
Mission 
Attack submarines support CSG/ESG operations. CSRR provides voice, video 
and data paths for coordinated operations with joint task forces, group and other 
combatant commanders. This requires the submarine to communicate in a stealthy mode 
to maximize its search capabilities. More voice circuits are needed in concert with the 
data flow. Figure 12 shows how a submarine coordinates with the CSG/ESG to provide 
support adversaries.  
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Figure 12.  CSG/ESG Mission Scenario (from PMW770 2011b, 67) 
4. Special Operations Forces Mission  
Submarines are effective platforms for supporting SOF operations for mission 
planning, insertion, coordination and extraction. Communications emphasizes tactical 
data and voice circuits required to coordinate with embarked SOF commanders, naval 
computer and telecommunications area master station, submarine BCA and joint special 
operations task force. 
5. Mine Warfare Operations Mission  
Submarines are capable of deploying mines to deny sea areas as well as mapping 
detected minefields and communicate the information to other units. CSRR supports 
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execution of this capability through reporting detected minefields. The MIW mission is 
similar to the CSG/ESG operations mission. The operational nodes and communications 
paths are the same but data versus voice is sent over the communication lines. 
6. Undersea Warfare Mission 
USW against hostile submarines is the traditional submarine mission. Typically 
operating independently, coordination with surface and air units creates a need for 
common communications during the detection and tracking of enemy submarines. CSRR 
provides the capability to receive intelligence of detected submarines when in a covert 
mode or pass intelligence to units assuming the track or prosecution of hostile units. 
CSRR also provides communications links to support pre-mission operational 
preparation, common operational picture (COP) updates, situation reports to the USW 
commander and tasking by the USW Commander. The operational nodes used for the 
USW mission are the same as the CSG/ESG and MIW missions. The USW mission 
emphasis is on data paths that support the submarine being deep for extended periods of 
time, maximizing search effectiveness. USW aircraft also play a significant role in this 
mission, and therefore they were included as part of the CSG/ESG commander node. 
7. Surface Warfare Mission  
SUW is a collateral independent mission to track and destroy lone surface units 
without assistance. However, this opportunity is not available when groups of surface 
combatants are in the same area. The danger of counter-detection with limited evasion 
possibilities makes this scenario a cautious one for submarines. If it is not possible for the 
submarine to conduct a direct attack, then it can assist or coordinate attacks on surface 
units. CSRR provides communications links to support pre-mission operational 
preparation, COP updates, situation reports to and tasking from the SUW commander. 
The operational nodes and data flows are the same as the USW mission. The SUW 
mission requires greater coordination with other units to prevent engaging friendly 
contacts and to feed information into the COP. 
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8. Strategic Deterrence Mission 
SSBNs makeup one leg of the nuclear triad remaining submerged to avoid 
detection while on alert. Reliable communications is a key requirement. Should a missile 
launch be ordered the SSBN will receive their orders via an emergency action message 
(EAM). Common Submarine Radio Room receives intelligence, situation reports, and 
EAMs while operating in a covert manner. Additionally, CSRR supports communications 
links for pre-mission operational preparation, COP updates, targeting change messages 
(TCM), situation reports and tasking. Figure 13 depicts the nuclear command, control and 
communications (NC3) infrastructure needed for mission communications while 
performing a strategic deterrent patrol. The BCA provides the interface to the NC3 
system for delivery of EAMs. Take charge and move out (TACAMO) aircraft and surface 
ships relay EAMs if there is a failure of the primary reception paths. The simultaneity 
point indicates when multiple communications paths will be available for use. 
 
Figure 13.   Strategic Deterrence Mission Scenario (from PMW770 2011b, 106) 
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D. SYSTEMS COMPRISING CSRR 
Section 2.4 of the revised CSRR Acquisition Strategy / Acquisition Plan (AS/AP) 
(PMW770 2008) defines CSRR as a network-centric communications system of systems, 
integrating several program of record systems within a common architecture to provide 
secure, reliable, and covert communications and effectively manage, control, process and 
disseminate command, control, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) information. Systems engineering activities during the development phase 
address issues to align the individual system requirements with the CSRR SOS 
requirements. The program office continually engages with the PORs to integrate and 
deploy new and updated capabilities in an evolutionary manner. CSRR is composed of 
systems from the following program offices as shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  CSRR Program Relationships to Other Programs of Record 
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The CSRR program shares product development and integration responsibilities. 
Within this scope CSRR integrates the individual component systems procured via their 
parent program offices, shown in Figure 15, and procures or modifies subsystem 
components and ancillary equipment (e.g., racks, rack cabling, and routers) into a 
common, open architecture baseline, with control and management of the physical 
components provided by the CSRR C&M software. The AS/AP directs how CSRR 
program must approach the modernization of each version for considering technology 
insertion activities to integrate new products and capabilities. 
The open system architecture maximizes the use of COTS, allows for the 
rapid insertion of technology, and addresses emerging requirements and/or 
obsolescence issues. This design flexibility is particularly important in this 
submarine communication program due to changing requirements and 
emerging technical advances. 
Use of non-proprietary standards and protocols enhance the program's 
ability to efficiently and effectively respond to requirements changes, 
incorporate commercial system improvements, and improve 
interoperability within the GIG. 
The CSRR modernization plan will continue to apply open system 
architecture concepts and plans for platforms with technology refresh back 
fits concurrent with modernization increments. (PMW770 2008, 26)  
Baseline updates are closely managed and accomplished as minor upgrades or in 
concert with a larger version modernization effort. Updates include C&M software 
changes incorporating new functionality or capability. The Gate Six review (PMW770 
2008, 1-2) authorized a change to the AS/AP defining version vice increment upgrades. 
The significance of this decision eliminated the requirements to create new acquisition 
documentation but did direct each version to accomplish operational testing (OT). The 
extent of testing is negotiated with Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), 
and Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force. 
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Figure 15.  Programs of Record Systems Composing CSRR 
Testing accomplished by individual programs of record will be leveraged where possible, 
however the main intent is determine if CSRR as a system of systems still meets 
requirements and is deemed operationally effective and suitable. The following program 
offices provide their products for integration and testing into a CSRR version. 
1. PMW 130 Information Assurance and Cybersecurity Program Office  
PMW 130 provides cyber security products and services and cryptographic 
products to protect Navy and Marine Corps C4I systems (PEO C4I 2012). PMW 130 
provides the following systems. 
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a. Crypto Universal Enclosure 
The crypto universal enclosure (CUE) provides a common host for the various 
modern crypto devices. 
b. Electronic Key Management System 
The electronic key management system (EKMS) handles the administrative and 
key generation capabilities onboard the platform. 
c. Cryptographic Devices 
There are a number of cryptographic devices required to support secure 
communications across the various communications and IP networks. Most of these 
devices are hosted in the CUE. 
2. PMW 160 Tactical Networks Program Office 
PMW 160 manages the network programs for afloat, airborne, and ashore nodes 
(PEO C4I 2012). These include the Automated Digital Networking System (ADNS), 
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and Special Intelligence (SI) Network 
System, and Submarine Local Area Network (SUBLAN).  
a. Automated Digital Network System  
The Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) is an ACAT III program 
managed within the Tactical Networks Program Office and provides the main access 
point to the Navy tactical / strategic and global information grid resources and services. 
ADNS provides wide area network (WAN) connectivity and is the Navy’s bandwidth 
optimization program of record to provide quality of service routing for voice, video and 
data using the available communications links within the ship / shore WAN. ADNS 
interfaces to the various Navy networks to enable interfaces to U.S. classified and 
unclassified networks, and Allied and Coalition networks (General Dynamics 2008).  
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b. Sensitive Compartmented Information Networks  
The primary mission of sensitive compartmented information (SCI) networks 
provides connectivity to the intelligence community to provide shipboard analysts with 
access to national and service strategic and tactical databases. SCI networks is the 
transport medium providing special intelligence data and secure WAN IP access to ship 
and shore national Web sites, signals intelligence and intelligence databases for seamless 
interaction between shore, surface, submarine and airborne special intelligence LANs 
(PEO C4I 2012).  
c. Submarine Local Area Network  
Submarine Local Area Network (SUBLAN) is a reliable high-speed secret, 
sensitive but unclassified and top secret local area network (PEO C4I 2012). When the 
SUBLAN network is combined with other subsystems, it provides the shipboard network 
services and uses CSRR as the gateway for off hull services to deliver an end-to-end net 
centric warfare capability. The Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise System 
(CANES) is the next generation network planned for afloat units to consolidate many of 
the individual networks into a larger system of systems network (PEO C4I 2014). 
3. PMW/A 170 Communications and Navigation Program Office  
PMW/A 170 provides satellite, line-of-sight, and extended-line-of-site 
communication systems for voice and data communications and Global Positioning 
System (GPS) capabilities for ship navigation, command and control systems and 
weapons systems (PEO C4I 2012). PMW 170 oversees the Navy EHF satellite program, 
DMR, Global Broadcast Service (GBS), Time Division Multiple Access Interface 
Processor (TIP), and Portable Radio Program. 
a. Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System / Navy Extremely 
High Frequency Program / Navy Multiband Terminal 
The military strategic and tactical relay system (MILSTAR) EHF system was 
introduced in the 1980s as an answer to the challenges facing users of the UHF band to 
provide tactical and strategic communications in all environments. Bandwidth capability 
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has grown since its introduction from 2400 bps to over 24 Mbps. The Navy Multiband 
Terminal (NMT) is the latest maritime military satellite communications terminal 
supporting the Military Satellite Communication (MILSATCOM) architecture to provide 
connectivity in all domains. NMT supports the advanced extremely high frequency 
program for protected satellite communications. The NMT communicates via the 
Wideband Global Satellites and Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) for 
super high frequency (SHF). NMT operates over EHF low data rate, medium data rate, 
and extended data rate communication modes (PEO C4I 2012). 
b. Global Broadcast Service  
Global Broadcast Service is a joint program led by the Air Force to provide high 
bandwidth capability to deliver classified and unclassified products. Classified as an 
ACAT 1 program, GBS leverages the EHF system as a transport for a “smart push” and 
“user pull” approach for delivering products. Data can include full motion video, 
imagery, maps, orders, and weather information. Unified commanders manage the flow 
of these products over the portions of the system supporting their area of responsibility. 
GBS uses CSRR and ADNS to route information to the classified and unclassified 
computers. Live video feeds are sent to the submarines training and entertainment system 
for viewing by the crew (CNO N61 and N87 1998, 3-13). 
c. Digital Modular Radio 
Digital Modular Radio is a multi-channel software programmable radio capable of 
operating across the HF-UHF frequency spectrum and is interoperable and compatible 
with legacy systems (PEO C4I 2012; General Dynamics 2014). The DMR is the COTS 
replacement for the MINI-DAMA. 
d. Miniature Demand Assign Multiple Access  
The MINI-DAMA is a legacy two-channel VHF/UHF radio retained in the LA 
class CSRR Increment 1 V3. Built in the 1990s, the MINI-DAMA provides UHF 
SATCOM and LOS capability and incorporates the Advanced Digital Waveform (ADW) 
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to support the Medium Data Rate Channel Access Protocol (MCAP) circuit (Federation 
of American Scientists [FAS] 1999). 
e. MD-1324 Advanced Digital Waveform Modem  
Early versions of DMR do not have the ADW waveform integrated as an organic 
capability. In order to support improved throughout the MIL standard for UHF 
waveforms was updated to include ADW. The MD-1324 has the ADW waveform to 
support MCAP by interfacing the modem with the DMR power amplifiers. 
f. PSC-5D Integrated Waveform Radio 
The integrated waveform (IW) was developed by the Defense Information 
Systems Agency as a solution to diminishing UHF resources. The PSC-5D is a 
commercial radio installed on LA platforms to provide IW capability. 
4. PMW770 Undersea Integration Program Office  
PMW770 is responsible for the development, acquisition, and integration and 
fielding of systems planned for the undersea domain (PEO C4I 2012). They manage 
product and integration responsibilities for the following programs: Radio Frequency 
Distribution and Control System (RFDACS), Q-70 and Novo workstations, control and 
management (C&M) software, SLVR, OE-538 Multifunction Mast, OE-562 Submarine 
High Data Rate (SUBHDR), BRR-6 towed buoy antenna and OE-315 floating wire 
antenna. 
a. Radio Frequency Distribution and Control System 
The RFDACS provides an automated interface between the radios and submarine 
antenna systems, amplifying and distributing RF frequencies to various systems such as 
GPS.  
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b. Q-70 and Novo CSRR Workstations 
The workstations provide the human-machine interface between the operator and 
CSRR. The C&M software provides the graphical user interface to align and operate the 
various communications circuits available to the operator.  
c. RT-9000 HF Transceiver 
The RT-9000 is a COTS radio installed on LA class submarines. The radio 
provides HF voice and data capability. 
d. CSRR Ancillary Equipment 
Ancillary equipment consists of HF modems, secure voice switch, black audio 
switch,  
e. Submarine LF/VLF Versa Module Eurobus Receiver  
SLVR is the VLF/LF receiver capable of receiving and processing all Navy, 
special, and NATO modes. SLVR receives message traffic from the FSBS via one of 
several VLF antennas while submerged. The SLVR is installed on all submarines and is 
operated from the CSRR operator work station. SSBNs have additional capability to 
directly control the SLVR via a local processor and can send messages directly to a 
printer for handling (CNO N61 and N87 1998). 
f. Time and Frequency Distribution System 
The TFDS provides precision time and frequency information to communications, 
electronic warfare, periscope, navigation, combat, and ship control systems aboard attack 
and Trident class submarines. The TFDS is a NDI system using two rubidium standards 
which eliminate single points of failure. The TFDS can select inputs from the internal 
standards or an external device such as GPS. The TFDS provides a variety of outputs for 
frequency and timing and time code. The TFDS originated as a Submarine Integration 
Program Office as an ACAT IVT program. In 2011 the FRD assumed sustainment 
responsibilities. 
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g. OE-538 Multi-Function Mast Antenna Group 
The OE-538 antenna group is an improved, multifunctional, combined 
communications, navigation and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) mast-mounted 
antenna system for all submarine classes. The OE-538 covers the RF spectrum for all 
VLF to UHF requirements including IFF and GPS and provides significant reliability 
improvements (CNO N61 and N87 1998). Increment 2 expands the capability to include 
support for the Mobile Users Objective System (MUOS), iridium, and Tactical Data Link 
via Link 16.  
h. Submarine High Data Rate Antenna System 
The SUBHDR antenna provides connectivity for the EHF, SHF and GBS 
communications for submarines capable of supporting data rates up to eight megabits per 
second. The SUBHDR antenna uses a 16-inch dish antenna which is controlled by the 
EHF terminal to point the satellite. 
5. PMW 790 Shore and Expeditionary Systems Program Office 
PMW 790 manages the Navy’s messaging systems to provide the message 
handling and distribution responsibilities for afloat and shore activities (PEO C4I 2012). 
Within PMW 790 is the submarine single messaging system (SUBSMS) which is 
composed of the following:  
a. Navy Modular Automated Communications System II 
The Navy modular automated communications system model (NAVMACS) II is 
a ship to ship, ship to shore messaging system which handles organizational message 
traffic and routes it to the ships LAN for distribution to the appropriate mailbox. In event 
a high priority message is received it can be configured to print out a copy for immediate 
action. NAVMACS is set up primarily to handle incoming serial traffic transmitted by the 
FSBS or MILSTAR (NUWC 2012, 194-196). 
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b. Submarine Single Messaging System Support Server 
The SUBSMS support server (SSS) is the main system to send and receive 
organizational message traffic received over an IP broadcast. The SUBSMS interfaces 
with the NAVMACS II to manage message reception, processing, storage and 
transmission (NUWC 2012, 194–196). Additionally, SUBSMS hosts the Information 
Screening and Delivery System which handles messages received via IP paths and routes 
them to the various users on the SUBLAN.  
6. Activities External to PEO C4I 
CSRR interfaces with multiple systems managed by other program offices within 
PEO SUB and Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) under 
NAVSEA, Nuclear Command and Control under Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), 
strike and airborne relay via Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and submarine 
force sponsored installations and alterations. 
a. Program Executive Office Submarines  
PEO SUB manages the submarine warfare federated tactical system (SWFTS). 
SWFTS, shown in Figure 16, is an SOS model composed of the combat control, sensors, 
SUBLAN, shown in yellow, and CSRR managed under a mutual agreement between the 
systems commands. CSRR, shown in pink, is considered a system within this larger SOS. 
These systems are managed within NAVSEA under PEO SUB and PEO IWS and 
program management air (PMA) 271 under NAVAIR. NAVSEA has responsibility as the 
ship acquisition program manager for oversight of all submarines acquired and currently 
in service. 
b. Strategic Systems Programs 
Strategic Systems Programs has oversight of all NC3 systems. CSRR interfaces 
with the NC3 community through SSP and their agent Naval Surface Warfare Center 




Figure 16.  Submarine Warfare Federated Tactical System  
(after PMW770 2012b) 
E. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
PRINCIPLES 
DOD continuously develops and procures systems to support the warfighter. 
These systems must meet their requirements in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. 
Sound systems engineering (SE) is critical to design, deliver, and support complex 
system of systems in order to achieve these key tenets. The number of attempts to 
institute acquisition reform during the last 30 years has proven challenging with few 
substantial changes really occurring. The Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009 provided several changes to include mandating use of SE and establishing the  
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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD SE). The 
Government Accounting Office annual high risk report (GAO 2013, 151) reported the 
following 
Moving forward, DOD faces challenges in extending the influence of the 
Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act. These challenges include: 
limited organizational capacity to support cost estimating, performance 
assessment, systems engineering, and developmental testing; lack of 
guidance in certain areas; limited dissemination of lessons learned related 
to systematic problems and best practices; and differences between the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military services about what 
constitutes an appropriate level of risk and whether the benefits of certain 
reform provisions are worth the cost 
As systems become more complex and rely more heavily on COTS this task 
becomes more difficult. The challenge of systems engineering (SE) and system of 
systems engineering (SOSE) is clearly articulating the terminology in the context of each. 
Systems engineers may opine SOSE is merely an extension of SE but SOSE practitioners 
will point out there are key differences. For example application of the SE process 
includes clearly defining system requirements at the beginning of a program. A SOSE 
engineer will most likely be looking at systems which already have established 
requirements. Understanding the differences in approach is critical during each phase for 
developing a system of systems such as CSRR. This section looks at the meaning of 
systems, system of systems, systems engineering, and system of systems engineering in 
order to provide a common understanding. 
1. Systems  
A system is defined by INCOSE as “an integrated set of elements, subsystems, or 
assemblies that accomplish a defined objective. These elements include products 
(hardware, software, firmware), processes, people, information, techniques, facilities, 
services, and other support elements” (Haskins 2014). The Systems Engineering Book of 
Knowledge (SEBOK) v1.3 (Adcock 2014) defines a system as “a set of elements and a set 
of inter-relationships between the elements such that they form a bounded whole relative 
to the elements around them.” Furthermore, the SEBOK v1.3 refers to Bertalanffy’s 
(Adcock 2014) discussion of systems within his general systems theory as 
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 General system theory (GST), attempts to formulate principles relevant to 
all open systems. GST is based on the idea that correspondence 
relationships (homologies) exist between systems from different 
disciplines. Thus, knowledge about one system should allow us to reason 
about other systems.  
Other definitions include the Defense Systems Management College’s (DSMC) 
(2001) view “Simply stated, a system is an integrated composite of people, products, and 
processes that provide a capability to satisfy a stated need or objective.”  
The NASA System Engineering Guide (2007, 3) provides a slightly different if 
more technical view of a system in the following quote  
A construct or collection of different elements that together produce 
results not obtainable by the elements alone. The elements, or parts, can 
include people, hardware, software, facilities, policies, and documents; 
that is, all things required to produce system-level results. The results 
include system-level qualities, properties, characteristics, functions, 
behavior, and performance.  
The formation of the components or elements to create a useful product is visible 
in almost everything we see, hear, or touch. Nature itself has systems (e.g. the ecosystem) 
which is made up of a set of elements to create a forest, or desert or reef.  
2. System of Systems 
There is a great deal of disagreement over what is the definition of a system of 
systems (SOS). One of the generally accepted definitions has been defined by INCOSE. 
According to INCOSE (Adcock 2014) defines a SOS as 
systems‐of‐interest whose elements are themselves systems; typically 
these entail large‐scale inter‐disciplinary problems involving multiple, 
heterogeneous, distributed systems. These interoperating collections of 
component systems usually produce results unachievable by the individual 
systems alone  
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition 
(ASN (RDA)) released a supplemental guide Systems of Systems Engineering Guidebook 
Version 2.0 (2006) defining system of systems as an  
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integrated force package of interoperable systems acting as a single system 
to achieve a mission capability. Typical characteristics include a high 
degree of collaboration and coordination, flexible addition or removal of 
component systems, and a net-centric architecture. Individual systems 
within the SOS may be capable of independent operations and are 
typically independently managed 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD 
(AT&L)) (Director Systems and Software Engineering 2008) defined a system of systems 
as  
a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent, and task-
oriented systems are integrated into a larger systems construct, that 
delivers unique capabilities and functions in support of missions that 
cannot be achieved by individual systems alone  
Jamshidi (2009), in his opening chapter section 1.2, outlines six definitions of 
system of systems from other researchers (Jamshidi 2009, 3). These are listed in Table 4 
below and illustrate the wide disparity in determining what a SOS is and what it should 
be able to do. 
Table 4.   System of Systems Definitions (from Jamshidi 2009, 3) 
1. Enterprise system of systems engineering (SOSE) is focused on coupling 
traditional systems engineering activities with enterprise activities of strategic 
planning and investment analysis [Carlock and Fenton, 2001]. 
2. System-of-systems integration is a method to pursue development, integration, 
interoperability, and optimization of systems to enhance performance in future 
battlefield scenarios [Pei, 2000]. [Luskasik, 1998]. 
3. Systems of systems exist when there is a presence of a majority of the 
following five characteristics: operational and managerial independence, 
geographic distribution, emergent behavior, and evolutionary development 
[Jamshidi, 2005]. 
4. Systems of systems are large-scale concurrent and distributed systems that are 
comprised of complex systems [Jamshidi, 2005; Carlock and Fenton, 2001]. 
5. In relation to joint war-fighting, system of systems is concerned with 
interoperability and synergism of Command, Control, Computers, 
Communications, and Information (C4I) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) Systems [Manthorpe, 1996]. 
6. SOSE involves the integration of systems into systems of systems that 




The following quote is Jamshidi’s definition of a system of systems  
systems of systems are large-scale integrated systems which are 
heterogeneous and independently operable on their own, but are 
networked together for a common goal. The goal, as mentioned before, 
may be cost, performance, robustness, etc. (2009, 4) 
Vaneman and Budka (2013, 2) identified a system of systems as “SOS as a system 
of all platforms, assets, systems, nodes, and networks that join together to achieve a 
capability needed to conduct a mission.” These definitions would be applicable to many 
systems within the DOD inventory.  
The contrast of this however is discussed by Dahmann, Rebovich and Lane (2008) 
that many of the systems within DOD were created as standalone systems, failing to 
benefit from the consideration of how they will fit in the overall defense architecture. 
Table 5 identifies the differences between a system and a system of systems. Systems 
engineers and SOS engineers must work to synchronize their efforts in order to meet the 
requirements for cost, schedule, and performance for each. 
In the context of command and control Manthorpe (1996, 305310) stated “Linking 
systems into joint system of systems allows for the interoperability and synergism of 
Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Information (C4I) and 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) System.” Systems with joint 
requirements such as the Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) are 
becoming increasingly interlinked in terms of requirements, development and acquisition. 
Their ability to operate only with similar systems within their networks prevents effective 
employment of information supporting the user. The increasing complexity and use of 
networks to support war fighting has made the requirement to develop systems that work 
together increasingly visible. The holistic view provided by a SOS approach provides a 
more clearly defined role of how a system will fit in the overall SOS architecture. In 




Table 5.   Comparison of Systems and System of Systems (from Dahmann, 
Rebovich and Lane 2008, 5) 
 
 
Systems of systems are classified as one of four types (Director, Systems and 
Software Engineering 2008; ASN (RDA) 2006; Vaneman & Budka 2013, 3): virtual, 
collaborative, acknowledged and directed. The type of SOS to be used can be planned 
from the beginning (directed) such as an entire architecture such as the littoral combat 
ship (LCS), ORP, or GPS. A virtual SOS is an ad hoc grouping of systems into a largely 
cooperative effort. A good example may be the organization of units in response to an 
emergency. A collaborative SOS example is the local internet service provider or the 
Defense Acquisition Community Connection Communities of Practice. The 
acknowledged SOS is the most common form seen across DOD. This can be seen when a 
cooperative agreement exists between individual participants and the lead systems 
integrator role. Each type is described in Table 6. 
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Table 6.   System of Systems Types (from Director, Systems and Software 
Engineering 2008, 4-5) 
Types of System 
of Systems 
Description 
Virtual A virtual SOS is essentially an ad hoc group of systems. There is 
no single authority or agreed upon purpose. Large scale behavior 
emerges and may be desirable. But this type of SOS must rely 
upon invisible mechanisms to maintain it. 
Collaborative Component systems interact more or less voluntarily to fulfill 
agreed upon central purposes. Stakeholders work collectively to 
provide some means to enforce and maintain standards (such as 
interface standards). 
Acknowledged There are recognized objectives, a designated manager, and 
resources for the SOS. Constituent systems retain their 
independent ownership, objectives, funding, and development 
and sustainment approaches. Changes in the systems are based 
on collaboration between the SOS and the system. A lead 
systems integrator may be an acknowledged SOS. 
Directed The integrated system-of-systems is built and managed to fulfill 
specific purposes. It is centrally managed during long-term 
operation to continue to fulfill those purposes as well as any new 
ones the system owners might wish to address. The component 
systems maintain an ability to operate independently, but their 
normal operational mode is subordinated to the central managed 
purpose. An example of this would the USS Virginia submarine 
program. The platform is made up of numerous smaller systems 
and system of systems. 
A SOS in contrast to a system, however complex, will evolve over time as 
functions, components, and requirements change for the individual systems (Jamshidi 
2009). Managing a SOS presents additional challenges due to the nature of the evolution, 
or fuzziness of future requirements. The SOS engineer not only must consider the 
individual systems capabilities and requirements but must arrange all of the components 
in an optimal manner to achieve operational synergy.  
Redundancy within a SOS is a factor which can separate it from a system. 
Redundancy can have different meanings but typically becomes a question of the risk of 
failure versus the consequences of failure. Traditional and sociotechnical systems can be 
categorized as Type I or Type II (Jamshidi 2009, 199). Type I SOS have redundancy built 
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in; if one system should fail the others are capable of reconfiguring or rerouting to 
continue operations. Type II SOS have no such redundancy.  
Resilience is another characteristic of a SOS. Jackson and Ferris (2013) outlined in 
their paper the principles of resilience in an engineered system. Using the definition 
recognized by the U.S. government resilience is “the ability to adapt to changing 
conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption” (Jackson and 
Ferris 2013, 153). They go into further detail to break down this definition and define the 
14 principles for resilience.  
3. Systems Engineering 
Systems engineering (SE) dates back to the 1940s to the Bell laboratories. The 
actual usage of SE principles dates earlier to the 1900s (Buede 2000, 6). Engineers and 
scientists were applying the principles within their own specialties but as they crossed 
with other fields new rules for developing and managing a system were required. An 
early example of systems engineering would be a locomotive. Whereas a formal 
requirements review probably did not occur the information still had to be defined. The 
use of SE identified key factors such as size, speed, range and cost.   
INCOSE defines SE as “an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the 
realization of successful systems” (Haskins 2012, 7). According to the SEBOK (Adcock 
2014) SE  
focuses on holistically and concurrently understanding stakeholder needs; 
exploring opportunities; documenting requirements; and synthesizing, 
verifying, validating, and evolving solutions while considering the 
complete problem, from system concept exploration through system 
disposal 
SE is supported by technical and technical management processes to enable 
focusing on successful development, delivery, and sustainment of a system meeting the 
customer’s needs while considering business and technical needs involved (Haskins 
2012). The NASA Systems Engineering Handbook (NASA 2007, 3) provides a more 
holistic view:   
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Systems engineering is the art and science of developing an operable 
system capable of meeting requirements within often opposed constraints. 
Systems engineering is a holistic, integrative discipline, wherein the 
contributions of structural engineers, electrical engineers, mechanism 
designers, power engineers, human factors engineers, and many more 
disciplines are evaluated and balanced, one against another, to produce a 
coherent whole that is not dominated by the perspective of a single 
discipline 
SE processes within various organizations share many common traits. A study 
funded by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
(USD (AT&L)) (Patterson, Dubin, and Richter 2004) evaluated the SE activities 
performed by each service, civilian government agencies, associations, the models 
available and education opportunities. Understanding these activities provides a common 
framework for effective use of SE processes and principles used by many programs and 
projects. 
4. System of Systems Engineering 
Using Wikipedia as a starting point, system of systems engineering (SOSE) is a 
set of developing processes, tools, and methods for designing, re-designing and deploying 
solutions to system-of-systems challenges (Wikipedia 2013). DOD develops many 
complex systems which require using SOSE approaches. A more scholarly definition 
defines “SOSE involves the integration of systems into systems of systems that ultimately 
contribute to evolution of the social infrastructure (Luskasik 1998 quoted in Jamshidi 
2009, 3). The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) (Defense Acquisition University 
[DAU] 2008) defines SOSE as “a set or arrangement of systems that results when 
independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique 
capabilities.” The USD (AT&L) developed their initial version of the “Systems 
Engineering Guide for System of Systems” (Director, Software and Systems Engineering 
2006) and ran a pilot to evaluate 18 programs within DOD. They found the following:  
1. Systems of systems tend to be continual efforts addressing user needs 
through a combination of systems.  
2. Systems of systems typically are not new acquisition programs.  
3. Program managers of a system of systems usually do not have requirements 
or funding for the individual systems. 
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4. System of systems capabilities evolve over time. 
5. A well designed system of systems is more capable of incorporating 
incremental upgrades. 
USD (AT&L) directed an update to its Systems Engineering Guide for System of 
Systems (USD SOSE Guide) V.9 to V1.0 recognizing the value SOSE has in enabling the 
development of complex systems in today’s environment. The USD SOSE Guide defines 
SOSE as “planning, analyzing, organizing, and integrating the capabilities of a mix of 
existing and new systems into an SOS capability greater than the sum of the capabilities 
of the constituent part” (Director, Systems and Software Engineering 2008). Additionally 
USD (AT&L) recognized SOSE must consider a variety of systems whether they are 
fully developed, or in an as yet to be defined state(Director, Systems and Software 
Engineering 2008) .  
The challenge of SOSE varies due to the level of complexity involved. This can 
vary from spontaneous, short-lived, simple SOS to long lived, complex, and continuously 
evolving SOS (Jamshidi 2009). Examples of a simple, ad hoc SOS may be a planned 
response to a casualty or disaster. In this case each individual system (e.g., the police, 
fire, paramedics, utilities, and other groups) each provide a component for responding to 
the event. Individually, they are still capable of accomplishing their primary role, but 
collectively they comprise a larger capability (e.g., responding to a mass casualty). A 
more complex example defined by Jamshidi (2009, 15) is a “galactic SOS” which is 
represented by an ecosystem or a community. Jamshidi continues by stating these 
complex SOS are characterized with 
an open systems approach to create a healthy, dynamic architecture, 
enabling them to effectively capitalize on open systems development 
principles and strategies such as modular design, standardized interfaces, 
emergence, natural selection, conservation, synergism, symbiosis, 
homeostasis, and self-organization (Jamshidi 2009, 16) 
An additional challenge to SOSE is the lead engineer must routinely integrate 
existing systems. Since they do not control the requirements, boundaries and 
development, the end result can be suboptimal. External environmental effects further 
complicate issues for the lead engineer. The complexity of engineering a SOS using the 
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trapeze model can be improved through implementing a wave model (Dahmann et al. 
2011). The colored blocks shown of the trapeze model in Figure 17 represent the 
different activities and how they are related to each other. The activities move from 
translating objectives to assessing performance and understanding the systems to 
evolving the SOS architecture. For example attempting to orchestrate upgrades requires 
the SOS engineer understand how the systems are interrelated, what the capability 
objectives are in terms of the individual systems and the overarching SOS. The arrows 
between the SOS engineering activities swing back and forth like a trapeze. This in turn 
drives how to assess the performance impacts of the proposed upgrades. The drawback of 
the trapeze model is the sequence of activities is not clearly defined and hard to follow. 
The sequence of events within the trapeze model can be transformed by 
“unwrapping” the process and correlating the processes to the wave model. The colored 
blocks are aligned on the left within a swim lane to show where they would occur. 
Converting to a wave model provides a better detail of the activities and their sequence 
(Dahmann et al, 2011). Figure 18 illustrates the unwrapping and final results as a wave 
model. The unwrapped wave model provides a much clearer picture of the order of the 
activities for analysis, development and implementation.  
  
Figure 17.  Trapeze Model (from Dahmann et al 2011, 2) 
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Figure 18.  Unwrapping the Trapeze Model into the Wave Model (from 
Dahmann et al 2011, 3) 
Another factor challenging SOSE is the lack of a standardized language. 
Thousands of standards are developed by hundreds of organizations which contribute to 
the confusion when discussing SOSE and comparing one against another. These 
standards and their application can be derived into a concept of “universally agreed-upon 
set of guidelines for interoperability” (Jamshidi 2009, 457). The guidelines define the 
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following levels of standardization: compatibility, interchangeability, commonality, and 
reference. From an SOS perspective these levels create “compatibility, similarity, 
measurement, and symbol and ontological standardization” (Johnson 2009, 457). As SOS 
development evolves and matures standards among the various disciplines will be 
created. Johnson (2009, 461) emphasizes without a common language a SOS cannot 
communicate with other SOSs, will not be fully functional, and is not capable of allowing 
new components to be added without significant effort. 
A system of systems needs a means of governance. Governance encompasses all 
of the processes to create and manage an organization regardless if it is formal or 
informal. Effective governance will define the activities that need to occur, identify who 
has authority to accomplish those actions and verify they are being accomplished. 
Without effective governance, similar to a lack of effective C2, the risks of delays or 
failure increase greatly. Challenges to successful SOS governance were identified by a 
study performed by the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise (Gansler, 
Lucyshyn and Rigilano 2012, viii). Five categories were identified which can affect 
successful SOS governance: leadership, management, requirements, human resources and 
funding (Gansler, Lucyshyn and Rigilano ixxiii). Berteau et al (2013, 646) presented 
eight attributes for the acquisition governance of a SOS using the future combat system 
(FCS) and maritime domain awareness programs (MDA) as case studies shown in Figure 
19. The Software Engineering Institute performed a study on system of systems attributes 
to define the characteristics of effective governance. They identified six characteristics 
concerning collaboration, accountability, evolution, and processes (Morris, Place and 
Smith 2006). 
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Testing 
and Evaluation (DASN(RDT&E) Chief Engineer and SPAWAR Information Technology 
Technical Authority (ITTA) identified five SOS qualities necessary for good governance 
(Vaneman and Jaskot 2013). Table 7 describes the characteristics of the directed and 
virtual SOS with collaborative and acknowledged SOS somewhere in between. 
Application of these principles provides a framework amenable to managing the activities 
surrounding system of systems development and sustainment. 
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Figure 19.  Attributes of Acquisition Governance (from Berteau et al 2013, 14) 
Testing and evaluation of a SOS involves taking a broader, more holistic 
perspective. Brooks and Sage (2005/2006, 268) pointed out while SOS integration is a 
complex affair the ability to accomplish validation and verification are just as important. 
The FY2000 DOT&E (2000, section IV-170) annual report pointed out several important 
points regarding testing in terms of challenges and benefits.  
1. Shorter acquisition cycles due to accelerations to field technology would 
make testing more challenging.  
2. The use of COTS should be tempered with the risks to degrading training, 
logistics, and documentation.  
3. Effective use of the requirements and testing strategy can keep the program 




Table 7.   System of System Characteristics (from Vaneman and Jaskot 2013) 
Characteristics Definition Directed SOS Virtual SOS 
Autonomy The ability to make 
independent choices; 
the right to pursue 




is ceded by parts in order 
to grant autonomy to the 
system 
Independence: Autonomy 
is exercised by constituent 
system in the order to 
fulfill the purpose of the 
SOS. 
Belonging To be a member of a 
group; to have the 
proper qualifications 
Centralize: To bring 
under one control; to 




choose to belong on a 
cost/benefit basis, also in 
order to cause greater 
fulfillment of their own 
purposes, and because of 
belief in the SOS supra 
purpose. 
Connectivity The ability of a system 
to link with other 
systems. 
Platform-centric- 
Prescient design, along 




Dynamically supplied by 
constituent systems with 
every possibility of 
myriad connections 
between constituent 
systems, possible via a 
network-centric 




distinct or unlike 
elements or qualities 
in a group; the 
variation of social and 
cultural identities 
among people existing 
together in an 
operational setting. 
Homogeneous: Managed, 
that is, reduced or 
minimized by modular 
hierarchy; parts diversity 
encapsulated to create a 
known discrete module 
whose nature is to project 
simplicity into the next 
level of hierarchy. 
Heterogeneous: Increased 
diversity in SOS 
capability achieved by 
released autonomy, 
committed belonging, and 
open connectivity. 
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Characteristics Definition Directed SOS Virtual SOS 
Emergence The appearance of 
new properties in the 
course of development 
or evaluation. 
Foreseen: Foreseen, both 
good and bad behavior, 
and designed in or tested 
out as appropriate. 
Indeterminable: Enhanced 
by deliberately not being 
foreseen, though its 
crucial importance is, and 
by creating and 
emergence capability 
climate, that will support 
early detection and 
elimination of bad 
behaviors. 
 
F. CASE STUDIES 
Case studies provide the opportunity to capture a teachable moment, learning 
principle, a lesson learned, and share the results with others. Case studies are an effective 
means to train engineering and acquisition professionals about real systems in use today 
(Soy 1997; Bahill and Chapman 1994, 145). Stjelja (2013, 3) made the following 
comment about case studies “An important aim of the case study approach is to capture 
the complexity of a single case.” Additionally Stjelja continues “Case studies, thus, 
cannot be defined through its research methods but rather through an interest in what is to 
be studied, and given the definition above it should be noted that a case study is not a 
method but a research strategy (Stjelja 2013, 3).  
A case study can take a number of approaches. Soy (1997) uses a methodology 
with six steps from defining the questions to completing the final report. Bahill and 
Chapman (1994) outline a commercial approach of benefits versus efforts. The Friedman 
and Sage framework (2003, 88–96) shown in Figure 20 and Table 8 analyzes nine areas 
and stratifies responsibilities by contractor, government, and shared responsibilities.  
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Figure 20.  Friedman and Sage Framework (from Friedman and Sage 2003, 88) 
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Table 8.   Description of the Friedman and Sage Framework Domains (after 




Prime contractor is responsible 
for SOSE
Govt acts as integrator and 
program manager
Govt contracts out individual 
components and the SOSE 
responsibil ities
A Requirements definition and 
management
Requirements shall flow 
downward in a coherent and 
traceable manner from the top 
level to all  lower levels
Customer and contractor shall  
share their knowledge of the 
technical maturity relative to 
new, unprecedented systems 
being engineered
Govt shall integrate the needs of 
its user organizations woth he 
management activities of its 
engineering organizations
B Systems architecture 
development
The system baseline architecture 
shall be established early in the 
program and involve all  
dimensions of technical issues as 
well as customer needs and 
satisfaction, political pressures 
and continuity of funding
The systems architecture should 
be established early and the best 
judgement of the government and 
contractor shall  be employed on 
all  key issues including use of 
new or legacy systems
A total systems architecture shall 
be established early in ordero to 
provide a sound basis of 
effectiveness across the broadest 
spectrum of contractors and 
operations
C System/subsystem design System desing shall proceed in a 
logical and orderly manner 
through a process of functional 
decomposition and design 
traceability that originates with 
the system functional architecture 
and results in design 
specifications for the system
The government customers and 
contractors shall  share the 
systems design responsbility
The user shall  share measures of 
effectiveness to ensure the 
proposals selected are those 
most responsivie to all  
stakeholders, especially 
operational organizations
D Systems integration and 
interfaces
The contractor shall  assure the 
systems integration and 
interfaces at each level suipports 
total system functionality across 
the lifel cycle
The contractor and government 
shall assure all  systems are 
integrated within themselves as 
well as interfaced with existing 
systems
The government shall assure that 
all  operational systems in 
planning, development or 
deployed are compatible and 
mutually supportive in a broad 
system of systems or family of 
systems context
E Verification/validation Every requirement shall have a 
test and every test shall  have a 
requirement
Government facil ities shall  be 
shared to perform V&V and the 
test criteria shall  be shared early
The government shall have the 
final word on the confidence 
levels derived from the testing 
during development, operational 
test and evaluation and actual 
deployment and operational use
F Deployment and post 
deployment
The contractor shall  maintain the 
appropriate engineering and 
testing capabilities to support 
gathering, analyzing, and 
recommending possible changes 
to the system design or support 
through reengineering
The government and contractor 
shall  cooperate to conduct an 
OPEVAL and be open to feeding 
information back to the program 
managers to consider design 
changes or modifications through 
reengineering
The government shall ensure a 
proper OPEVAL occurs and that 
all  data gathered from the tests 
be evalauted for potential 
recommendations for system 
modification, redesign, or 
reengineering. Pre planned 
improvements are encouraged
G Life cycle support All design activities shall  be 
viewed from an entire l ife cycle 
perspective
A balance of methods, 
measurements, technologies and 
processes shall be employed to 
support the entire l ife cycle
Funding support across the life 
cycle shall be maintained and 
early development programs 
shall recognize the importance of 
controlling total ownership cost
H Risk assessment and 
management
Risks shall  be identified, 
prioritized and mitigated at all  
levels. Risk is associted with cost, 
schedule and technical 
dimensions
The government shall ensure risk 
management is part of the 
contractors systems engineering 
management plan (SEMP) and 
risks are presented at all  
program reviews
Risk management at all  levels 
shall  be an essential and inherent 
part of systems engineering, 
program planning and life cycle 
activities
I System and program 
management
Every program shall have a SEMP 
tailored to that program. The 
contractor shall  also develop a 
team of capable systems 
engineers
Systems engineering shall b e 
recognized and supported 
throughout progam development 
and management
The government shall establish 
security levels for programs to 
protect crucial technologies and 
special capabilities
 62 
Using the framework enables the researcher to follow a common approach to 
examine the details of a program. Understanding the successes and failures of a program 
reveals the benefits and penalties they incurred which can be leveraged to avoid repeating 
the same mistakes and identify similar opportunities for success. The Secretary of the Air 
Force directed several initiatives to revitalize the systems engineering community using 
case studies of programs within the Air Force and NASA. The Air Force Institute of 
Technology and NASA wrote a series of systems engineering case studies about the A-10 
Thunderbolt (Jacques and Strouble 2010), F-111 (Richey 2005), Global Positioning 
System (O’Brien and Griffin 2007), Hubble Space Telescope (Mattice 2003), 
International Space Station (Stockman, Boyle, and Bacon 2010), B-2 bomber (Griffin and 
Kinnu 2007), C-5 Galaxy (Griffin 2004), Theater Battle Management Core System 
(TBMCS) (Collens and Krause 2005), KC-135 Aircrew Training System (Chislaghi, 
Dyer and Free 2010), Global Hawk (Kinzig 2010) and the Miniature Seeker Technology 
Integration (MSTI) (Grenville, Kleiner, and Newcomb 2004). Each case study identified 
“learning principles” capturing significant aspects across the systems engineering, risk 
management and program management support activities. Most of the case studies 
implemented a Friedman and Sage framework to capture the learning principles. 
Examples of some of the learning principles captured are listed below in Table 9. 
NASA acknowledged the value of case studies. The Challenger and Columbia 
shuttle accidents, errors with the Hubble telescope, oversight from Congress and the fact 
two-thirds of their workforce is approaching retirement provides strong motivation to 
avoid repeating mistakes and capture opportunities for improvement. NASA has over 50 
case studies to capture learning principles. NASAs GSFC Case Study Methodology 
(NASA 2011, 3-8) outlines their approach for an effective case study. These steps are:  
1. Pick a target, preferably something which will offer insight to others 
2. Define the parameters of the case 
3. Do the homework and background research 
4. Interview the key players to get their story 
5. Evaluate the story lines for learning points 
6. Draft the case into a narrative 
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7. Circulate the draft 
8. Test the case with a local audience 
9. Create a teaching note an epilogue 
10. Validate, publish and roll out the case 
Table 9.   Examples of Case Study Learning Principles 
Case Study Learning Principles (LP) 
F-111  Richey (2005, 6) identified the following learning principles: 
LP1- Requirements definition and management were poorly conceived 
and difficult to achieve. The attendant specifications made the F-111 
system development extremely costly, risky and difficult to manage. 
LP2- Systems architecture and design trade-offs- System engineering 
managers were not allowed to make important tradeoffs needed in order 
to achieve a design balanced for performance, cost and mission 
effectiveness and the related risk and schedule impacts. 
LP3- Communications and systems management- Poor communications 
between Air Force and Navy staffs and over management by the 
Secretary of Defense and Congress prevented the System Program 
Office director from applying sound systems engineering principles. 
LP4- Validation and Verification- Areas of risk and deficiencies were 
discovered during RDT&E even though there was perceived low risk in 
the design.  
LP5- Program Management- Cancellation of the Navy’s participation in 
the F-111 program came after the design was frozen causing enduring 
impacts on the Air Force F-111 performance and cost. 
TBMCS Collens and Krause (2005, 6) identified the following LP 
LP 1- The requirements process for producing the first release of 
TBMCS was broken. The user and acquisition communities never were 
on the same page. The users did not write a CONOPS or update the 
original ORD. The acquisition community wrote a technical 
requirements document for the contractor to develop their system-level 
specifications. None of these documents were aligned causing further 
confusion. 
B-2 Griffin and Kinnu (2007, 53) identified this LP. 
LP 4- Subsystem Maturity- Identification that a number of aeronautical 
systems did not meet the performance baseline configuration forced a 
reconfiguration of a number of subsystems resulting in a 18 month 
schedule slip. 
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The SPAWAR chief engineers office developed a number of SE and SOSE 
studies including their Information Dominance Enterprise Architecture (IDEA) which 
seeks to outline the way forward for achieving mission assurance. While these are not 
case studies these documents reflect the growing role of SOSE in integrating and 
delivering capabilities to the warfighter. The Navy Capability Evolution Process (NCEP) 
(SPAWAR 2012) model shown below in Figure 21 is being applied to align the systems 
being developed and procured to have traceability from the joint level downwards. Thus 
the mission capabilities are addressed at the appropriate level along with the notional 
evolution of capabilities moving forward. For example if a joint STK mission capability 
is needed the high level capabilities are defined in the Joint Capabilities Development 
System. The capabilities are broken down into SOS or family of system (FOS) portfolios 
of capabilities such as communications. The SOS or FOS capabilities are broken down 
further to the platform level. Finally the systems needed onboard the platform are defined 
at the lowest level. 
 
Figure 21.  Naval Capability Evolution Process Model (from SPAWAR 2012, 6) 
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SPAWAR Systems Centers Atlantic and Pacific have various resources they 
develop and post within their technical libraries available to their workforce. The 
SPAWAR SOSE and integration “Vee” shown in Figure 22 is one example of the 
products used to illustrate SOSE processes. The Vee shows the division between the 
SOSE and the SE activities. Starting from the left the SOS activities follow a similar 
process as the NCEP model to break the mission SOS into the platform SOS to the 
constituent systems. The right side is the validation and verification as each system is 
tested with a platform SOS and ultimately the mission SOS environment. The Systems 
Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems (Director, Systems and Software Engineering 
2008) describes seven core elements to be applied to the SOSE process. These are similar 
to the NCEP model to translate mission SOS capabilities into specific requirements at the 
SOS and systems levels (SPAWAR 2012). The evolution of SOS is considered since 
capabilities change over time. Continually assessing the capabilities and evolving the 
architecture become additional considerations where SOS engineer engages with the SOS 
and systems teams. By applying the SOSE Vee processes, changes can be managed and 
fielded with minimal impact to the larger SOS.  
 
Figure 22.  System of Systems Engineering and Integration “Vee” (from 
Vaneman and Budka 2013) 
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Submarine communications have evolved from simple single function systems to 
multi-function integrated systems. The creation of SCSS proved a system of systems 
approach would work and set the groundwork for establishing CSRR as a formal system 
of systems program. As a formal program, CSRR has a body of required acquisition, 
engineering, and logistics documentation which can be used to support creating a case 
study. This literature review identified a body of information available concerning the 
purpose of a case study and the benefits. Additionally there is a significant amount of 
information available about systems and systems engineering. There is also substantial 
evidence DOD has been moving toward system of systems and system of systems 
engineering as disparate capabilities are increasingly integrated. Despite this move, most 






The methodology used for this research looked at a logical manner of providing 
the necessary background and context in order to understand the reasons for some of the 
activities which occurred and the overall impact, either positive or negative. The research 
questions were bounded by the purpose to aid in providing background and context. The 
purpose of this case study was used as a basis for the research questions and they are 
listed below.  
1. The history of submarine communications leading up to the creation of the 
CSRR program. 
2. The organizational structure of the CSRR program. 
3. The relationship with other programs of record and stakeholders.  
4. System of systems architecture management.  
5. The advantages and disadvantages of the CSRR SOS approach within the 
various disciplines (e.g., modernization, integrated logistics support (ILS), 
training, sustainment, and information assurance (IA)).  
6. Process improvement initiatives and their impact in regard to cost, 
schedule and performance. 
7. CSRR’s ability to meet future mission requirements while supporting 
current missions 
The wide scope for this case study is necessary given the history of submarine 
communications leading up to CSRR and amount of activity that has occurred. 
Maintaining focus on the purpose ensures we are addressing the correct topics while the 
scope ensures the questions are reasonably bounded so they could be answered in a 
reasonable manner. The scope was applied in the methodology and is listed below. 
1. The development of submarine communications from its initial beginnings 
up through the deployment of CSRR increment one version three. 
2. The organizational structure of the CSRR program to include the design 
and development group, production and installation group, ILS and 
training groups, IA groups, and sustainment group.  
3. The version development process, its strengths and weaknesses. 
4. SOS architecture management with other programs of record and portfolio 
capability management, the relationships with the other programs of 
record and the warfighter. 
 68 
5. The advantages and disadvantages of the CSRR system of systems 
approach regarding ILS, training, production, installation (synchronization 
of installations into block upgrades), IA and sustainment.  
6. Assessment of requirements in a changing environment with regard to the 
Undersea Connectivity Roadmap, Design for undersea warfare, PEO C4I 
Master Plan, and the way ahead for considering disruptive technologies. 
7. An evaluation of the process improvement initiatives and their influence 
and impact in regard to cost, schedule and performance. 
8. The future of CSRR in today’s environment and tomorrow up through 
2030. 
The methodology for this case study consisted of the following activities. 
1. Investigation into other case studies to determine if other researchers had 
performed similar work and confirm if a case study would be an 
appropriate approach. Review of other case studies did indicate similar 
work had been done and several case studies addressed SOS issues. 
2. Investigation into Navy and specifically PEO C4I archives to determine if 
any case studies had been written. No case studies could be located in the 
SPAWAR and PEO archives or technical libraries.  
3. Review of the DOD acquisition and program documentation regarding 
SOS, defense acquisition requirements, systems and system of systems 
principles and how to measure the characteristics of a SOS. A large 
amount of information is available for acquisition, systems engineering 
and systems engineering principles both locally and online. Most of the 
system of systems literature has been developed in the last 14 years.  
4. Perform an in depth analysis of the CSRR program documentation. This 
includes the formal program documentation and minutes from the various 
integrated product teams (IPT) supporting the program. The 
documentation provided insight to the history, requirements and policies 
for managing the CSRR program. 
5. Conduct selected interviews with subject matter experts (SME) with 
regard to developing and managing a SOS program and the individual 
systems supporting the SOS. Interviews were conducted with key 
members of the engineering and production teams. 
6. Synthesize the information to capture lessons learned (or learning 
principles), develop conclusions and make recommendations for further 
consideration. A derivative of the Friedman-Sage framework will be used 
since contractor involvement is limited.  
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Initial research began identifying background information concerning case studies 
related to systems engineering and system of systems engineering to determine if a case 
study approach would be appropriate. Eleven case studies were identified and read. These 
case studies are listed in Table 10. 
These case studies were reviewed in order to understand the reasons they were 
performed, how they were accomplished and what significant lessons were identified. 
Research of these case studies looked for common themes. Several case studies 
acknowledged they were part of a SOS (GPS, TBMCS). The learning principles were 
compared against the lessons learned from the CSRR program. 
Most of the case studies used the Friedman and Sage framework to capture 
learning principles. Several of these case studies included their learning principals as part 
of the whole document and the remainder provided in a separate executive summary. 
Examples of learning principles identified were compared against the CSRR program 
lessons learned to determine if commonalities existed.  




KC-135 Flight Simulator Air Force Center for Systems Engineering 
 Global Positioning System 
International Space Station 
F-111 Aardvark 
C-5A Galaxy 
Hubble Space Telescope 
A-10 Thunderbolt II 
Theater Battle Management Core System 
Global Hawk 
Miniature Seeker Technology Integration Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University 
 




Online research of the PEO and SPAWAR process activity libraries, Naval 
Systems Engineering Resource Center and Systems Engineering Environment, located 
applicable SE and SOSE policy documents. However, no case studies were located in the 
repositories. While case studies are available through other online means there is no 
central, easily accessible source for SPAWAR and PEO C4I engineering and program 
personnel.  
Several SMEs were interviewed to capture their insights regarding the design, 
production, and sustainment of CSRR as a SOS. NUWC and SSC LANT maintain the 
core teams of SMEs responsible for the design, development, testing, production and 
sustainment. The sample size of this research was limited to the people involved with the 
CSRR program for the last ten years. The CSRR chief engineer, technical project 
manager, design agent and production agent were interviewed to capture their 
responsibilities and insight to design and manage CSRR as a SOS. These interviews took 
place via email and telephone. The interviews were limited to the background of 
submarine communications immediately preceding CSRR and development from V0 
through V3. 
CSRR is a recognized acquisition program and maintains the required acquisition, 
technical, and logistics documentation. The CSRR documents listed in Tables 11 through 








Table 11.   CSRR Acquisition Documents Reviewed 
Document Purpose of Document 
Acquisition/Programmatic 
Mission needs statement for the Integrated 
Maritime Communications System (CNO 
N81 1995) 
Original statement of requirement to fill a 
capability gap. This would be the Initial 
Capabilities Document under the JCIDS 
process.  
Common Submarine Radio Room 
Capabilities Production Document 
(PMW770 2006) 
Defines the production elements 
applicable to CSRR increment one 
Submarine Exterior Communications 
System Capstone Requirements Document 
(CNO N8 1998; CNO N8 2003) 
Similar to a Capability Description 
Document (CDD) it defines the key 
performance parameters and key systems 
attributes 
Submarine Communications Master Plan 
(CNO N87 1995; CNO N61 and N87 1998) 
Part of the submarine force strategic plan 
consolidating current and future 
communications requirements in support 
of the budget planning process 
CSRR Acquisition Strategy/Acquisition 
Plan (PMW770 2008) 
Outlines the business and technical 
acquisition management approach in order 
to achieve the program objectives within 
the allotted resources 
Concept of operations for CSRR Inc1 V2 
and Inc 1 V3 (PMW770 2011b) 
Defines the overall intent of a particular 
mission or strategy. The CONOPS 
provides a high level view of how a 
system will be employed 
Design for Undersea Warfare (Richardson, 
Caldwell and Breckenridge 2011) 
Commander Submarine Force guidance 
for executing their “lines of effort” for 
maintaining readiness for operations, 
maximizing effectiveness during 
deployments and develop future 
capabilities 
PEO C4I Strategic Plan 2013-2018 
(Burroughs 2012) 
PEO guidance for delivering capability 
and reducing variance 
Undersea Connectivity Roadmap 
(Hendricks and Duffy 2012) 
Undersea enterprise vision of future 
capabilities for communications and 
undersea connectivity 
DOD Inspector General (IG) report on 
CSRR (2005) 
IG investigation into the performance of 
the CSRR program 
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Table 12.   CSRR Engineering Documentation Reviewed 
Technical 
System Engineering Plan (PMW770  2007) Defines the programs strategy for 
managing all of the technical activities 
related to systems engineering 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (PMW770 
2012a) 
Defines the overall test strategy and 
resources needed to accomplish all 
required developmental and operational 
testing 
System Subsystem Design Description for 
CSRR Inc1 V3 SSBN (NUWC 2008), VA 
(NUWC 2012) and LA (NUWC 2011) 
Provides program background and 
describes the physical and functional 
designs of the capabilities within each 
version. 
Systems Design Verification Test Plan for 
CSRR Inc1 V3 LA (NUWC 2011), VA 
(NUWC 2012b), SSGN (PMW770 2013a), 
and SSBN (PMW770 2013b) 
Defines the testing parameters to verify 
CSRR can meet all performance 
requirements outlined in the CPD. 
Supports the TEMP as part of the overall 
testing strategy 
CSRR System Requirements, Design, 
Integration and Testing Process (Ross 2013) 
An internal document developed to aid 
new team members in familiarizing 
themselves with the CSRR program 
CSRR Circuit Matrix (PMW770 2014) A formal agreement between PMW770 
and the submarine force which details 
which circuits will be supported by a 
particular CSRR version and platform 
class 
 
Table 13.   Logistics and Training Documentation Reviewed 
Logistics 
Integrated Logistics Support Plan 
(PMW770 2008b) 
Supports the CSRR acquisition strategy 
and defines the sustainment strategy for 
the overall program 
CSRR Navy Training Systems Plan (CNO 
N2N6 2012) 
Service specific training systems plan 
which serves as the agreement between the 
program stakeholders 
CSRR Reliability, Maintainability, and 
Availability (RMA) reports 
Periodic reports from the Navy’s 
independent assessor for RMA data 
collected from maintenance, material and 




In 2008 the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a policy directing all DOD 
activities to begin using Lean Six Sigma (LSS). The CSRR program performed a number 
of improvement activities in order to improve meeting cost, schedule and performance. 
These improvement activities were reviewed as well to determine what issues occurred, 
their root cause and their solutions. Table 14 is a summary of the continuous 
improvement events using LSS. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the SE and SOSE processes used by 
other DOD and government organizations an investigation into the differences and 
benefits between systems engineering and systems of systems engineering was 
accomplished. These references were located on the INCOSE website, Defense 
Acquisition Portal Acquisition Community Connection, Dudley Knox library, and other 
recognized sources such as MITRE and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). 
Table 15 is a summary of the types of documentation examined. 
Table 14.   Continuous Process Improvement Activity Documentation Reviewed 
Process Improvement Events 
CSRR version value 
stream analysis (VSA) 
Lean event to evaluate how to shorten the CSRR 




Lean six sigma (LSS) event to analyze system failures, 
identify the root cause and develop improvements for 





LSS event to identify non-value added activities in the test 






LSS event to capture the benefits of performing consolidated 




LSS event to revisit the original CSRR VSA and attempt to 
address configuration variance issues identified during the 




Table 15.   Other Applicable Engineering Documents Reviewed 
Other engineering documents 
INCOSE Systems Engineering Book of Knowledge (Adcock 2014) 
OSD Systems Engineering Guide for System of Systems (Director, Systems and 
Software Engineering 2008) 
DSMC Systems Engineering Fundamentals Guide (DSMC 2001) 
NASA Systems Engineering Guide (NASA 2007) 
MITRE System Engineering Guide (MITRE 2014) 
DOD Systems Engineering annual reports released by the GAO 
SOS modeling and acquisition 
The methodology outlined the plan of action to identify and accumulate 
information to complete the case study. Once all of the information was identified and 
collected, the initial analysis developed the framework for the case study. Research using 
the information from the systems engineering classes provided a starting point for 
developing the research questions and a plan to answer them. Further investigation of the 
local and online resources including SPAWAR, PEO C4I, PMW770, Dudley Knox 
library and the Defense Technical Information Center portal located CSRR program 
documentation and related SE and SOS information. The information was collected and 
analyzed to answer several of the questions presented in this thesis about defining CSRR 
as a system of systems. The results in turn derived further answers to the remaining 
questions for effectively developing and managing comparable system of systems. 
Lessons learned or learning principles were validated and any new ones were identified. 
 
 75 
IV. APPLICATION OF METHODOLOGY 
The methodology outlined in the previous chapter will answer the research 
questions. The results were used to identify learning principles applicable to CSRR as a 
system of systems. These learning principles were also assessed to determine if they 
could be extended to other programs or system of systems. A number of these can serve 
as an opportunity to avoid mistakes and identify prospects that would otherwise be 
missed. Each of the research questions will be answered in more detail. 
A. EVALUATION OF THE CASE STUDIES 
The first step to developing this case study began by reading other case studies to 
determine what they are and decide if using a case study approach would be appropriate. 
Friedman and Sage (2003, 8486) stated case studies serve a valuable purpose by 
exposing a student to real world examples of systems engineering. Their stated position is 
a case study is an “empirical inquiry that investigates contemporary phenomenon within a 
real-life context, especially when boundaries between the phenomenon and context are 
not clear and multiple sources of evidence is used” (Friedman and Sage 2003, 85). 
There are several benefits of performing a case study (Friedman and Sage 2003, 
85). Understanding the how and why, revealing the detailed information surrounding an 
event, and allows exploration of a topic when a strong theory may not be available. The 
sources of evidence available to conduct research include looking at documentation, 
records, interviews and observations. Using more than one approach can add detail and 
context. One of several approaches such as pattern matching, explanation building, logic 
models, and time series or cross case analysis can be used to analyze the collected 
information. 
An initial search was performed to determine how much information about case 
studies existed. Using Google, a search for “case studies” returned over 25 million 
possible results. Extending this further to include the term “system of systems” narrowed 
the results to over 350,000. The search for identified case studies written by the Air Force 
and NASA concerning the Hubble space telescope, F-111, Global Hawk, TBMCS, MTSI 
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and others. A search of the Dudley Knox Library identified over 9,000 possible results. 
For the term “navy system engineering case studies” identified 96 possible candidates. 
Performing a more detailed search for a “navy engineering system of systems case 
studies” identified only five hits, none of which pertained to the search. Searches of the 
Defense Acquisition University portal identified a number of case studies including the 
ones used in this study. 
The SPAWAR chief engineers web portal maintains the process activity library as 
a repository and workspace for SE and SOSE documentation related to the information 
dominance enterprise architecture (IDEA) (SPAWAR 2014a). The IDEA is attempting to 
define the way forward for developing and delivering future C4I strategic level objectives 
in support of information dominance capability to the warfighter. Figure 23 shows how 
the IDEA disassembles the enterprise SOS architecture into more discrete requirements 
and systems. Using a process similar to the NCEP and the Vee the objective requirements 
are decomposed to the mission and service requirements. These requirements are then 
assigned to the specific programs to develop and acquire the applicable systems. 
 
Figure 23.  SPAWAR Information Dominance Enterprise Architecture 
Requirements Tree (from SPAWAR 2014b) 
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Additional searches of the PEO C4I and SPAWAR technical repositories revealed 
no SPAWAR systems case studies were available. SSC PAC maintains a technical library 
to support their science and engineering activities, but no case studies were available for 
systems under their purview. SSC LANT maintains a limited technical library primarily 
devoted to holding various drawings. The CSRR design agent was also asked if NUWC 
Newport maintains a technical library. Their technical library mainly handles drawings 
and technical publications requested by the staff (Steve Devin 2014, email questionnaire). 
The availability of any related engineering case studies could not be confirmed.  
The case studies confirmed the approach would be appropriate for the goals of 
this study. Ten case studies used a Friedman and Sage framework or a slight derivative 
while the MSTI and V-22 created a different approach to lessons learned. Several of the 
case study learning principles were provided in an executive summary and were not 
available. For these case studies, such as the KC-135, significant items were identified 
and presented as learning principles. In all cases there were other topics which 
represented possible learning principles as well. For this study the evaluation was limited 
to the ones presented in the executive summary or extracted if a summary was not 
available. An initial evaluation identified the framework domains addressed from each 
case study as seen in Table 16.  
Table 16.   Summary of Domain Areas Impacted by Each Case Study 
 
 
Framework Domain Areas A-10 TBMCS B-2 C-5A Hubble ISS GPS F-111 GH MTSI KC-135
A. Requirements Definition and 
Management X X X XX X X X XX X
B. Systems Architecting and 
Conceptual Design XX X X XX X X X X X
C. Detailed System and Subsystem 
Design and Implementation X X X X X XX X X X
D. Systems and Interface Integration X X X X XX X X
E. Validation and Verification X X X
F. System Deployment and Post 
Deployment X
G. Life Cycle Support X X X
H. Risk Management X X X X X X X
I. System and Program Management X XX X XXX XX XX X XXX X
Programs
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All of the case studies used the Friedman and Sage framework except for the 
MSTI and the V-22. The MSTI lessons were applied to the Friedman and Sage domains 
based on this researcher’s assessment. The V-22 case study was not written to assess the 
application of systems engineering principles so it was removed from further 
consideration. The eleven case studies were then assessed to determine if there were 
correlations between the earlier case studies and CSRR. Each case study identified areas 
which were related to similar issues with CSRR. For example the TBMCS team had not 
engaged with the user community to develop a CONOPS, the systems architecture did 
not have adequate detail and interface management was poor or nonexistent. Another 
example using the B-2 identified a failure to recognize a maturity issue needed attention, 
which resulted in a five month delay and missing the Critical Design Review (CDR) 
milestone (Griffin and Kinnu 2007, 53). The F-111 described the problems faced by the 
engineering team when a major stakeholder chose to pull out of the effort which had 
lasting and substantial impacts on the program (Richey 2005, 3031). 
Similar challenges exist for CSRR in that individual systems may not have a 
CONOPS, or if they do, it is not uncommon for them to conflict with another. This might 
appear to be in conflict with the JCIDS but a large number of programs had been 
developed prior to JCIDS being fully implemented. If the program was post milestone 
they were grandfathered and the existing documentation was accepted to support that 
particular milestone decision. Oversight of ACAT I programs, minimal oversight of other 
ACAT programs beyond budgetary cycle requirements and infrequent reviews of systems 
once in sustainment deter assessing if a system is aligned to a mission SOS. 
Systems architecture is defined for the individual system but illustrates itself as 
operating as a piece in the global architecture and not necessarily in the intermediate 
architecture which would include CSRR or SWFTS. Interfaces are usually defined at the 
system level but routinely do not interoperate with other systems, forcing some type of 
middleware solution. Several authors acknowledged they were working within a SOS 
architecture while conducting their case study on the area of interest. The specific 
learning principles or lessons learned from these case studies are listed below in Table 
17.  
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Table 17.   Learning Principles by Case Study and the Associated Domains 
Affected 
System Case Study Associated Friedman and Sage 
Domains 
A-10 Thunderbolt II Warthog (Jacques 2010) 
LP-1 The system concept and preliminary design 
must follow, not precede, the mission analysis. 
A. Requirements Definition 
and Management 
B. Systems Architecture and 
Conceptual Design  
C. System and Subsystem 
detailed design and 
implementation 
LP-2: Prototyping can be used to help manage 
technical and cost risk at the system, subsystem, and 
component level. 
H. Risk Assessment and 
Management 
LP-3: Clear lines of responsibility must be 
established to ensure successful integration, 
especially when multiple programs are involved. 
D. Systems Integration and 
Interface 
LP-4: The government must ensure the contractor is 
able to “Walk the Talk” when it comes to production. 
G. Life Cycle Support 
H. Risk Assessment and 
Management 
LP-5: Successful design, development and production 
is not enough to sustain a system throughout its life 
cycle. 
F. Deployment and Post 
Deployment 
LP-6: If the politics do not fly, the system never will. B. Systems Architecture and 
Conceptual Design 
Theater Battle Management Control System (Collens and Krause 2005) 
LP-1: The government did not produce a Concept of 
Operations, key operational performance parameters, 
or a system specification for the contractor. The 
requirements baseline was volatile up to system 
acceptance, which took place after operational test 
and evaluation. 
A. Requirements Definition 
and Management.  
 
LP-2: The system architecture was defined at too 
high a level, which had a tremendous impact on 
system design and development. 
B. System Architecture. 
LP-3: The system and subsystem design was severely 
hampered by the complexity of legacy applications, 
misunderstanding of the maturity and complexity of 
commercial and third party software products, and a 
lack of understanding of how the system would be 
employed by the user. 
C. System/Subsystem Design 
LP-4: Systems and interface integration was highly 
complex. The external system interfaces were not 
managed and were often impossible to test at the 
D. Systems Interface and 
Integration 
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Domains 
contractor’s facility. 
LP-5: The lack of a firm requirements baseline made 
validation and verification very difficult. Not being 
able to replicate the operational environment prior to 
acceptance test created severe problems. 
E. Validation and Verification 
B-2 Spirit Bomber (Griffin and Kinnu 2007) 
LP-1: Integration of the Requirements and Design 
Processes. A key aspect of the implementation of the 
systems engineering process was the integration of 
the SPO requirement’s team with the contractors’ 
work breakdown structure task teams into a cohesive 
program effort. 
A. Requirements Definition 
and Management.  
  
LP-2: Work breakdown structure task teams and 
functional hierarchy. A well-defined contract work 
breakdown structure stipulated the entire program 
content and tasking. 
I. System and Program 
Management 
LP-3: Air vehicle reconfiguration. When the 
identification of a major aeronautical control 
inadequacy was discovered just four months prior to 
formal configuration freeze, an immediate refocus of 
the task teams was required. 
B. Systems Architecting and 
Conceptual Design 
LP-4: Subsystem maturity. The effect of the 
reconfiguration on the maturity of all the air vehicle 
subsystems (flight control, environmental control, 
electrical, landing gear, etc.) was far greater than 
projected. 
C. System and Subsystem 
detailed design and 
implementation 
 
LP-5: Risk planning and management. The program 
was structured so that risks affecting the viability of 
the weapons system concept were identified at 
contract award and were structured as part of the 
program and work breakdown structure work plans. 
H. Risk Assessment and 
Management 
C-5A Galaxy (Griffin 2004) 
LP-1: The process for developing and documenting 
the system performance requirements involved the 
user, planners, developers, and technologists from 
both the government and industry in a coordinated set 
of trade studies. It resulted in a well-balanced, well-
understood set of requirements that fundamentally 
remained unchanged throughout the program. 
A. Requirements definition and 
management 
LP-2: The total package procurement concept (TPPC) 
employed by the government required a fixed-price, 
incentive fee contract for the design, development, 
and production 
H. Risk Assessment and 
Management 
I. System and Program 
Management 
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Domains 
LP-3: A weight empty guarantee was included in the 
specification as a performance requirement and in the 
contract as a cost penalty for overweight conditions 
of delivered aircraft. The weight empty guarantee 
dominated the traditional aircraft performance 
requirements (range, payload, etc.), increased costs, 
and resulted in a major shortfall in the wing and 
pylon fatigue life. The stipulation of a weight empty 
guarantee as a performance requirement had far-
reaching and significantly deleterious unintended 
consequences. 
A. Requirements Definition 
and Management 
LP-4: The system program office employed 
independent review teams to assemble national 
experts to examine the program and provide 
recommendations to the government. These problem-
solving teams were convened to garner the best 
advice in particular technical areas: structure design 
and technology, and designs to achieve useful service 
life. 
I. System and Program 
Management 
Hubble Space Telescope (Mattice 2003) 
LP-1: Early and full participation by the customer/ 
user throughout the program is essential to success. 
A. Requirements definition and 
management 
LP-2: The use of pre-program trade studies to broadly 
explore technical concepts and alternatives is 
essential and provides for a healthy variety of inputs 
from a variety of contractors and government. 
B. Systems Architecting and 
Conceptual Design 
LP-3: A high degree of systems integration to 
assemble, test, deploy, and operate the system is 
essential to success and must be identified as a 
fundamental program resource need as part of the 
program baseline. 
C. System and Subsystem 
detailed design and 
implementation 
D. Systems Interface and 
Integration 
LP-4: Life cycle support planning and execution must 
be integral from day one, including concept and 
design phases. The results will speak for themselves. 
B. Systems Architecting and 
Conceptual Design 
G. Life Cycle Support 
LP-5: For complex programs, the number of players 
(government and contractor) demands that the 
program be structured to cope with high risk factors 
in many management and technical areas 
simultaneously. 
I. System and Program 
Management 
International Space Station (Stockman, Boyle and Bacon 2010) 
LP-1: Systems engineering involves communications, 
critical to international partnerships, so before 
worrying about technical interfaces, make sure the 
I. System and Program 
Management 
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integrated product teams and communication 
bandwidth between partners are optimal. 
LP-2: Maintaining a high level of competent and 
experienced personnel over a two decade long 
program requires strategic level planning and 
execution of workforce planning. 
I. System and Program 
Management 
LP-3: Do not be so ready to chase revolutionary 
designs over evolutionary designs. A key lesson from 
Russian experience (such as the Soyuz) is that it is 
often less risky to stay with a known design and 
provide minor improvements. 
B. System Architecture and 
Conceptual Design 
LP-4: Multi-element integrated testing with actual 
hardware, high fidelity simulators and connectors is 
critical and must be in the program from day one 
E. Validation and Verification 
LP-5: In an ISS like project where so many different 
countries and companies contribute hardware and 
software, the interfaces must be extremely simple. 
C. System and Subsystem 
detailed design and 
implementation 
D. Systems Interface and 
Integration 
LP-6: Do not be too quick to allow partners (or 
NASA) to start building modules or expensive 
experiments too far in advance of locking in schedule 
and program baseline  
A. Requirements Definition 
and Management 
I. System and Program 
Management 
Global Positioning System (Griffin and O’Brien 2007) 
LP-1: Programs must strive to staff key positions 
with domain experts. 
I. System and Program 
Management 
LP-2: The systems integrator must rigorously 
maintain program baselines. 
C. System and Subsystem 
detailed design and 
implementation 
D. Systems Interface and 
Integration 
LP-3: Achieving consistent and continuous high-level 
support and advocacy helps funding stability, which 
impacts systems engineering stability. 
I. System and Program 
Management 
LP-4: Disciplined and appropriate risk management 
must be applied throughout the life cycle. 
H. Risk 
Assessment/Management 
LP-5: The GPS case study highlights the need for 
systems thinking throughout. 
B. System Architecture and 
Conceptual Design 
C. System and Subsystem 
detailed design and 
implementation 
D. Systems Interface and 
Integration 
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F-111 (Richey 2005) 
LP-1: Ill conceived, difficult to achieve requirements 
and attendant specifications made the system 
development extremely costly, risky and difficult to 
manage. The state of technical maturity was not well 
understood by either contractor or government in the 
case of inlet-engine compatibility (dynamic 
distortion) and structural fracture mechanics of brittle 
materials. 
A. Requirements Definition 
and Management 
LP-2: Systems engineering managers were not 
allowed to make important tradeoffs that needed to be 
made in order to achieve an effective design that was 
balanced for performance, cost and mission 
effectiveness and the attendance risk and schedule 
impacts. The government provided the systems 
architecture specifications and the contractor 
responded, although there were concerns expressed 
by Navy and Air Force analysts that the disparate 
range of system architecture requirements could be 
met while maintaining the required level of 
commonality. 
B. System Architecture and 
Conceptual Design 




LP-3: The program suffered from poor 
communications between Air Force and Navy 
technical staffs and from over management by the 
Secretary of Defense and The Director, Defense 
Research and Engineering and received intense 
congressional scrutiny, restricting the program office 
from applying sound systems engineering principles. 
I. System and Program 
Management 
LP-4: The F-111 had areas of risk or deficiency that 
came to light during research, design, testing and 
evaluation even though there was a low perceived 
risk in the design. The development program 
introduced concurrency between design validation 




LP-5: Cancellation of the Navy version after the joint 
design was frozen and production of the Air Force 
version was in progress had a lasting impact on the  
F-111 performance and cost. 
I. System and Program 
Management 
Global Hawk (Kinzig 2010) 
LP-1: The Joint Program Office was a very small, 
austere organization, purposely sized that way to 
ensure minimal oversight by the Government and 
I. System and Program 
Management 
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provide a significant degree of autonomy to the 
contractors. 
LP-2: The program developed a set of desired 
performance characteristics that were defined in 
terms of a range of values considered acceptable. The 
parameters were labeled as goals, either as Primary 
Objective, Objective, or Desired. This approach gave 
the contractor the latitude and responsibility to define 
the balance among the desired performance 
parameters, so the user would receive the “biggest 
bang for the buck.” This freed the Joint Program 
Office from closely tracking the contractor’s progress 
in meeting a large number of individual performance 
specifications. The Joint Program Office even tried 
hard to avoid giving the impression that they valued 
one specific performance goal over another. 
A. Requirements Definition 
and Management 
LP-3: The risks and problems associated with 
integrating COTS into a complex system were 
underestimated. 
H. Risk Assessment/ 
Management 
LP-4: The pace of the flight test program was too fast 
given its cumbersome mission planning process and 
limited resources. Test personnel were clearly 
overburdened, which appears to have been a 
contributing factor in the air vehicle 3 taxi mishap. 
E. Validation and Verification 
LP-5: With the major reduction in the use of 
specifications and standards, there was no 
comprehensive set of requirements to judge that an 
aircraft was safe to fly. This void in the acquisition 
process led to the formulation and release of Air 
Force Policy Directive 62-6. 
A. Requirements Definition 
and Management 
C. System and Subsystem 
detailed design and 
implementation 
D. Systems Interface and 
Integration  
Miniature Seeker Technology Integration (Grenville, Kleiner and Newcomb 2004) 
LP-1: “Build Porsches, not Formula 1’s. Use design 
margins to reduce the level of optimizing at the sub-
system level and take advantage of existing hardware 
architectures. 
B. System Architecture and 
Conceptual Design 
C. System and Subsystem 
detailed design and 
implementation 
LP-2: Use daily meetings and an electronic problem 
failure report approach to enable peer reviews. 
Embedding quality assurance with the team allowed 
problem discovery earlier and resolution earlier in the 
process. 
I. System and Program 
Management 
LP-3: Team took ownership of the project. Each I. System and Program 
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responsible engineering authority looked forward to 
the project horizon. Team members had more 
responsibility. 
Management 
LP-5: Keep the team focused to accomplish their 
objectives. 
I. System and Program 
Management 
KC-135 Flight Training System (Chislaghi, Dyer and Free 2010) 
Designing the platform to be compatible with a 
motion system paid dividends later in the system’s 
lifecycle by providing a growth path which facilitated 
the implementation of future upgrades. (8) 
B. Systems Architecting and 
Conceptual Design 
C. System and Subsystem 
detailed design and 
implementation 
The philosophy employed by the KC-135 aircrew 
training system senior engineering and management 
leadership emphasizes the importance of open 
communication lines between the various 
stakeholders. (14) 
I. System and Program 
Management 
Air Mobility Command has emphasized two key 
program goals that formed the foundation of the KC-
135 aircrew training system upgrade strategy. The 
first addressed the need for concurrency, which is to 
ensure the operational flight trainer is upgraded and 
ready for training prior to the aircraft with its 
modifications being fielded. The second addressed 
the goal to upgrade operational flight simulator 
training effectiveness. The first goal emerged as a 
result of early successes in the execution of the 
simulator’s upgrade strategy concurrent with a major 
aircraft upgrade and modification program. (18) 
G. Life Cycle Support 
There was no formal systems engineering process 
followed for requirements allocation. (36) 
A. Requirements Definition 
and Management 
Added emphasis had to be placed on managing risk 
mitigation in order to ensure the right people were 
assigned to work the problem, mitigation plans were 
realistic and implementable, and that the required 





B. COMMON SUBMARINE RADIO ROOM SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION APPROACH 
As a system of systems, CSRR followed an established and fairly disciplined 
approach to developing each version. The paradigm shift from simply building a 
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collection of boxes to actively working with various programs which were in different 
stages of maturity created many challenges and opportunities. Throughout the entire 
process from design and development to sustainment these challenges and opportunities 
influence the CSRR program ability to deliver and support a complex SOS to support the 
submarine communications requirements. 
1. Design and Development 
The initial version of CSRR was based on a contractor-furnished design for the 
VA class. Following a failure by the subcontractor to deliver a system to the shipbuilder 
PEO SUB performed an analysis of alternatives (AOA). The AOA recommended several 
options (PMW770 2008, 11).  
1. Sole source contract to Electric Boat and Lockheed Martin-Maritime 
Systems and Sensors 
2. A full and open competition and a government-industry team development 
and production effort 
3. Government industry team  
Option three was chosen to support the CSRR work for the SSGN. Work from the 
SSGN development was carried forward and leveraged to support OPNAV’s direction to 
design a CSRR variant for the SSBN. The main requirement of CSRR is to integrate 
other PORs. Several PORs, such as ADNS, were not ready in time to support the delivery 
in support of the development efforts so PMW770 developed suitable replacement 
solutions to support program delivery. This solution enabled CSRR to effectively work as 
a directed SOS up through CSRR V2. From an SOS perspective CSRR could have been 
defined as a directed SOS. A benefit of being a directed SOS is CSRR had a large degree 
of control over design, configuration management and sustainment. The disadvantage is a 
solution which increased overall total ownership costs (TOC) to the CSRR program.  
The original approach for developing each version of CSRR was related to a 
specific submarine class. The SSGN V0 leveraged the VA V0 design. The SSBN and SW 
used the SSGN V0 design as a basis for their development. Each of these designs were 
built and completed a full system design verification test (SDVT) and systems acceptance 
test (SAT) prior to their introduction to the fleet. SSBN V1 began the next cycle with 
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SSGN and SW V2 closely following behind. In each case a full design was again built 
and fully tested to validate the design and verify functionality. For these versions it was 
not difficult to maintain a single design since only four SSGNs, three SW and 14 SSBNs 
were operational. The changes to the VA design were incorporated with the shipbuilder 
to deliver a minimal capability and upgrades occurred as each platform entered a post 
shakedown availability (PSA). Following PSA responsibility of the VA CSRR shifted to 
PMW770.  
The development of V2 for SSGN and SW attempted to leverage available PORs, 
but one of the initial problems noted is their equipment had not completed their own 
testing, was planned to occur concurrently, or it was accomplished without consulting 
with the CSRR team to assure their approach would work. The maturity of two systems 
fell behind despite assurances from the POR they would be ready. The first was 
discovered at the SSGN CDR which forced a significant design change to remove all 
interface cabling when it failed to deliver a system. Another issue with this program 
resulted from the CSRR team reconfiguring the system in order to physically fit the 
components in the design. The program had completed their design environmental testing 
without engaging the CSRR team to assess its ability to fit in the design. This resulted in 
invalidating the environmental testing when the components were relocated to fit in the 
radio room. The other occurred when the POR reported their software would be delayed 
one year. This was identified just prior the beginning of the installation. The CSRR 
program had agreed to procure the hardware but the lack of software forced development 
of a temporary solution.  
A similar issue occurred with the SSBN V1 when modifications to an antenna 
system did not complete all of their design work in time to support the scheduled 
modernization period. While the CSRR and antenna modernization were related but 
separate efforts it still represented a lack of synchronization of activities. Several 
agreements were established with ADNS and other programs to arrange a shift of 
sustainment responsibilities and to agree upon the delivery of POR systems in the future. 
At this time, the LA class, originally deferred from FY10 to FY15, were 
accelerated to reach a planned IOC in FY12. Since the LA class constituted the majority 
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of the submarines in the force and was already facing obsolescence issues, it was selected 
to be the first V3 platform. In 2009, the CSRR V3 preliminary design review (PDR) 
initiated a transition from an informal directed SOS to a recognized acknowledged SOS 
utilizing other POR systems to deliver capability. A benefit of this approach more closely 
aligned CSRR development with the direction of the program acquisition plan (AP) to 
fully leverage other POR systems. One advantage of this shift in approach is the 
reduction of TOC for the CSRR program. Reduction of overall SOS TOC is questionable 
since these costs were spread across a number of programs. Another advantage is the 
CSRR team no longer had to identify and procure these components. The disadvantage is 
the number of configuration management and logistics challenges increased with each 
new POR as they introduced changes in their systems. These changes had to be assessed 
for their impact to the overall SOS design. Using the other PORs in many cases identified 
their designs had to be modified in order to be accommodated physically and 
functionally. Changes to the system designs had to be negotiated with the POR which in 
turn impacted cost and schedule (Steve Devin 2014, email questionnaire). In one case 
SDVT had to be halted to identify the source of heating issues in the inboard racks. The 
issue was resolved through reversing component fans, fixing cooling shorts and 
redirecting more cooling to the radio room. The outcome of this approach identified the 
need to engage with the PORs earlier to ensure any submarine unique requirements were 
included in their documentation.  
Another issue was identified just prior to beginning the first installation impacted 
the certification of the messaging system. The change in its certification forced a change 
how information could be routed. A solution was identified but was not installed on the 
first platform. The increased density of cables and network components in the radio room 
created cable management issues which increased the difficulty of racking out equipment. 
This was first noted by the production team as they assembled the production kits in their 
facility for pre-installation testing and checkout (PITCO). The issues were confirmed on 
the first several platforms which in turn forced a redesign effort to strengthen cable 
retractors and reroute cabling. The number of issues found confirmed more maturation of 
POR components was needed prior to beginning integration into the CSRR architecture. 
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Additionally closer coordination between the design and production team needs to occur 
in order to identify issues impacting production, installation and maintainability.  
Effectively managing an SOS program such as CSRR requires creating and 
maintaining effective teams. The NUWC design team, shown in Figure 24, is responsible 
to support the design, integration and testing to ensure CSRR and each of the PORs 
continued to meet their performance requirements. The lead systems engineer, also the 
systems architect, coordinates the efforts of the platform engineers to maintain the 
commonality of the CSRR design across all platforms while balancing the needs of the 
individual programs and platforms. The chief engineer in essence devotes much of his 
efforts to “herding the cats” toward a common goal. When interviewed the CSRR chief 
engineer (Mike Gozzo 2013 personal communication) defined his roles and 
responsibilities as follows: 
1. Leading a team of engineers throughout all aspects of the systems 
engineering process. This includes:  
2. Developing plans and processes to achieve the desired program 
goals and monitor progress towards those goals.  
3. Collaborate with technical experts to outline the overall 
architecture and design of baseline modernization. 
4. Be knowledgeable enough in all areas of the system to be able to 
discern important issues vice minor concerns or wants. 
5. Constantly watch for feedback of failing or inadequate processes 
and implement course corrections. 
6. Act as final decision for technical and non-technical issues as 
required. (Mike Gozzo 2013 personal communication) 
The design agent works with the chief engineer who oversees the design team. 
The design team is composed of platform engineers who are supported by functional 
SMEs from other areas such as network systems, software, information assurance, 
integrated logistics, testing and evaluation and others. The SMEs from the other programs 
are available to provide information and expertise during the integration SOS activities. 
The challenge of working with other programs is identifying the appropriate definition 
point between what is entirely within a POR responsibility and what impacts the SOS as 
a whole. Each platform engineer is responsible for creating and tracking the baseline for 
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the version planned. These results are shared within the local design teams so maximize 
the sharing of information between the platform engineers. The results produce the 
information necessary to support installing a version of CSRR.  
The chief engineer must have a vision of what the overall SOS is going to be in 
terms of capability, function, and physical design (Mike Gozzo 2013 personal 
communication). He describes these as 
1. Understanding the inter-relationships of the subsystems and the 
components. These drive the end to end capabilities and determine if they 
can be achieved (Mike Gozzo 2013 personal communication).  
2. Look at the functional block diagrams early in the process to determine if 
the proposed design blocks will work together? The next level looks 
beyond functionality of the interrelationships down to the physical and 
logical relationships (Mike Gozzo 2013 personal communication). 
The CSRR program envisioned using an evolutionary approach for the 
development of each version. Each version would be developed based on the expected 
capabilities needed. Version zero replaced the legacy architecture and most of the 
components. Version one delivered improvements to RFDACS and the operator 
workstations. Version two provided improvements to network components and 
introduced SHF. Version three was originally planned to include JTRS and ADNS 
Increment three as the major capability drivers. As each version is created the work from 
the previous one is leveraged to maximize the open architecture and commonality in 
terms of hardware and software.  
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Figure 24.  NUWC Design Team Organization (after Anderson 2014) 
The challenge of developing a version lies with the expected maturity of the 
systems planned for integration (Steve Devin 2014, email questionnaire). Deployed 
systems are usually mature and may be difficult and expensive to change. Systems still in 
the early stages of development introduce added risk through additional changes arriving 
late in the development cycle. Attempting to use the SOS engineering and integration 
process to force maturation introduces potential rework and testing, and potential 
recertification which can impact cost, schedule and performance (Steve Devin 2014, 
email questionnaire). Finding the proper balance is a constant challenge for the lead 
systems engineer. Figure 25 (DAU 2013, 37; Dahmann et al 2011) reflects the SOS 
system engineers view to implementing an SOS. The wave model begins with each 
incremental change planned for the overall SOS. The wave model represents an iterative 
process to analyze, design, build, test and deploy an SOS. Common Submarine Radio 
Room has documented their process in a value stream analysis (VSA) which enables a 
great deal of repeatability. 
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Figure 25.  Application of the Wave model to CSRR 
Application of the wave model to CSRR is performed in concert with the system 
engineering technical review (SETR) process from the acquisition guidance (DOD, 
2013). Initiating the SOS design begins with the SOS analysis which, depending on the 
maturity of the proposed systems is normally an initial technical review or a PDR. The 
PDR outlines the functional baseline of the systems involved and assessing the proposed 
changes to the SOS baseline. Once the proposed changes are agreed upon detailed 
planning of the SOS update takes place and is reviewed again at the CDR. Approval at 
CDR establishes the physical architecture of the SOS leading to completion of the 
development, integration and certification of the SOS architecture. Following 
certification the SOS architecture will be implemented as an update. Further changes 
leverage the previous development cycle. This process occurs during the development of 
each version of CSRR as systems and capabilities are inserted and removed. This same 
process can be applied to other related SOS such as SWFTS, TBMCS, or a VA platform.  
Enclosure three of interim DOD instruction 5000.02 Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System (DOD 2013, 82) mandates the use of SE principles as part of the 
acquisition activities. The SETR process defines the mandatory and recommended 
activities that occur over a programs life cycle. The challenge with this is the SETR 
process was created to address a single program. The DOD instruction 5000.02 addresses 
SOS briefly in terms of establishing a special interest program, developing an acquisition 
strategy, identifying a lead systems integrator and testing. If a program happens to be a 
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directed SOS most of these activities are occurring as needed in the overall effort. Since 
many mission capabilities are the result of creating an acknowledged SOS the individual 
programs may be in different phases of their life cycle. The main challenge to the SOS 
engineer is coordinating the integration and implementation of changes to minimize 
potential negative impacts. DASN (RDT&E) drafted a revision three to the current Naval 
System of Systems Engineering Guidebook (ASN (RDA) 2006). The focus of the revision 
is described in the foreword of the draft 
The focus of this Guidebook is on the mission level System of Systems 
engineering process to provide needed capabilities and functionality 
within a Net Centric Operations and Warfare environment in support of a 
Mission Area Capability. It provides a guide to recommended processes, 
methods and tools that, when applied by the Mission Area Systems 
Engineers, will aid program managers, their SEIPTs, support teams, and 
contractors in producing systems that successfully deliver the Mission 
Area capability. (DASN (RDT&E) 2013) 
Revision three significantly revises the content but the end goal of delivering 
mission capability from a SOS context is preserved. An important distinction in revision 
three is how a SOS is redefined in the context of mission capability. The following quote 
from the background captures this new definition and intent. 
In the future, global operations will be conducted by distributed, integrated 
and interoperable forces. This future warfare is about capability delivered 
by a “SOS” operating as a single system. SOS is defined in this document 
as a force package of interoperable platforms and nodes acting as a single 
system to achieve a mission capability, i.e. a mission level SOS. Typical 
characteristics include a high degree of collaboration and coordination, 
flexible addition or removal of component systems, and a net-centric 
architecture. The capabilities provided by each constituent system 
operating within the SOS are framed by the integrated force package 
architecture. (DASN (RDT&E) 2013, 6) 
In order to achieve these capabilities the SETR processes must be applied at each 
level (e.g., the CSRR SOS must support the platform and mission level SOS). The PORs 
supporting CSRR follow the SETR processes as part of their development cycle. The 
level of complexity and amount of change within each system and the maturity of the 
program can determine which SETR events may be included or omitted. A SOS will be 
using an iterative process previously described and may include events such as an initial 
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technical review, systems requirements review, or software specification reviews. The 
CSRR value stream analysis identified the following SETR events in Table 18 which 
occur during the design and development phase. The SETR events are not the main goals 
within a program development cycle but status reviews assessing the maturity of a system 
or SOS to progress to the next phase. 
From a SOS approach each individual system performs these SETR events as 
well. These POR SETR events are important to the SOS since they drive maturity and 
demonstrate they are ready to be implemented in the overall architecture. The design-
build approach at both the systems level and the SOS level in concert with the SETR 
events attempt to minimize the risks of introducing a capability before it is ready.  
Table 18.   System Engineering Events Occurring During Design and 
Development 
Event Activity 
Preliminary Design Review 
(PDR) 
The PDR provides the initial review of the design at the 
functional level. At this point individual systems maturity 
is still low, approximately 20–30 percent. 
Integrated Baseline Review 
(IBR) 
The IBR follows the PDR to establish the development 
baseline. Each development baseline is based on a Lean 
Six Sigma (LSS) Value Stream Analysis (VSA) which 
identified the major events and the time required to 
accomplish them. The VSA uses an accordion concept 
allowing each version development baseline to expand or 
shrink based on the expected amount of work. Once the 
development baseline is approved it provides the main 
tracking method to assess if schedule was being 
maintained. 
Critical Design Review 
(CDR) 
CDR is scheduled to occur when the design maturity is 
estimated to be approximately 85–90 percent. At this point 
the physical design is presented along with proposed 
testing criteria and assessments from the production, ILS 
and IA leads. Systems that are not determined to be mature 
by CDR are recommended for deferral to the next version. 
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2. Testing and Certification 
CSRR follows a build-test-certify approach during the development cycle as a 
risk reduction methodology. Once a component or system is received the CSRR team 
performs several levels of testing prior to deployment to the fleet. The goal is to minimize 
repeating any testing performed by the parent POR while ensuring it will fit and function 
within the CSRR architecture and will be interoperable. Figure 26 illustrates the systems 
which undergo some level of testing within the overall system of systems.  
With the exception of functional interface testing and regression testing a test 
readiness review will occur to get concurrence from the principal assistant program 
manager (PAPM) or program manage the CSRR is ready to begin testing. The levels of 
testing are described below. Once the testing is complete the results are shared with the 
stakeholders as necessary to support meeting program acquisition milestones. 
 
Figure 26.  Systems Testing Required in Support of Common Submarine Radio 
Room as a System of Systems 
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a. Functional Interface Testing 
This is the first time the system or component can be actually evaluated by the 
design team. The system is evaluated for form and fit, logical and power interfaces are 
checked, and the system documentation is reviewed. Accomplishment of this testing is 
under the direction of the design agent and chief systems engineer. Once this is complete, 
the system or component is reported at the CDR as ready to support SDVT. 
b. System Design Verification Testing  
SDVT is a formal test event to validate the system will operate within the CSRR 
architecture using an end to end environment, will meet its own system requirements, and 
will not degrade the CSRR performance specifications defined in the SUBECS CPD. 
When the system is ready to enter SDVT the design agent and test and evaluation lead 
will brief the PAPM and request concurrence to begin testing. Once the system has 
successfully completed SDVT, the physical design has been fully verified and validated. 
If necessary any regression testing required will occur after SDVT. If this is a first of 
version design, the CSRR will proceed into SAT. 
c. Systems Acceptance Testing 
Systems acceptance testing is performed if the design is a first of version or has 
been determined necessary by the program team. Systems acceptance testing is the final 
performance run to demonstrate system stability while operating during a series of 
scenarios. Operating procedures are validated using fleet operators and system 
configuration information is collected to support development of the CSRR Multi-
Reconfigurable Training System (MRTS). If necessary any strategic certification testing 
will occur as well as collecting equipment data to determine operational availability (Ao). 
Testing is accomplished using operational circuits with the submarine BCA. Authority to 
proceed into SAT is granted by the PMW770 program manager at the SAT test readiness 
review. 
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d. Regression Testing 
Any deficiencies or changes that occur during SDVT or SAT require some level 
of retest to verify if a patch or configuration change works. Regression testing is not 
considered a required event but enough time is normally scheduled between SDVT and 
SAT testing of any changes. 
e. Cybersecurity Testing 
Cybersecurity (or IA) testing will take place in concert with the formal testing 
events and as necessary in between testing events to verify security technical 
implementation guides are applied and validate they are working. Any updates that need 
to be installed will be accomplished prior to SDVT and SAT. 
f. Strategic Certification Testing 
Strategic testing is required by the Joint Staff to ensure any changes to a NC3 
system have been properly and adequately verified and validated prior to deployment to 
an operational NC3 activity or platform. The primary certification tests are TCM and 
EAM certification. 
1. TCM Certification—TCM certification is accomplished to validate any 
hardware or software changes made to the messaging path by transmitting 
a predetermined number of targeting messages and recording them to 
media. An agent for SSP analyzes the messages to verify they are fully 
readable by the strategic weapons system. Any discrepancies are analyzed 
and corrected before issuing the final certification recommendation to U.S. 
Strategic Command.  
2. EAM Certification—Clear and concise communications between the 
president and strategic forces requires the use of highly reliable 
communications paths. In accordance with JCS direction any changes to 
systems impacting the messaging paths are tested prior to being fielded. 
The certification is an end to end test to verify any changes have not 
impacted the reliable delivery of EAMs. Testing results are provided to the 
JCS for review and approval. 
The design and development process maintains the rigor necessary to ensure any 
issues or deficiencies are resolved or mitigated before deployment in an operational 
environment. The challenge from the system versus SOS perspectives is defining what 
the right level of design, development and testing that must be done. The design and 
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development activities are largely driven by physical and functional characteristics of 
each system. Testing becomes a more contentious issue at times, especially if the POR 
feels they have performed an adequate level of testing to demonstrate they are ready for 
fielding. History within DOD is replete with examples where this argument has been 
proven false. TBMCS is one example where unclear requirements and over reliance on 
the contractor led to being unable to validate or verify the operational readiness prior to 
deployment (Collens and Krause 2005, v, 2737). The Hubble space telescope is another 
where the system was launched into orbit before a flaw in the main mirror was detected. 
The repair required an unplanned 11 day space mission by the shuttle Endeavor (Mattice 
2003, 10). The F-111 attempted to implement concurrency of design validation and 
verification while entering production. The validation and verification resulted in several 
costly design changes to 200 aircraft and schedule delays due to structural failures which 
grounded the entire F-111 fleet for several months (Richey 2005, 24). While it can be 
extremely challenging to test every possible scenario the testing approach from the 
system to the SOS should follow a logical progression to maintain traceability and 
identify potential areas of risk to investigate further. It is incumbent on the SOS program 
manager to keep the stakeholders aware of the status and concerns of any shortfalls in the 
testing. Vaneman and Budka (2013) illustrated the role of SOSE integration in Figure 27. 
Each POR performs the activities shown in the lower portion of the Vee. If these are not 
adequately performed or incomplete, the validation and verification necessary for 
certification, deployment and sustainment, shown in Figure 28, increase the risk of 
failure. This approach is also reflected in table A-6 of annex A in the SE Guide for SOS 
(Director, Systems and Software Engineering 2008, 103) of the importance of the SOS 
verification building on the efforts of the individual systems. Once the CSRR version has 
completed the design and development phase, responsibility for procuring the materials 
and equipment shifts to the production agent.  
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Figure 27.  System of Systems Engineering and Integrations Role in System 
Design and Development (from Vaneman and Budka 2013, 6) 
 
Figure 28.  Validation and Verification Supporting the System of Systems 
Interoperability, Deployment and Sustainment (after Vaneman and 
Budka 2013, 6, 11) 
The design agent also manages responsibilities as the CSRR planning yard to 
maintain configuration control of each CSRR version. The purpose of the planning yard 
is to serve as the repository for all drawings concerning CSRR. The CSRR planning yard 
maintains a partnership with the platform planning yards to manage changes that occur 
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within the CSRR boundary and the platform boundaries. Changes are managed via a 
planning yard liaison action request (PLAR) between the design, production and 
installation teams. Any changes that occur post testing will be assessed to determine the 
impact and if any additional design or testing is required.  
C. COMMON SUBMARINE RADIO ROOM SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
PRODUCTION APPROACH 
Prior to CSRR, SCSS modernization involved the coordination of multiple 
programs to build and ship their own installation kits. This meant the alteration 
installation team had to verify they had all of the right materials and equipment and 
develop their own integrated drawings to accomplish the installation. Lack of 
standardization between the organizations and programs created a significant amount of 
variation of what a kit would contain. This approach also created complications if several 
install kits were managed by different installation teams. The lack of coordination added 
complexity in a very dynamic, fully scheduled availability. This approach also created a 
substantial amount of rework if errors were found in a ship alt package or no guidance 
was provided for configuration issues. Ultimately, this approach ended up creating 48 
similar yet different configurations among the LA platforms. This same approach has 
also resulted in creating different configurations among the several hundred surface 
platforms as well. 
The SSC LANT production agent was interviewed as part of this research via 
email and telephone. SSC LANT oversees production activities to include procurement of 
all equipment and materials necessary to support a CSRR installation, PITCO, kitting, 
and shipment to the site (Dave Bednarczyk telephone interview 2014). By leveraging 
opportunities for quantity purchases of installation materials, significant cost savings can 
be realized. Individual PORs provide their equipment and any unique materials necessary 
for inclusion in the installation kit. The production team shown in Figure 29 engages with 
the various PORs as necessary to coordinate the procurement or delivery of their 
equipment and materials for PITCO and shipping to the installation team. The production 
team assigned responsibilities by platform to address specific issues while balancing 
workloads. The PITCO period allows pre-loading and configuring software and 
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hardware. Additionally it serves as a burn in period to eliminate possible failures prior to 
shipping. Once PITCO is complete, the installation kit is packed and shipped to the 
installation site. Similar to the design agent’s role in performing SOS verification, PITCO 
provides the overarching testing to ensure the product shipped to the site is operational. 
This production quality assurance approach mitigates the risk of failures occurring during 
the production and systems operational verification testing (SOVT) (Dave Bednarczyk 
telephone interview 2014).  
The PITCO process successfully demonstrated for V1 and V2 proved to be more 
difficult to perform for V3. Some PORs chose to ship their systems directly to the 
installation team while others sent them to SSC LANT without their final configuration 
settings inserted. Having some incomplete components and others not available impacted 
the ability to perform a complete PITCO and validate the ship set prior to packing and 
shipping.  
 
Figure 29.  CSRR Production and Support Team 
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Late changes to software and hardware configurations also caused delays. The 
initial V3 ship set installed on the USS Hampton did not perform PITCO which resulted 
in a number of failures caught by the installation and SOVT teams. Failed parts had to be 
replaced from the CSRR production team and the other programs. These failures in turn 
drove up installation costs and delayed schedules. Data collected from follow on 
installations by the production agent confirmed failure to accomplish a PITCO continued 
to drive costs upwards of several hundred thousand dollars and delay completion from 
days to weeks (Dave Bednarczyk telephone interview).  
Previous to the deployment of V3 the production team procured and managed all 
of the system components necessary to install CSRR. As the procurement arm for the 
CSRR program SSC LANT was able to control their fate by purchasing or designing the 
materials necessary to build a ship set (Dave Bednarczyk telephone interview). The 
advantage of this approach is production and kitting responsibilities solely resided with 
the production agent. The disadvantage of this is systems normally managed by another 
program office used a different configuration and could not easily assume responsibility 
of these new components within their budgets. Specific components, such as the EHF 
Follow on Terminal, was provided from PMW 170. Others had to be designed entirely to 
fulfill requirements if a formal POR was not available. One component which was 
entirely built to support CSRR was the modern legacy cryptographic system (MLCS) 
which was originally planned as a replacement for the multifunctional cryptographic 
system (MCS). The vendor’s inability to prove the viability of the MCS resulted in its 
cancellation in 2004. In order to keep the CSRR program on track an alternate solution 
was rapidly developed and deployed with version zero. The MLCS was created in less 
than a year to provide the similar capabilities as the MCS. Created only as a stopgap 
solution, the MLCS is being replaced with a POR crypto universal enclosure managed by 
PMW130. 
Version three shifted to an approach of using consolidated engineering changes 
(EC) and ship alteration record (SAR) with the ship installation drawings (SID) contained 
in an associated EC creating what was called a “SIDless SAR.” The creation of the ECs 
and their associated SARs were used to create the consolidated list of bill of materials the 
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production team would provide and a list the installing activity would have to provide. 
This approach identified a number of issues when engaging with other PORs. For V3, 
PORs were expected to provide their equipment and either the installation materials or 
funding to procure them. This approach added another layer of coordination which 
caused confusion, resulting in equipment received with the wrong configurations, 
damaged, or shipped late. As a build to print organization, introducing late changes to the 
SSC LANT production team caused perturbations in costs and schedules due to rework 
(Dave Bednarczyk telephone interview). PLARs directing changes to cables or mounting 
kits often meant pulling materials out of a packed kit, creating a risk of something being 
misplaced. This process is reflective of an acknowledged SOS characteristic where the 
SOS has objectives, resources and manager but must also collaborate with the constituent 
systems (Director, Systems and Software Engineering 2008, 5). 
D. COMMON SUBMARINE RADIO ROOM SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
INSTALLATION APPROACH 
Common Submarine Radio Room installations are performed by alteration 
installation teams (AIT) contracted through the SPAWAR Systems Center Installation 
Management Office (IMO). In 2011, the FRD was established to provide a single agent 
responsible for coordinating installations. The platform installation manager (PIM) is the 
embedded FRD representative within the Undersea Integration program office 
responsible for coordinating installations. The PIM works with the respective product 
program offices to ensure the equipment, materials and personnel are available to support 
the installation.  
The installation packages developed by the design agent included the bill of 
materials needed to accomplish the work. The intent was to have the POR fund their 
share and leverage the advantages of making quantity purchases. This effort resulted in 
an agreement between PMW770 and several program offices in which the CSRR 
program would purchase the materials and deliver them in the kit. The other PORs 
installation funding would be used first and then CSRR installation funding would be 
used.  
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Each installation is assigned government onsite installation coordinator (OSIC) to 
serve as the liaison between the platform, the local maintenance activities, and the 
installation team. The OSIC is responsible for arranging for the modernization, testing, 
and training activities. Once the production phase of the installation is complete the 
SOVT is performed. A SOVT is performed by government personnel and serves as the 
acceptance testing. Since SSC LANT had more collective experience with CSRR they 
provided the majority of the SOVT SMEs. The production agent provides support to the 
installation teams if a piece of material or equipment fails or is defective. Once SOVT is 
complete the platform assumes responsibility for CSRR and all of the ancillary systems.  
E. COMMON SUBMARINE RADIO ROOM SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
SUSTAINMENT APPROACH 
Even though CSRR is a SOS there are sustainment responsibilities to be 
maintained. SPAWAR Systems Center Atlantic is assigned as the CSRR in service 
engineering activity (ISEA) responsibilities. The ISEA shown in Figure 30 is responsible 
for providing onsite and distance technical support, provides the initial spares outfitting, 
and is the CSRR inventory control point for repair parts. The ISEA maintains a cadre of 
onsite representatives (OSR) at most submarine ports which provide local support and 
perform minor modernization. The production agent is responsible for overseeing the 
activities of the ISEA and was interviewed as part of the research. Notes from the 
integrated logistics support management team, fleet support team and program 
management review action items were reviewed as part of this research. Obsolescence 
management is a recurring item which must be managed by the ISEA working in concert 
with the support activities of the other PORs.  
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Figure 30.  SPAWAR Systems Center Atlantic In Service Engineering Activity 
Organization 
Unlike Trident IRR, which saw little change until the introduction of submarine 
IP, both SCSS and CSRR went through a significant amount of change as systems 
became more tightly integrated and automated. The SCSS represented a transition from 
manual patch panels to the automated baseband switching eliminating the manual 
patching of crypto devices to other baseband equipment and consolidating a number of 
individual systems into a consolidated modernization availability. Common Submarine 
Radio Room introduced an integrated yet open architecture which automated RF 
switching and expanded the network to control the systems and distribute information to 
the appropriate users. 
Introduction of new changes normally results in an increase in requests for 
technical assistance until enough native user knowledge is available to operate and 
maintain their systems. One drawback of installing a new system is the lack of technical 
expertise of how the system interfaces with other systems. The OSRs are responsible for 
accomplishing minor modernization and providing onsite technical assistance to develop 
the core of knowledge so users can determine if a problem is the new system or 
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elsewhere. The OSR can assess a problem to determine if it is CSRR related or caused by 
an individual system and if necessary engage the specific POR SMEs to resolve the issue. 
F. COMMON SUBMARINE RADIO ROOM SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
TRAINING APPROACH 
SSC LANT is responsible for developing the training material used by Submarine 
Learning Center on their multi reconfigurable training system (MRTS). The MRTS is a 
complete network based training system which provides a virtual representation of the 
CSRR using touch screen technology mounted in full sized racks representing a CSRR 
system. Prior to MRTS CSRR training was provided using training technical equipment 
(TTE) which is a physical and functional representative ship system installed in a training 
laboratory. The advantage of this obviously is the ability of the operator to touch and 
manipulate the systems just as they would on the platform. The disadvantage of using 
TTE is 
1. If the TTE breaks down, training value can be lost. 
2. In order to replicate this capability, it must be installed at each site or 
operators must travel to the site for training 
3. There is a significant cost to install and maintain TTE. This includes a cost 
on the program to procure additional assets increasing their TOC. 
4. Pre faulted modules and scenarios had to be developed. Occasionally 
introducing a fault could actually cause a real failure. 
Notes from the submarine communications and networks training management 
team (SCANTMT) were reviewed as part of the research. A significant challenge which 
confronts the training community concerns the delivery of training for a system of 
systems. The CSRR training uses a system of systems approach for operations and 
maintenance while each individual program provides their own training solution and ILS 
documentation. The submarine force has recognized the value of using a trainer like 
MRTS and is implementing similar approaches for other system trainers including 
weapons control and electronic warfare. Unfortunately, the lack of a concrete common 
requirement within the system training plans has resulted in training solutions which do 
not synchronize well.  
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The SSC LANT training team is partnered with the NUWC ILS team which uses 
the CSRR documentation and information from the individual programs to incorporate 
their systems information into the MRTS. There are several advantages of using a SOS 
solution like MRTS 
1. While a loss of a MRTS at a school site can impact training, the chance of 
entirely stopping training is substantially reduced since each training site 
has several systems installed. 
2. The ability to replicate the training capability has a non-recurring cost to 
install the hardware and software. Once this is complete, updates will be 
developed by the MRTS team and distributed to all sites. 
3. Removing the TTE eliminates the cost of installing a new trainer and 
associated maintenance and modernization costs. 
4. The ability to reconfigure the trainer from one CSRR version to another 
can be accomplished in very little time. 
5. The MRTS allows an operator to still manipulate his CSRR and get the 
applicable responses. This includes training in various mission scenarios 
and equipment casualties. 
The CSRR shares several characteristics with the Air Force KC-135 FTS. The 
KC-135 FTS uses a hardware TTE approach to train flight crews (Chislaghi, Dyer and 
Free 2010). Their approach shared the same challenges as the TTE installed at the 
training facilities in Bangor, Washington and Kings Bay, Georgia. The Air Force 
discovered like CSRR that resources had to be allocated in order to maintain and upgrade 
the trainers. The approach at this point treated the trainers like platforms for 
modernization purposes. This approach was feasible as long as changes were minimized. 
However, the rapid modernization occurring across the fleet forced acknowledgement 
this approach was no longer cost effective nor responsive enough to meet the fleet 
operator needs. The transition to MRTS demonstrated a SOS training approach could be 
effectively developed. The success of the MRTS program resulted in the submarine force 
expanding its use to other systems. 
G. CSRR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINMENT 
SSC PAC is responsible for the development and sustainment of the control and 
management (C&M) software. The software project manager works with the prime 
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vendor to develop new updates for each CSRR version via delivery orders. All other 
programs provide their own software to support their systems but also provide 
information for enabling remote operation of their systems from the C&M. The C&M 
software provides the overall systems control and management of CSRR. The integration 
of new capabilities identified from information derived from the constituent programs to 
create the necessary drivers. The advantage of this approach means the individual 
programs maintain their own software and the C&M provides the overall capability of 
tying the individual components to each other, in essence is the glue needed to make 
everything work efficiently.  
The challenge of managing the C&M software is similar to other programs. 
Changing technology, new interfaces, and increasing security upgrades via software 
while leveraging deployed applications is a challenge for a single program. This 
challenge is no less for the C&M which must handle a multitude of components for 
configuration, circuit management and system status.  
H. CHALLENGES FACING COMMON SUBMARINE RADIO ROOM AS A 
SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
The challenges facing CSRR or any other SOS share many characteristics. As an 
acknowledged SOS the CSRR program manager has the same responsibilities as his peers 
managing their product programs. The SOS program manager faces additional challenges 
to ensure the specific program activities under his responsibility take into account not 
only his program but the challenges and opportunities of his peers. If a program attempts 
seeks to optimize their constituent system without consideration of the impact it may 
have on others the results may be a more fragile system, vulnerable to intentional or 
unintentional degradation. 
1. Program and Other POR Requirements 
One of the main challenges facing CSRR is the relationship it has with other 
programs. DOD largely acquires individual systems and integrates them versus 
integrating capabilities into systems of systems upfront. A notable exception was the GPS 
program which integrated several segments or components to deliver capability under the 
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lead of one service. Since GPS is classified as an ACAT I program, it was provided the 
authority to define the overall SOS architecture and the overall system requirements. GPS 
can be classified as a directed SOS since it was built to address a specific purpose, 
precise navigation and timing. The other services can develop their systems to 
accommodate their specific needs but must still be interoperable within the established 
GPS architecture. The JCIDS approach was implemented in 2002 to address shortfalls in 
the DOD acquisition system. JCIDS introduced a more defined process of identifying 
capability gaps and solutions. However, this did not specifically address how capabilities 
could be delivered via a SOS. DOD did recognize certain capabilities required the 
integration of several systems to create a SOS. Most of these were acknowledged SOS 
intended to work together but the emphasis on the system from a budgetary perspective 
shifted the focus off the SOS and onto the system. CSRR faces this same challenge. 
While it is an ACAT II program, resource officers considered it a system like many 
others. This view often results in creating breaks among the various constituent systems 
and the overall SOS. 
CSRR can be considered an acknowledged SOS which has its own recognized 
requirements and objectives, but each of the constituent programs is independently 
managed, funded, and sustained. SWFTS is under the cognizance of PEO SUB and is not 
a formal program, but a managed agreement which shares many characteristics of a 
directed SOS. The challenge is CSRR is classified as an ACAT II program responsible 
for delivering a defined capability like other program when viewed from the resource 
sponsor level. Budget, contractual or technical changes affecting individual programs 
within PEO C4I or PEO SUB can impact the overall C4I capability and potentially force 
significant design changes to the CSRR architecture (Darlene Sullivan 2014, email 
response to questionnaire). Additional non-technical issues can occur when there is a 
turnover of personnel. These new personnel sometimes require an introduction to 
reinforce the “value added” the system of systems approach such as CSRR provides 
(Darlene Sullivan 2014, email response to questionnaire).   
A persistent challenge encountered with the extensive use of COTS or new 
technology has been the late delivery of equipment, or if received, it has not been fully 
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tested (Steve Devin 2014, email response to questionnaire). Some of this is attributable to 
poor communication, technical or programmatic issues (Darlene Sullivan 2014, email 
response to questionnaire). One example is the joint tactical radio system (JTRS) airborne 
maritime fixed station (AMF), an ACAT I program. JTRS-AMF was envisioned to be the 
common replacement for the different radios procured by each service. The CSRR V3 
design planned using JTRS-AMF as a cornerstone component. The inability to meet 
milestones, de-scoping of key requirements and cost overruns ultimately caused the 
program to be cancelled. The cancellation forced the program plans and schedules for 
CSRR and other programs to be revised, and last minute investigation into other solutions 
to provide the capabilities to the warfighter was pursued. Similar issues have been 
encountered as other systems failed to meet their schedules or had funding cut from their 
program. 
Testing of a SOS poses a number of challenges to validate and verify capabilities. 
Testing of individual systems can be performed using clearly defined criteria in a 
controlled environment. Even these events are solely focused on demonstrating the 
specific capabilities inherent to the system. Testing and evaluation of a SOS is more 
difficult since the aggregation of individual requirements can result in a testing event 
which may be very difficult or expensive to accomplish. Common Submarine Radio 
Room has performance requirements defined in the CSRR CPD and SUBECS CRD, but 
these must be adjudicated against the individual systems to eliminate conflicts.  
End to end testing may also identify a problem which was not evident during 
systems testing. This emergence may force unexpected changes to a specific system or a 
group of systems. An acknowledged SOS, made up of individual PORs, must come to 
agreement about testing approaches and scope. Each system performs testing to meet 
their particular key performance parameters and key systems attributes. Testing a system 
rarely involves evaluating full end to end performance except as part of a formal 
developmental test (DT) or operational test (OT) event. The aspects of a SOS from 
stakeholder involvement to performance and behavior have implications on the testing 
and evaluation of a SOS. Table 19 lists the aspects of a system and acknowledged SOS to 
identify implications for SOS testing and evaluation (Dahmann, et al. 2010). The CSRR 
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DT and OT approach used for each version had to take a macro level view to demonstrate 
it could meet the CPD requirements. Any problems noted in individual systems had to be 
addressed since these reflected against the overall operational effectiveness and 
suitability. Using a systems approach would not have identified many of the issues during 
DT and OT.  
2. Integrated Logistics 
Another challenge is the myriad of integrated logistics support (ILS) issues which 
arise from managing a SOS. Acknowledged SOS architectures require close cooperation 
among the different programs to ensure documentation, repair parts and intermediate or 
depot support in place at the right locations and formats. Each version performs a 
reliability assessment to determine the appropriate quantity of spare parts to carry. The 
type of reliability analysis performed is determined by the type of platform. SSBNs 
perform a mission essential component (MEC) analysis which assigns a numerical value. 
A higher number represents a more critical part. This reliability analysis identifies which 
repair parts must be onboard the SSBN to support the strategic deterrence mission. All 
other platforms perform a readiness based sparing (RBS) analysis. Like the MEC an RBS 
performs a similar function to determine which repair parts should be onboard.  
Each system performs their own reliability analysis which can result in different 
sparing levels when the analysis is performed at the SOS level. System maturity can 
impact the accuracy of the sparing analysis. New systems are analyzed using predicted or 
vendor provided data. Deployed systems can use actual failure data. Any disparities 
between the systems reliability analysis and the SOS analysis must be resolved, 
especially if a spare part is determined to have a high MEC, or additional spare parts are 
needed to meet the results of the overall SOS. A high MEC determines more repair parts 
are required, which in turn drives cost. Conversely, if the systems within the SOS share 




Table 19.   System of Systems Test and Evaluation Implications (from Dahmann 
et al. 2010) 
Aspect System Acknowledged System of Systems SOS T&E Implications 
Management & Oversight  
Stakeholder 
Involvement  
Clearer set of 
stakeholders and 
aligned objectives  
Stakeholders at both system level and 
SOS levels (including the system owners), 
with competing interests and priorities; in 
some cases, the system stakeholder has no 
vested interest in the SOS; all 
stakeholders may not be recognized.  
 
Validation criteria more 
difficult to establish  
Governance  Aligned PM and 
funding  
Added levels of complexity due to 
management and funding for both the 
SOS and individual systems; SOS does 
not have authority over all the systems.  
 
Can not explicitly impose 
SOS conditions on system 
T&E  




developed to meet 
operational 
objectives  
Called upon to meet a set of operational 
objectives using systems whose objectives 
may or may not align with the SOS 
objectives.  
 
System level operational 
objectives may not have 
clear analog in SOS 
conditions that need T&E  
Implementation  
Acquisition  Aligned to ACAT 
Milestones, 
documented 
requirements, SE  
Added complexity due to multiple system 
lifecycles across acquisition programs, 
involving legacy systems, systems under 
development, new developments, and 
technology insertion; Typically have 
stated capability objectives upfront which 
may need to be translated into formal 
requirements.  
 
Depends on testing of 
constituent systems to 
SOS requirements as well 
as SOS level testing  
Test & 
Evaluation  
Test and evaluation 
of the system is 
generally possible  
Testing is more challenging due to the 
difficulty of synchronizing across 
multiple systems‟ life cycles; given the 
complexity of all the moving parts and 
potential for unintended consequences  
 
Difficult to bring multiple 
systems together for T&E 
in synchrony with 
capability evolution.  





interfaces for the 
single system  
Focus on identifying the systems that 
contribute to the SOS objectives and 
enabling the flow of data, control and 
functionality across the SOS while 
balancing needs of the systems.  
 
Additional test points 




Performance of the 
system to meet 
specified objectives  
Performance across the SOS that satisfies 
SOS user capability needs while 
balancing needs of the systems  
Increased subjectivity in 
assessing behavior, given 
challenges of system 
alignment.  
 
Legacy or non-COTS systems, which may have spare parts in short supply, add 
new dimensions as well. The challenge to building or modernizing a SOS with a legacy 
system may determine additional repair parts are needed, only to find out there are no 
spare parts available, or the reengineering costs exceeds the available resources.  
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Documentation must remain current as well for each platforms configuration. 
This is one area where there is significant weakness. Individual systems will update their 
operating procedures, maintenance manuals and software user manuals as changes occur. 
The format of these manuals may vary as well unless the standards are included as a data 
item in the contract. Few SOS create overarching manuals which aggregate the 
information needed to create consolidated operating procedures. The IRR developed 
integrated procedures and manuals, providing a standard approach for CSRR which is 
used today. Overarching technical manuals, such as cable manuals, are created as 
references to support maintenance and repairs. The quality of overarching documentation 
is directly related to the quality of the source data. If the data is poor, extra work may be 
required to improve the quality.  
3. Training 
System of systems training is a relatively new concept for DOD. The approach 
used by CSRR is a large step in the right direction but the solution is imperfect. Effective 
systems engineering considers every facet to ensure they develop an appropriate solution. 
The SOS engineer must consider how the training solution impacts the desired end state. 
If there is little need to an operator to interface extensively with the system or there is a 
large cadre of onsite technicians the training solution may be minimal. If there is a need 
to train operators to respond to a complex scenario involving extensive C4I capabilities 
such as carrier strike group performing strike operations in concert with a cyber-operation 
or humanitarian aid / disaster relief the current trainers cannot be networked to support 
this and coordinating operational assets is time consuming and costly. A SOS engineer 
has the task of examining the SOS architecture to come up with a balanced approach to 
the solution. 
To date there is little to no policy or guidance for managing the training of 
multiple systems integrated together. Each system is required to develop a training 
systems plan which is typically not coordinated with other systems. This in turn results in 
training materials and curricula to operate and maintain the specific AN/USQ-XX but 
little is covered about how it fits into the larger SOS architecture. A training course for a 
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technician may train them on a variety of equipment but there is very little about how 
they are related at a larger level. One limitation to this is the cost to build a SOS trainer is 
very cost prohibitive and the student throughput is limited to a predetermined number for 
each course. An option to meet this need is to build a virtual type trainer.  
To meet this need the CSRR program developed a Multi-Reconfigurable Training 
System (MRTS). The MRTS is a virtual representation of the CSRR which is used to 
train operators and maintenance technicians. The system is composed of touch screen 
monitors mounted in the racks similar to the platform and arranged to match the platform 
configuration. The MRTS software emulates the real equipment and is loaded with a 
comprehensive suite of scenarios. Several advantages of this approach include:  
 Lower costs to develop and update the trainer. The initial startup costs 
cover the hardware and initial software load. Installing a complete suite of 
technical training equipment (TTE) can cost $20 million and about $500 
thousand annually for maintenance. Procuring and installing a MRTS is 
less than $1 million. Updates can be created once and deployed to all sites. 
Software development costs may vary but are still significantly less than 
hardware modernization and sustainment.  
 The MRTS can be updated quickly via a software load. Hardware updates 
occur only as needed to address obsolescence issues. TTE remains in a 
static condition until it is modernized. Once TTE is modernized it cannot 
support earlier configurations for training.  
 If necessary a MRTS lab can be reconfigured to a different version or 
version represented on another platform. Other PORs such as ADNS, 
SUBLAN, CANES and team trainers can leverage the MRTS approach. A 
TTE laboratory is limited to the installed configuration.  
Increasing information assurance and cybersecurity requirements consume a 
larger role of training technicians and operators. The approach used today by the 
submarine force to address communications and networks is under the responsibility of 
two different ratings. Communications systems operations and maintenance is the 
responsibility of the submarine communications electronics technicians (ETR). All 
network responsibilities are managed by the submarine information systems technician 
(ITS). Current DOD policy mandates all personnel assigned duties to work on a network 
must be a certified member of the information assurance workforce (IAWF). This 
mandate did not discriminate between closed and open networks. The mandate created a 
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substantial amount of confusion for the technical ratings in terms of where the line of 
separation is defined between isolated networks used for the control of systems and those 
responsible for managing the flow of data from one point to another.  
The duties of many of these technical rates mean they must have a substantial 
level of access to operate their systems. Specifically a problem arises if a 
communications component in the control network fails the ITS must be notified in order 
to investigate and correct the problem. The challenge is the ITS has not received any 
training on the CSRR as a SOS so they must rely on their basic network knowledge. The 
training provided to the ETR does not include any network systems which limits them to 
identifying which network component might have a problem. The conflict which 
frequently arises from this dichotomy is if the problem has several potential causes a 
great deal of back and forth exchange occurs in order to fully understand if the failure is 
truly a network problem or a communications component interfaced to the network. The 
lack of providing adequate training to both ratings creates a gap in their knowledge which 
creates a risk of a platform incurring a communications outage. 
The solution to this would be to (1) designate the ETR personnel as member of 
the IAWF or (2) initiate a rating conversion of all ETR personnel to ITS which 
automatically places them in the IAWF, or (3) create a designation criteria of which 
systems require an IAWF certified technician and which ones can be maintained by other 
personnel. Within the submarine force this issue is not isolated to the ETR rating. Other 
ratings including combat systems and engineering ratings. On a macro level this problem 
is not isolated to the submarine force. The Navy as a whole faces challenges to determine 
how to fully train and equip their forces when many systems are now designed to 
interoperate so closely.  
4. Production 
The versions of CSRR prior to V3 were managed solely by SSC LANT. During 
this period the production team and installation teams worked closely together to build 
each CSRR prior to shipping to the installation site. The number of platforms in each 
class also helped since they were small enough to create a single design which could be 
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fielded in concert with the modernization periods. After assuming responsibility for the 
CSRR program and as lead systems integrator PMW770 developed and installed CSRR 
on the SSGNs replacing their legacy Trident IRRs using the VA CSRR design as a 
model. The SSBNs followed closely leveraging the work from the SSGN design while 
incorporating the components and systems necessary to support their strategic deterrence 
mission. The Seawolf class followed next leaving the LA class as the final exception. The 
production teams would build each ship set, perform a PITCO, configure it for the 
designated platform, an then pack and ship it. 
The deployment of V3 coincided with the standup of the FRD and 
implementation of the global installation contract. Prior to V3 the production team would 
coordinate the delivery of all components and systems after performing a complete 
PITCO of the ship set. V3 proved to be a coordination challenge much more significant 
than earlier versions. First, the initial platform to receive V3 was the LA class, which also 
had the largest population of platforms and all of them required major modernization 
with a total replacement of their SCSS. Second, the number of new systems making up 
V3 each had their own mounting kits, software, alteration documentation, testing 
requirements and sparing approaches. The CSRR V3 production team had to contend 
with these issues as well as the differing bill of materials developed for each class. Third, 
some PORs insisted in delivering their systems directly to the installation site vice having 
it go through the PITCO process. This increased the risks of finding infant failures which 
delayed testing and drove up costs. 
Several lessons were learned from the production process for V3. First, the 
production team manufactured all of the cables for the installation with at least one end 
completed in order to accelerate the installation. Second, the design drawings provided by 
the design agent were used to pre-assemble pieces into larger subassemblies again to 
accelerate the installation. A problem which arose from this approach is the AIT received 
the same drawings and would report materials missing which were actually consumed in 
the pre-fabrication process. Third, the production team developed the integrated SOVT 
merging all of the system verification testing into a larger, more comprehensive systems  
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verification. A result of this discovered the SPAWAR system for tracking installation 
completions does not have the capability of tracking the status of SOS installation and 
testing progress.  
5. Installations and Synchronization of Installations into Block Upgrades 
The establishment of the FRD significantly altered the existing installation 
process. Instead of each program office working directly with the IMO all functions were 
redirected to the FRD as the single point of contact for all installation issues. Additionally 
the FRD and IMO released a global installation contract which supported multiple award 
contracts and divided the installation responsibilities geographically with SSC LANT 
responsible for the east coast and SSC PAC responsible for the west coast. The standup 
of the FRD shifted the installation responsibilities away from the CSRR program 
production team. The shift significantly changed the relationship between the production 
and installation teams and eliminated the SSC LANT installation learning curve. The new 
installation contract discouraged development of a learning curve as new vendors with no 
prior CSRR experience were awarded the work. The lack of prior experience resulted in 
the CSRR production team altering their kitting approach as each new vendor wanted the 
installation kit created and delivered differently. Ultimately the FRD, IMO, and 
production team agreed on a standardized approach to how the kits would be produced, 
packed and shipped. However this did not address the issue of no effective learning curve 
for the AIT.  
PEO C4I established a strategic goal for reducing the number of system variants 
installed afloat and ashore. To achieve this goal PEO C4I developed a synchronized 
fielding plan to align the fielding of systems to platform availabilities. This approach was 
an important first step but overlooked is the system development cycle. In the case of 
CSRR V3 several systems including ADNS, NMT, RFDACS and new workstations were 
consolidated into a single package. The recommended approach for a development cycle 
is working to an event based schedule. However, this approach conflicts with the 
calendar and budget based schedule. This is particularly acute when they have not been 
adjudicated to identify and mitigate schedule conflicts. The first installation of CSRR on 
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an LA was planned for early 2012. In order to meet the program schedule several 
significant design issues had to be resolved before SDVT and SAT could be 
accomplished. Solutions to these issues were identified prior to the installation but 
required procuring new materials and revising the installation drawings in order to allow 
prospective vendors to bid on the work. Daily meetings to track the status of material 
occurred between the program office, design agent and production agent. While this 
effort succeeded in obtaining the materials and getting them to the site a key 
consideration from a systems engineering and more importantly a SOS perspective is 
attempting to identify and resolve issues as early as possible. This may sound like 
common sense but a good heuristic is “Plan for the worst while praying for the best.” 
6. Cybersecurity 
Information Assurance, or more recently known as Cybersecurity, has increased 
in importance as DOD’s and the Navy’s reliance on networks has grown. Prior to SCSS 
threats of cyber-attacks were practically unknown. Today cyber-attacks and scans for 
network vulnerabilities occur constantly. The importance of protecting the components in 
a network such as CSRR or SWFTS or SUBLAN is a clearly understood requirement. 
The challenge faced here is the often arbitrary approach to address cybersecurity. By 
arbitrary it does not mean policies and rules are being ignored. More accurately it means 
the application of cybersecurity architecture approach at the systems level often conflicts 
with the architecture approach needed for a SOS due to the interpretation of the 
standards. For example applying security technical implementation guides (STIG) to 
individual systems is an appropriate approach if it is meant to operate in an isolated or 
standalone manner. Getting authorization to waive or modify cybersecurity applications 
is often complicated and time consuming. 
The transition from the defense information assurance certification and 
accreditation program (DIACAP) to the defense information assurance risk management 
framework (DIARMF) shown in Figure 31 represents an opportunity to design and 
implement more logical and effective approaches to IA and network defense. The 
DIARMF places more emphasis on managing the risk of a system getting penetrated vice 
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blindly following checklists which have little regard for the impact to the SOS. The 
approach a system follows using the DIARMF is the same approach the SOS IA engineer 
would follow.  
 




Sustainment of CSRR is challenging due to the heavy reliance on COTS by all of 
the POR systems including those components provided by the CSRR program. CSRR is 
not alone facing this challenge but the frequency of changes occurring to the other 
systems can have a unforeseen impact on the overall SOS if not assessed and possibly 
tested. The standard evolution of new technology is approximately 18 months. This is far 
faster than the typical defense acquisition program which might not have funding to 
begin design work for two years. Once funding is available it is unlikely a design will be 
completed in 18 months. Implementing the design in the current 24 month development 
period means at least one component that has reached end of life. Performing a six to 
eight year modernization cycle for all platforms means the systems have a large number 
of obsolete components within the first several installations.  
SWFTS encountered this issue with their tech insertion / advanced processor 
build (TI/APB) approach. Similar to CSRR each TI/APB delivers an integrated suite of 
capabilities for the combat systems. A TI/APB is released every two years with the TI 
providing the hardware updates and the APB all software updates. Each TI/APB is 
planned to modernize a certain number of platforms before moving onto the next 
upgrade. The challenge is a change of a modernization schedules creates the risk of 
allowing a system to exceed its planned obsolescence and may have difficulties obtaining 
repair parts.  
CSRR faced the same challenge when developing V3. The length of time between 
the initial design of the first platform in 2009 to completing the design of the last class in 
2014 resulted in a number of obsolescence issues which in turn forced a number of 
design changes. The timing of the issue can impact the ability to sustain the systems out 
there while introducing new challenges. One solution may be to perform a lifetime buy to 
provide enough spares in inventory until a new solution is identified and deploys. 
Another is working the users to move the component from one platform to another to 




introducing smaller but more frequent changes vice over a longer period with larger 
changes. In either the case the SOS engineer must still assess the impacts these changes 
will have on the overall SOS architecture.  
This problem is not unique to CSRR or any of the related systems. The challenge 
to the systems engineer is finding a suitable replacement. The challenge to SOS engineers 
is minimizing the impacts these changes induce in the overall SOS. The upgrading of a 
local software application on one system may degrade or disable remote operations 
located in another system. One recommendation to mitigate this is to provide loose 
coupling within the SOS but the extent to which loose coupling can be applied varies 
from system to system within the whole SOS (Director, Systems and Software 
Engineering 2008, 23).  
I. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
At this point the following can be summarized from the research into the 
background of CSRR and system of systems engineering.  
1. What is Common Submarine Radio Room and what Characteristics 
Classify it as a System of Systems? 
Common Submarine Radio Room is an open architecture system of systems 
developed to support the submarine force communication requirements. This question 
determined if CSRR was a SOS justifying a case study analysis. If so, then what 
characteristics from the available literature regarding SOS would apply. The program 
documentation describes CSRR as a SOS but did not elaborate on specific characteristics. 
Vaneman (2013, 13) applies a “litmus test” to determine the applicability of a SOS. 
These consider if the individual systems “(1) Can operate independently from the SOS. 
(2) Have life-cycles that are individually managed. (3) Come together to achieve a 
capability that is unrealized by a single system alone” (Vaneman 2013, 13). Using this as 
a litmus test for CSRR the following is identified in answering the previous questions. 
Additional characteristics are listed in Table 19. 
(1) Can the individual systems operate independently from the SOS? Each of the 
systems within CSRR is an individual POR which had to provide an operational view 
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identifying their role in the overall architecture. NMT is one example which has been 
installed on SCSS platforms and can operate independently of the CSRR SOS. 
(2) Is the life cycle of each system individually managed? Each system such as 
ADNS, RFDACS and NMT within CSRR has their own life cycle management. 
Collective assessments are done with each version to determine the SOS impacts when 
changes are made.  
(3) Do the systems come together to achieve a capability that is unrealized by the 
single system alone? Each individual is capable of providing a certain level of capability 
by itself. Prior to installing RFDACS antenna switching functions were performed using 
manual patch panels. Integrating RFDACs with the available radios and antennas 
provides automation and simultaneity capabilities that did not exist previously. NMT can 
be a standalone system but can provide asymmetric capabilities when paired with UHF 
and network systems. 
Jamshidi (2009) identified the characteristics describing a SOS listed below in 
Figure 32 and Table 20. Resilience can be further classified examining the attributes of 
capacity, flexibility, tolerance, and cohesion which are supported by 14 principles 
(Jackson and Ferris 2012, 155). These characteristics were compared against CSRR to 
determine where it compared. The type of SOS is derived from the System Engineers 
Guide for Systems of Systems (Director, Systems and Software Engineering 2008). 
Governance is addressed using the information provided from the Naval Postgraduate 
School System of Systems Engineering and Integration course (Vaneman, 2013). These 
criteria were used to examine CSRR and determine if these characteristics can be used to 
describe it as a SOS.  
Governance is addressed in more detail since this is of particular interest to many 
systems engineers and program managers. Governance is defined as “the organization, 
set of rules, policies, and decision-making criteria that will guide a System of Systems 
(SOS) to achieving its goals and objectives” (Vaneman 2013, 6). The characteristics 
listed in the center of Figure 32 and described in Table 21 define the two extremes of 
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defining a SOS. Governance of a SOS has four criteria defined in Table 21 which must 
be considered in order to determine if there is effective management.  
 



















Table 20.   System of Systems Characteristics and Applicability to Common 
Submarine Radio Room (after Jamshidi 2009) 
SOS 
Characteristics  
Description Applicability to CSRR 






Ad hoc, virtual, acknowledged and 
directed 
CSRR is considered an 
acknowledged SOS since 
there is an assigned 
manager, funding and 
resources but must 
collaborate with other 






The evolution of a SOS can select or 
eliminate system configurations 
independently of the presence of other 
configurations” as long as the 
configurations are not subsequent 
system states 
CSRR has demonstrated 
evolutionary characteristics 
as new technology is 
incorporated. Each change 
to add or remove a system 
has been assessed to 






Operational independence signifies that 
subsystems of an SOS are independent 
and useful in their own right.  
Managerial independence 
signifies that a system both is able to 
operate independently and actually is 
operating independently. 
Operational independence is 
reflective of the systems 
comprising CSRR. They are 
independent from a funding 




Heterogeneity is a strong driver of 
system complexity. A system is often 
heterogeneous on multiple layers 
simultaneously (e.g., size, architecture, 
life cycle, scientific area, and 
elementary dynamics) 
CSRR can be considered 
heterogeneous since it is 
composed of a variety of 
systems to provide 








The unexpected appearance of new 
properties in the course of development, 
evaluation, and operations  
Two types: weak and strong. 
Weak emergence can be foreseen 
through experience or modeling and 
simulation. 
Strong emergence is indeterminate 
Weak emergence is 
addressed through the 
CSRR development 
approach and experiences 





Traditional SOS are often designed 
with multiple redundant high-level 
subsystems; i.e., a functional 
requirement is satisfied by multiple 
CSRR demonstrates Type I 
qualities through the use of 
multiple communications 




Description Applicability to CSRR 
design parameters. 
Type I have redundancy 





The ability to make independent 
choices or conform to a higher standard  
Two key aspects of system autonomy 
that must be preserved: technical 
autonomy and operational autonomy. 
Each of the systems 
comprising CSRR have 
their own technical and 
programmatic requirements 





Diversity of needs and environmental 
diversity 
Can be Homogeneous or 
Heterogeneous 
Each system in CSRR 
provides a capability but 
there is a large amount of 




The use of existing systems to create 
SOS solutions introduces unavoidable 
complexities, both in terms of 
constraints and consequences 
CSRR has to deal with a 
number of technical, 











Net centricity is relevant to all SOS 
within DOD 
Is the connectivity more platform 
centric or network centric 
CSRR was designed to 
support net centric 





To be a member of a group or to have 
qualifications  
This can be centralized or decentralized 
An acknowledge system 
can choose which systems 
to include or not. CSRR has 
a formal relationship with 





Is connectivity more platform centric or 
network centric 
CSRR is designed to 
support the submarine force 
but the principles could be 





The ability to adapt to changing 
conditions and prepare for, withstand, 
and rapidly recover from disruption 
CSRR as a SOS 
incorporates a design 
capable of preparing for 
disruptions and if disrupted 
can recover within the 
required criteria 




Description Applicability to CSRR 
(Vaneman and 
Jaskot 2013) 
and decision making criteria that guide 
a SOS to achieve its goals and 
objectives  
through program policy and 
guidance. 
Table 21.   Governance Criteria (from Vaneman 2013) 










environment must be 
understood to develop 
effective governance. 
To be successful, governance must be 










needed in the governance 
strategy 
Virtual- SOS participants not included in 
the decisions of suggested changes. 
Directed- High degree of participation, 




How transparent are the 
governance decisions, 
and how is enforcement 
managed within the SOS 
Virtual- Most stakeholders do not care 
as long as they can achieve their 
missions and goals. 
Directed- Governance strategy is 









of the SOS 
Virtual- Used for their own purposes. 
Should favor independence and 
decentralization. Difficult to predict or 
measure effectiveness. 
Directed- Designed to work together 
toward a common objective. 
Effectiveness and interoperability should 
focus on engineered effectiveness 





Based on the characteristics, CSRR can be classified as an acknowledged SOS. 
An acknowledged SOS has recognized objectives, a designated manager, and resources 
assigned. The individual systems are managed separately in terms of ownership, funding, 
and sustainment. System changes are primarily managed by the parent program but are 
closely collaborated with the CSRR program. Many programs within DOD can be 
considered acknowledged SOS since they started out as a standalone or stovepipe system 
and over time were integrated to create or deliver capabilities needed by the user. 
2. What are the Benefits and Challenges of Developing, Designing, 
Producing, Deploying, and Sustaining Common Submarine Radio 
Room as a System of Systems? 
Prior to CSRR the typical approach to deliver a capability occurred in stovepipe 
fashion. Stovepipe systems provide all of the components within the overall program. 
The disadvantage of this approach is costs can be prohibitive, logistics can be very 
complex and prone to proprietary issues and performance may be limited to a very small 
set of requirements. For a submarine space and weight are critical considerations when 
determining what systems are needed. In the late 1990s the emphasis on COTS drove 
many programs to provide their own controller for their system, normally in the form of a 
laptop or desktop workstation. The space limitations in the submarine radio room 
immediately identified a need for establishing some means of centrally controlling all of 
the systems. The Trident IRR provided a central control capability but used a proprietary 
architecture. Additionally the following comment provides more insight into IRR 
IRR was actually the first real implementation of an integrated submarine 
communications system, although not really a SOS. While well-designed 
with excellent reliability, necessary modernization became cost 
prohibitive. In the days of shrinking budgets, dedicated interface protocols 
and bus-based systems have become unaffordable (Darlene Sullivan 2014, 
response to questionnaire) 
As SCSS was deployed in response to the IMCS MNS, it served as the precursor 
for CSRR. The following quote captures some of the differences between SCSS and 
CSRR. 
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SCSS was the first government integrated submarine communication 
system. The most significant architectural difference between SCSS and 
CSRR is the use of baseband switching. The miniaturization of crypto and 
the implementation of network interfaces obviated the need for baseband 
switching and removed throughput limitations. Additionally, the 
Integrated Network Manager (INM) in the SCSS controlled primarily the 
baseband switch (not the whole room), and changes to the baseband 
switch could be made easily, with updates to a database vs the INM 
software. However, these two technical differences both also have 
programmatic implications for modernization. The baseband switch 
allowed for a more well defined boundary and easier division of 
responsibility between PORs during the modernization phase. 
Additionally, software configuration updates for SCSS were mostly done 
with database changes; minimal software development was required. 
(Darlene Sullivan 2014 response to questionnaire) 
The SCSS enabled the operator to be more effective but the multitude of 
individual controllers degraded their ability to maintain situational awareness of the 
communications status. Delivering individual systems also created problems for 
configuration management and ILS. Since systems were delivered individually the 
combination of different configuration increased exponentially. Just modernizing four 
systems could result in potentially 16 different configurations to track. Of the 42 LA 
submarines there were essentially 42 different configurations. The changes may have 
been minor, but the lack of accurate ILS documentation, training, and technical support 
made design changes and sustainment more challenging.  
3. What Best Practices have been Identified and Implemented in the 
Common Submarine Radio Room Program and what Benefits have 
been realized in Terms of Cost, Performance, and Schedule? 
The Department of Defense has implemented a number of initiatives to improve 
efficiency, contain costs and deliver capability. A major goal of these initiatives included 
identifying effective means of measuring program success and progress. The ability to 
measure progress using lagging indicators is relatively easy to do since elapsed time and 
performance criteria can be measured. The drawback of this approach is changes to a 
system or SOS must be made after the design is complete and this can be costly.  
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In 2003 the Navy began implementing continuous process improvement 
initiatives using Lean Six Sigma (LSS) to eliminate waste and identify opportunities 
using leading indicators to determine system and program performance. About 2006 PEO 
C4I initiated a number of process improvement events to reduce the total ownership costs 
of acquiring new capability.  
In 2008 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed all services and activities in 
DOD to begin using LSS. SSC LANT production and the CSRR ISEA began using LSS 
to find efficiencies and took an additional step to obtain capability maturity model 
integration (CMMI) level three certification from the Software Engineering Institute as 
well as meeting International Standards Organization (ISO) 9000/9001 standards.  
Since 2008 the CSRR program completed six projects and SSC LANT another 15 
related to increasing quality and reliability, reducing cycle time, improving development 
first pass yields and achieve costs savings and avoidance. The CSRR LSS events 
performed sponsored by the program office are listed in Table 22 with the objective and 
the outcome. Several of these were directed at specific systems but the overall results 
provided benefits to CSRR as a SOS. Investigation of RFDACS and BRR-6 identified 
gaps affecting capability, logistics, and requirements definition. Another confirmed 
planning and executing installation as a package of capabilities could deliver cost and 
schedule benefits. Implementing continuing process improvement demonstrates it is a 
practice which both a systems and system of systems should attempt to achieve. Effective 
process improvement also identifies leading indicators and benchmarks to assess 
performance of the SE activities and the overall program (Oppenheim, Murman and 







Table 22.   Lean Six Sigma Projects Completed or in Progress 




Shorten the development 
cycle and identify the major 
activities 
Identified all of the activities required to 
create a CSRR version. Established the 
development timeline at 24 months and 
identified $60M in cost avoidance for 






Identify the root cause of 
RFDACS failures and 
develop solutions 
Isolated root causes of several problems. 
Developed groom procedures. Increased 
Ao to .97 and identified $10M cost 






testing performed during 
SDVT and SAT 
Identified $128K in savings through 





Identify root cause of poor 
buoy performance and 
develop potential solutions 
Identified 22 improvement 
recommendations for operating 
procedures, technical documentation, and 
operator and maintenance training. 
Developed a successful case to the CNO 
resource sponsor to fund improvements 







Capture the costs of 
executing consolidated SOS 
installations 
Validated consolidated installations are 
more effective. Identified $2.5M savings 







4. What Lessons Learned Can be Applied to Future Versions of 
Common Submarine Radio Room and Common Radio Room for 
Surface Combatants? 
Examination of the case studies, systems engineering, system of systems 
engineering and integration principles and acquisition policies identified where there 
have been successes and failures. Further understanding the history of how submarine 
communications has increased in complexity provided context in looking at how 
individual systems evolved into a SOS. These case studies were able to capture the 
lessons learned so they can be shared with others. Examining CSRR using the Friedman 
and Sage framework identified many of the learning principles noted in the case studies 
used in this research. Table 23 lists the learning principles identified from the information 
available regarding CSRR. The SOS principles identified would be applicable to other 
SOS regardless if they are a DOD or commercial entity.  
One important observation noted is the fact too many opportunities are allowed to 
pass where a case study would be of value. The lessons learned, learning principles, or 
teachable moments could be captured and shared with others. LSS and CMMI events 
provide an opportunity for improvement as well using a systematic process to capture 
data and information while accomplishing a goal. Maier and Rechtin (2009) highlights a 
number of heuristics which are applicable to systems and systems of systems. 
The learning principles identified in Table 23 from studying CSRR could be 
applied to any SOS. Several of these learning principles are related to one area and 
discussed in more detail below. These lessons can be shared with the current and future 
development of CSRR versions and are applicable to any system of systems. These 







Table 23.   CSRR Learning Principles 
 
 
1. Lesson One: Clearly Define the Requirements and Write the 
Requirements Clearly for the ENTIRE Life Cycle 
While CSRR is a system of systems and has an approved set of requirements 
these must be balanced against the constituent subsystems to ensure the requirements of 
both are met. Many conflicts arise due to the conflicting requirements between program 
in different program offices. This is not limited to just within the individual program 
offices but also concerns the interactions of programs managed in different program 
Integration approach The government acts as the integrator and program manager
A Requirements definition and 
management
Clearly define the requirements and write the requirements 
clearly for the ENTIRE life cycle
B Systems architecture 
development
Don’t begin building before the architecture has been defined 
(or don’t engineer just for the sake of engineering!)
C System/ subsystem design Design of an acknowledged system of systems must be shared 
to the maximum extent practicable. 
D Systems integration and 
interfaces
Maintain control of the system of systems at the interfaces 
from a physical, functional, and logical approach.
E Verification/ validation Design the test to test the design and trust but verify
F Deployment and post 
deployment
Keep your customer(s) in mind
G Life cycle support Account for all of the “ilities” when developing the system of
systems design
H Risk assessment and 
management
Expect the unexpected and embrace change. It’s inevitable
I System and program 
management
A. Go fast whenever possible, otherwise go slow
B. Perfect is the enemy of good enough
C. Be a trusted partner and build effective relationships
D. Most importantly create the most effective team possible and 
keep them engaged, motivated, and productive
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offices. Over 70 percent of a program’s cost is in the operations and sustainment phase. 
This can be partially mitigated if the requirements are clear and do not conflict. Clear 
requirements with some clearly established flexibility to allow for evolving systems and 
capabilities should be considered. System of systems are evolutionary and have no 
defined ending date. However there are still three criteria that should be met when 
developing or evaluating requirements: (1) They must be precise, (2) they must be 
verifiable, and (3) they must be traceable (Madni and Sievers, 2014, 43). While this 
applies to systems level it is even more important for the SOS engineer since many times 
the requirements for an acknowledged system can be fuzzy and unclear. Reframing them 
in context of the criteria above will improve the probability of successfully building the 
right capability. 
2. Lesson Two: Do Not Begin Building before the Architecture Has Been 
Defined (or Do Not Engineer Just for the Sake of Engineering!) 
An open systems architecture must provide as much flexibility as possible to the 
constituent programs while maintaining the integrity of the whole system of systems. 
However it must also be clearly defined. This has been proven painfully true on more 
than one occasion. The F-111, TBMCS and International Space Station demonstrated 
attempting to build something without fully understanding the requirements and 
specifications invariably lead to building the wrong item or delivering the wrong 
capability. The lead SOS engineer must lead the team to define the SOS architecture as 
completely as possible in order to create and deliver the capabilities needed. This period 
involves a lot of creative thinking and almost no bending metal or turning screws. Clearly 
defining the architecture will improve the odds of building the right capability. The 
following quote from Maier and Rechtin (2009, 176) “A system will develop and evolve 
much more rapidly if there are stable intermediate forms than if there are not” often 
proves true when working with what is known to be factual vice what is undefined. This 
might sound like a direct SOS is the correct approach but this applies to acknowledged 
SOS as well. 
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3. Lesson Three: Design of an Acknowledged System of Systems must be 
Shared to the Maximum Extent Practicable 
Common Submarine Radio Room displays many of the characteristics of an 
acknowledged system of systems. As a formal program CSRR engages with other 
programs to develop and deliver the set of capabilities needed by the submarine force. In 
order to be successful, open collaboration of information is paramount. Sharing 
information is a two-way activity. Constituent systems need information as well so they 
can attempt to meet the SOS requirements. Holding onto information and not sharing it 
undermines the integrity of the SOS and the ability to deliver the capability to the 
warfighter. 
4. Lesson Four: Maintain Control of the System of Systems at the 
Interfaces from a Physical, Functional, and Logical Approach 
One characteristic an acknowledged SOS must always consider is how much 
control should be exerted over the constituent systems and their interfaces. However, if 
there is no manager of the interfaces, then it is probably not an acknowledged SOS. A 
Direct SOS would have full and complete control over defining and directing what 
interface specifications must be followed. An acknowledged SOS does not control the 
other programs without agreements between the SOS and the constituent systems. CSRR 
attempts to maintain this relationship through constant engagement with the constituent 
programs. This includes working with new programs to ensure interoperability 
requirements are addressed, and determining the impact of changes to mature programs. 
If this is not possible, then it is incumbent for the SOS to assume this responsibility and 
share the information with the other programs.  
One specific aspect that must be considered is when the interfaces between 
systems or within a system as it moves from one configuration to the next. The key piece 
is managing the interfaces so changes within the individual systems will not perturb the 
other systems. Maier and Rechtin pointed out in The Art of Systems Architecting (2009), 
“The greatest leverage in system architecting is at the interfaces. The greatest dangers are 
also at the interfaces.” 
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5. Lesson Five: Go Fast Whenever Possible, Otherwise Go Slow 
Common Submarine Radio Room as a system of systems requires effective and 
collaborative governance to manage delivery and sustainment of capability. This is not a 
parable related to the tortoise and the hare but more accurately the heuristic “haste makes 
waste.” This normally occurs when event based and calendar based schedules conflict 
and artificial timelines are created. Few people like to admit they pad a schedule to allow 
for those moments when they cannot work on their project. Parkinsons law states “work 
expands so as to fill the time available for its completion” and the student syndrome is 
“2/3 of the work will be done in the last 1/3 of the time” (SPAWAR 2011; Goldratt 1997, 
114128). These relate to the first heuristic in there is always a normal tendency to 
address the crisis of the day and put off a task until it is close to or at a crisis stage. Then 
we make haste to get the project done in time to meet the deadline which is typically 
missed or the final product is incomplete. We see this occur almost everywhere we look. 
The problem is if the work is held off until the last moment the next heuristic from 
Murphy of “if anything can go wrong it will” kicks in. So the goal is to achieve as much 
progress as possible within the timeline that is allotted but do not expend energy to 
complete it too far in advance. When managing a SOS, there are many pieces which must 
be tracked. Maintaining a steady drumbeat with reasonable schedule expectations results 
in fewer crises and will keep the program development on track. 
6. Lesson Six: Account for All of the “ilities” when Developing the 
System of Systems Design 
Collaboration is key to ensuring the overall system of systems is supported for 
documentation, training and parts. When looking at the “ilities” (reliability, 
interoperability, maintainability, availability, usability) from an acknowledged SOS 
perspective the first issue that will be apparent is the different approaches each program 
followed to develop their system. The higher level intent was met but the result is 
different than another team. The primary focus for an SOS is interoperability. If the 
disparate systems cannot communicate with each other it’s just a collection of 
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components. The other ilities must be balanced to ensure the optimization of one system 
does not occur at the sub-optimization of the others.  
7. Lesson Seven: Design the Test to Test the Design, and Trust but 
Verify 
Focus the testing on changes made to the system of systems. When building a 
system or system of systems a means to perform verification and validation has to occur. 
One of the lessons from the TBMCS is the requirements were unclear which in turn 
prevented effective test planning. When creating a test for an SOS verify the 
requirements themselves are clearly stated and testable via one or more means. When 
creating an acknowledged SOS, additional derived requirements will frequently be 
identified. These need to be included in the testing process and verified. In many cases 
the ability to fully test the SOS would require too much time and resources. These 
requirements need to be articulated as possible risks and a plan for testing them following 
employment of the SOS capabilities.  
Common Submarine Radio Room has encountered this on several occasions when 
evaluating a system or component for integration into the SOS. The testing criteria were 
vaguely stated or established unrealistic conditions. One such example involved testing a 
system which required having four other platforms plus a shore station involved. The 
only problem is the system had not been fielded to the shore stations yet. This would be a 
valid SOS test but inappropriate for an individual system. 
8. Lesson Eight: Expect the Unexpected and Embrace Change. It is 
Inevitable 
Risks must be evaluated to determine if there is any potential for emergence. One 
of the SOS characteristics previously discussed was emergence. Emergence is really the 
unexpected occurring. If the changes to the SOS are well defined and documented the 
likelihood of emergence occurring should be low. Anticipating emergence may occur can 
provide the opportunity to identify alternate paths. CSRR has a relationship with a 
number of programs which are constantly modernizing their systems. Unless a close 
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relationship is maintained to keep abreast of their activities, the likelihood of emergence 
happening is high. Understanding there will always be change will minimize the amount 
of occasions to be surprised. 
9. Lesson Nine: Perfect is the Enemy of Good Enough 
This is one topic which causes much angst between acquisition and engineering 
teams. The acquisition team objective is to develop and procure a system which will meet 
the threshold requirements (a.k.a. the minimum standards). On the other hand, most 
engineering teams are driven to achieve the objective (a.k.a. possibly polishing a 
cannonball). Neither goal is wrong but all factors must be considered when designing and 
building a SOS. Unless it is a directed SOS, the lead engineer has no control over the 
individual systems requirements. If the POR is in development, opportunities exist to 
ensure the threshold and objective requirements are achievable. 
Programs in development today are attempting to achieve perfection by 
establishing the threshold and objective to the same value. From a SOS perspective, this 
becomes unachievable since the overall performance is dependent on the individual 
systems performance. Establishing a more realistic set of requirements for the POR and 
the SOS also increase the probability of building a capability that is good enough. 
General Patton made the following statement which sums this up clearly “A good plan 
violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.” (NDP 6 1995, 24) 
10. Lesson Ten: Be a Trusted Partner and Build Effective Relationships 
 One of the most important characteristics of an effective lead systems or system 
of systems engineer is not the fact he can describe the technical specifications in detail. It 
is the ability to work with teams from the individual PORs in order to create consensus 
on a common goal. This is not a skill limited to systems engineering. The effective lead 
engineer will be able to understand the overall SOS goals and objectives and frame them 




and Rechtin (2009) stated, “If a system requires voluntary collaboration, the mechanism 
and incentives for that collaboration must be designed in.” From an SOS point of view 
this becomes critically relevant. 
11. Lesson Eleven: Keep your Customer(s) in Mind 
The system of systems must be able to collect performance data to determine 
what changes should occur to support the mission system of systems. A frequent problem 
seen in many SOS is the great deal of complexity built into the constituent systems. This 
may be okay if the planned operator is an engineer or a technician but presents potential 
problems when the operator is given a minimum amount of training. Whether it is a 
system or a SOS, it must be operable by an operator who has been given an appropriate 
level of training. For example, many of the CSRR technical manuals covered all of the 
systems within CSRR but did not cover the interfaces to the antennas. Conversely, the 
antenna technical manuals covered the antennas but did not cover the interfaces to CSRR, 
creating a gap where no documentation existed for the operator. When looking at the 
SOS from the user’s perspective, it is advantageous to have a CONOPS which describes 
how the SOS will be operated and maintained. Collecting SOS performance data from the 
users can be used to develop improvements and address deficiencies. 
12. Lesson Twelve: Most Importantly Create the Most Effective Team 
Possible and Keep Them Engaged, Motivated and Productive 
Regardless, if this is an engineering or management or academic issue, if there are 
no people on the team, nothing will get done. CSRR has had the advantage of recruiting 
and retaining a large number of talented engineers, technicians, testers, logistics and 
program management personnel. Creating synergy within the teams keeps them focused 
on the immediate problems while not ignoring the longer term issues and goals. The 
International Space Station case study pointed out maintaining a competent and 
experienced staff for over 20 years is a challenge. Getting the teams to get engaged and 
remain engaged can be a challenge especially when circumstances prevent scheduling 
face to face events. One issue noted during the development of CSRR V3 is the lack of 
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many of face to face meetings due to the federal budget challenges prevented a lot of 
interpersonal engagement which occurs when teams are together. When working with 
multiple systems the ability to engage and remain engaged is one of the key components 
to successfully managing a SOS program. 
There is one last piece of this question which still needs to be answered in terms 
of the scope of this case study looking out beyond CSRR V3. The most recent acquisition 
program baseline (APB) (PMW770 2011a) extended the CSRR program out to FY 2030. 
Unlike a system which may have a defined modernization plan and requirements which 
are fairly static, a SOS is tied to the plans of the individual systems. A directed or 
collaborative SOS may require less negotiation due to their nature but acknowledged 
SOS will always be in a series of negotiations to assure changes within one program do 
not break a capability in another. Too often this is not identified until it is delivered to the 
end user. Common Submarine Radio Room has a large role in maintaining effective and 
open communications with other systems. Over time, this changes as people, policies and 
technology come and go. The version approach is planned to remain in place but will 
continue to evolve as well to meet the needs of the stakeholders. The Ohio SSBN 
replacement will deploy some version of CSRR, whether it is the one envisioned today 
remains to be seen. For the other domains considering using the CSRR model they have 
much to consider in order to define the architecture which supports their platforms and 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
INVESTIGATION 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The C4I capabilities of the submarine force have evolved greatly over the last 
century. Expanding use of the RF spectrum and introduction of new technologies led to 
fielding systems of increasing complexity. As these systems were integrated into larger 
systems and systems of systems new capabilities emerged. The challenges experienced 
by DOD with the integration of these systems led to questions of ownership 
responsibilities of these new capabilities and how they should be managed. This in turn 
required defining a SOS and their characteristics. Depending on the type of SOS 
programmatic and systems engineering decisions are reached which may not be in the 
best interests of the SOS. Even today this is a major issue with many acknowledged SOS 
created within DOD having minimal oversight. Only recently has DOD recognized their 
acquisition approach must shift from an individual systems requirements mentality to a 
mission based mentality requiring a much more holistic examination of what is needed to 
achieve a given capability.  
Systems engineering and SOS engineering share many characteristics but the 
applications differ by their approach. A system will have clearly defined requirements 
and a defined life cycle. SOS requirements are more generalized and possess an 
evolutionary life cycle which changes but does not end. A system normally has a single 
program manager whereas depending on the type of SOS may not have one at all. Most 
SOS within DOD are considered acknowledged SOS. Policy guidance from OSD is 
providing the framework for developing and managing systems of systems. Acquisition 
and systems commands have in turn recognized many of their products can be classified 
as a SOS or are a constituent component of a system of systems. This can be seen in 
Figure 33 by looking at a system such as ADNS supporting a C4I system of systems in 
CSRR which in turn supports the combat systems SOS in SWFTS to the Virginia 




Figure 33.  Systems to System of Systems Management Perspectives (after 
Director, Systems and Software Engineering 2008, 12) 
The submarine force quickly recognized they needed to leverage the capability of 
these systems while bounding them with the limitations inherent for their platforms, 
specifically in terms of space, weight and power. The introduction of the Trident 
integrated radio room represented the first step toward employing a contractor furnished 
system of systems capability. The submarine communications support system took the 
next step by introducing automation and coordinated installation approaches. Common 
Submarine Radio Room is the culmination of these efforts while introducing open 
systems architecture designed to combine and leverage its constituent systems to deliver 
capabilities not possible in an individual manner. The approach for developing CSRR has 
evolved as well, moving from developing a specific increment version for each class to 
the point where a single version delivers a complete core capability capable of accounting 
for any unique platform characteristics. Clearly defining and balancing the requirements  
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of the constituent systems composing CSRR within the system of systems architecture 
means attempting to optimize one system over the others can be detrimental to the overall 
system of systems.  
 The development of case studies serves several purposes. Case studies provide 
opportunities to capture information about a particular event or system. The case studies 
may vary in their approach but the main result is identifying lessons learned or learning 
principles. NASA and the Air Force consider case studies to be a valuable means for 
capturing and sharing learning principles as explicit knowledge. The learning principles 
identified from the case studies confirmed CSRR would make a viable case study. The 
lack of available C4I case studies for other PEO C4I and SPAWAR systems reinforced 
the benefits of developing a case study involving systems managed within the CSRR 
program.  
This research examined the question if CSRR met the characteristics to be 
classified as a system of systems. The SOS characteristics furthered defined CSRR as an 
acknowledged SOS. As an acknowledged SOS CSRR have requirements, funding and 
management. These must be balanced with the other systems that make up the whole 
SOS. System changes are primarily managed by the parent program but are closely 
collaborated with the CSRR program to avoid or minimize degradation or disruption of 
capability. As a system of systems, CSRR provides redundancy in several ways. If a 
communications path is not available another can be selected. If there is a network 
failure, alternate means to reroute or restore network management exist. Additionally, an 
examination of submarine communications demonstrated the evolutions from individual 
stove pipe systems to fully integrated and interoperable SOS can deliver more capability 
than if each system were employed separately. The research identified CSRR was not a 
result of a Manhattan project approach but rather another step in the evolution of 
submarine communications. 
This case study confirmed systems engineering and system of systems 
engineering share similar qualities but are applied differently. The challenge lies in the 
SOS approach that is implemented. Most DOD SOS are considered acknowledged SOS 
due to each individual program maintaining its own program and funding responsibilities. 
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The net result is these systems create an iterative impact on other systems through 
introduction of new capabilities, phasing out old ones, changes to hardware or software, 
or changing operational planning. This increased emphasis on a SOS approach means a 
more holistic view is required when evaluating a new SOS or one that is already 
established. The guidance promulgated by Director, Systems and Software Engineering 
(2008) and the DASN (RDTE) 2013 draft provided a good starting point to begin 
implementing SOSE principles. Specifically the seven core elements a SOS engineer 
must be involved in encompass translating SOS capability objectives into SOS 
requirements to coordinating and monitoring changes to improve SOS performance 
(Director, Systems and Software Engineering 2008, 92). Another thought about the 
difference between systems engineering and SOS engineering is the level of complexity 
involved. A system can be decomposed into its discrete components. A radio can be 
decomposed to a power supply, amplifier, modulator and demodulator. A SOS considers 
the systems to be the discrete components. This changes the level of complexity the SOS 
engineer must consider when developing or changing a SOS. 
In summary, the effective application of SOS engineering principles can be 
applicable to a variety of SOSs. The challenge will be related to the type of SOS and if 
there is a clear vision of what the SOS must be able to do. If designing a hospital the 
considerations need to include such factors as the location, type of hospital, services to be 
offered, etc. The same approach can be taken to build a command and control system. Or 
they can be applied to build an afloat communications architecture similar to CSRR. Case 
studies provide a means to capture these lessons learned from others so it can be retained 
as explicit knowledge and shared with future engineers, technicians and managers. In the 
end the SOS engineer must learn from the experience of others and be capable of 
balancing the needs of the systems and the SOS. 
B. RECOMMENDED AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY 
The body of knowledge regarding systems of systems is beginning to expand as 
recognition just how closely systems are tied together to provide new capabilities. This 
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case study examined how CSRR met the criteria for a system of systems and the lessons 
gained from the program. The following areas could possibly merit further investigation. 
1. An examination to develop a case study of PEO SUBs approach to the 
development and sustainment of SWFTS would add to the knowledge 
base for the SOS community. 
2. What resources exist to train SOS engineers? A study was performed for 
systems engineers so a similar study can emphasize the differences of a 
system and a SOS. 
3. Investigate what leading indicators exist for measuring the performance of 
a SOS and how can they be utilized to provide a user insight to potential 
degradations. 
4. An examination of the SOS approach to the DOD cloud development 
projects 
5. An assessment of implementing a quality function deployment approach 
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